Western University

Scholarship@Western
Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository
5-25-2017 12:00 AM

Historical Institutionalism and the Politics of a Knowledge
Economy
Michael Dietrich, The University of Western Ontario
Supervisor: Dr Adam Harmes, The University of Western Ontario
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy degree
in Political Science
© Michael Dietrich 2017

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd

Recommended Citation
Dietrich, Michael, "Historical Institutionalism and the Politics of a Knowledge Economy" (2017). Electronic
Thesis and Dissertation Repository. 4583.
https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd/4583

This Dissertation/Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Western. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository by an authorized administrator of
Scholarship@Western. For more information, please contact wlswadmin@uwo.ca.

Historical Institutionalism and the Politics of a Knowledge Economy

Abstract
This dissertation examines the role that domestic institutions can play in the
implementation of international intellectual property rights standards. In doing so, it
argues that the path dependence of existing institutions can alter how international
standards are actually implemented on the ground. It further argues that this altering of
standards can create feedback effects that influence related state policies and the
international standards themselves. This argument adds to the IPE literature on the
creation of international intellectual property (IP) rights, which thus far, has tended to
focus primarily on international-level negotiations rather than national-level
implementation. It challenges the dominant 'market power' explanation that emphasizes
the role of economic power in setting international regulatory standards. It does so by
examining a critical case study of Canada and its implementation of trade-related
intellectual property standards. Canada is a critical case due to its high trade dependence
on the United States, which makes it 'least likely' to resist US market power. The
dissertation shows how Canada has managed its adoption of trade-related IP standards
through institutional layering and conversion strategies at various levels of
governance. The analysis argues for, and significantly supports, the value of historical
institutionalism in the study of international political economy.
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Chapter 1 - Introduction

Facing international competitive pressures, nations have increasingly turned to the
“knowledge economy” for new sources of wealth, prosperity and employment.
Enhancing intellectual property protection (IP) is often a key pillar of this effort. IP has
become a central component of multilateral trade agreements towards an increasingly
global set of standards. The Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) has
proved particularly successful in promoting US IP-related interests internationally
through trade agreements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
and by inserting Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Protection (TRIPS) into
the Uruguay Round of World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations (Sell 2003;
Tyfield 2008).
The emergence of the international intellectual property regime begs the research
question: are dominant theories of international political economy such as “market
power” sufficient to explain the design and implementation of international intellectual
property standards? This is an important question given IP’s clear distributional
implications and is a subset of a broader research question in international political
economy (IPE) that asks: which theories best explain international regulatory regimes? In
examining these questions, this dissertation adopts an historical institutionalist approach
which, in contrast to other theories of international relations, views international

2
regulatory regimes as historically cumulative and as arising out of domestic standards. It
argues that historical institutionalism is not in fact “bunk.”1
For example, a state-centric realist approach would argue that intellectual
property standards, like many international regimes, are created through US leadership.
Particularly important to the US’s effectiveness as a standard-maker is its market power
(Drezner 2007; 2010). Access to the US market acts as a strong incentive for other
standard-taker nations to adopt US-style IP standards when tied to trade treaties.
Neoliberal institutionalism also takes a state-centric approach but places greater emphasis
on the role of agency, coalition-building and issue linkage among states. Opening the
black box of the state, neopluralist and Gramscian approaches, in contrast, would
emphasize the role and power of US transnational corporations (TNCs) as well as
neoliberal ideas on property rights. Similarly, some liberal constructivists have looked to
the role of norm formation and socialization under power asymmetry as a source of
determinacy (Morin et al. 2011). Finally, some IPE scholars have argued that historical
institutionalism provides a useful set of tools to help understand how international
regimes are created. Specifically, historical institutionalism (HI) stresses the importance
of national characteristics, domestic institutional structures, and the sequencing of
regulatory capacity in explaining the establishment of international regimes (Farrell and
Newman 2010; Sell 2010).
While the creation of TRIPS and their associated IP standards have been studied
in the context of the US as a standard-maker, there is little agreement on theoretical

1

The question “Is Historical Institutionalism Bunk?” was raised by Drezner (2010) in response to
some early articulations of historical institutionalism in IPE.
2
Per North (1990), this study employs a broad and inclusive definition of institutions as “humanly
devised constraints that shape human interaction…Institutional change shapes the way societies evolve
through time and hence is key to understanding historical change” (3). For the purposes of greater breadth,

3
approaches and an acknowledged gap regarding the actual implementation of these
standards across specific national contexts (Drezner 2010, Matthews 2002; Sell 2010;
Alter and Meunier 2009). For example, Susan Sell notes that, “while many scholars have
analyzed how actors reach international agreements, we know far less about agreements’
implementation” and the “exact causal mechanisms through which policies are
communicated” (Sell 2010, 780). Reflecting this gap in the literature, the dissertation
examines the role that domestic institutions can play in the implementation of
international IP standards. In doing so, it argues that the path dependence of existing
institutions2 can alter how international standards are actually implemented on the
ground. It further argues that this altering of standards can also create feedback3 effects
that influence related state policies and the international standards themselves.
In other words, standard-maker countries do not unilaterally set international IP
standards. The process of standard creation does not end when the negotiating parties
sign an international agreement. By focusing on agreement implementation and the
evolution of standards over multiple agreements, this dissertation offers a new way of
thinking about standard setting. It is proposed that past experience with regulatory
2

Per North (1990), this study employs a broad and inclusive definition of institutions as “humanly
devised constraints that shape human interaction…Institutional change shapes the way societies evolve
through time and hence is key to understanding historical change” (3). For the purposes of greater breadth,
this quote excludes North’s discussion of incentives.
3
The concept of policy feedback is linked to institutional path dependence and has different uses
and definitions. Generally, this refers to the tendency of a political or institutional event, critical juncture,
or power structure to naturally reinforce itself over time. Thelen (1999) provides a few different
conceptions and notes “once a set of institutions is in place, actors adapt their strategies in ways that reflect
but also reinforce the ‘logic’ of the system” (Thelen 1999, 392). An alternative view posits that institutions
“reflect, and also reproduce and magnify, particular patterns of power distribution in politics” (Ibid, 394).
Pierson has explained policy feedback in similar terms: “when effect becomes cause,” when “polices create
politics,” or when “policies generate resources and incentives for political actors” (Pierson 1993). The
present analysis identifies different forms of feedback according to the level governance or institution
where it becomes apparent (i.e. regulatory, judicial, procurement, international relations). Feedback usually
involves a self-reinforcing impulse and can manifest in institutional layering and conversion strategies
(Thelen 2003). However, this institutional reproduction may act to repel or resist some other political force
or phenomenon. As such, a broad and inclusive conception of feedback is employed herein.
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standards and existing institutions can greatly impact negotiating positions, negotiated
outcomes and the implementation process. Implementation further shapes the real-world
regulatory effects of the regime.
To evaluate these points, the dissertation examines the case of Canada, a country
that has adopted US-style intellectual property norms under TRIPS and NAFTA.4 On the
surface, this case would appear to correspond to a market-power explanation for the
creation of intellectual property standards given Canada’s considerable dependence on
the US market and adoption of US-style IP rights. However, a pure market power
explanation is called into question when taking a closer look at TRIPS/NAFTA
implementation and related policies. Canada shows that domestic regulatory and legal
institutions are formed or existing institutions are converted to mitigate the local effects
of those international standards.

Background
The evolution of international intellectual property standards is perhaps one of the most
politically contentious areas of international regulation. Intellectual property protection
fundamentally alters a given distribution of wealth, creating benefits for technology
producers and owners, and creating costs for consumers of those technologies. Canada is
a somewhat reluctant participant in the international intellectual property regime and its
standards. Access to the US market was a powerful motivator for bringing Canada closer
4

While there are some differences regarding the provisions for patents between TRIPS and NAFTA,
these parallel agreements were part of the same US advocacy push and should be considered together.
Under Bill C-22 (1987) linked to the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement, Canada implemented 20 years of
patent protection in 1989 in advance of those standards being mandated under TRIPS. Key IP language
from a draft of TRIPS was directly reproduced into NAFTA’s IP- Chapter (Chapter 17). Bill C-91 (1992)
the Patent Amendment Act implemented NAFTA and TRIPS provisions jointly (Norton Rose 2012;
Douglas and Jutras 2008). These are treated herein as part of the same overarching group of extended
intellectual property protections.
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to US standards in the late 1980s and 1990s. This included the abolition of most
compulsory licensing, the extension of patent protection from 17 to 20 years,
implementation of a US-style patent linkage regulation, and the introduction of clinical
data protection for pharmaceuticals (Norton Rose 2012; Douglas and Jutras 2008).
Canadian institutions have acted to constrain the effects of these more protective
US-style standards. Canada’s introduction of US IP standards marked an important
divergence from historical practice that triggered a series of institutional responses. Some
responses were immediate including measures explicitly tied to domestic implementation
such as regulatory price controls. This was a deliberate policy offset attached as a
compromise to domestic interest groups and subnational governments. Other responses,
such as post-TRIPS case law, materialized over a longer time horizon following
implementation. In Canada’s case, the manner in which the standards were implemented
allowed considerable flexibility for subsequent interpretation. This set the stage for a
clash between international and domestic standards.
Canada’s uneasy relationship with intellectual property rights and knowledge
economy promotion reflects its historical industrial composition and output. By OECD
standards, Canada’s knowledge economy output is quite low.5,6 Canada has fared

5

As measured by Technology Balance of Payments: Receipts (TBP), Canada receives around $2.9
billion (2010) or approximately 0.19% of GDP. The US is the international leader for this metric at $113.1
billion (2011) or 0.73% of GDP (OECD 2013, 88, 103). Canada has considerable economic strength in
banking and resource sectors but its technology sectors have clearly lagged. Other comparators include the
UK $49 billion (2% of GDP); Sweden $29 billion (3.9% of GDP); Netherlands $39 billion (4.8% of GDP);
Italy $13.7 billion (0.63% of GDP); Spain $9.9 billion (0.67% of GDP); Switzerland $21.1 billion (3.2% of
GDP); and Finland $10.7 billion (4.1% of GDP).
6
This still nascent metric compiled by the OECD reflects an aggregation of a national economy’s
capacity to convert real-world economic value on those products subject to intellectual property protections
as measured by the flows received from technology and knowledge-based products. According to OECD
methodology, the Technology Balance of Payments “registers the commercial transactions related to
international technology transfers. It consists of money paid or received for the acquisition and use of
patents, licenses, trademarks, designs, know-how and closely related technical services (including technical
assistance) and for industrial R&D carried out abroad, etc.” OECD Technology Balance of Payments
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particularly poorly in attracting and incenting Business Enterprise Research and
Development (BERD). Between 2006 and 2011, BERD in all Canadian industrial sectors
declined 9% as compared to a 19% increase in the OECD (OECD 2013).7 These recent
declines have been skewed toward business sectors particularly impacted by new
technology and intellectual property protection.8 While the exact causes of Canada’s poor
research and development (R&D) investment performance have not been decisively
established, an entrenched “branch-plant” technological dependency is likely a factor
(Smardon 2014, 51). Regardless of historical factors, Canada’s IP regime is clearly not
producing investment results. This is framed by IP advocates as justification for a
modernization or strengthening of TRIPS-era standards, and framed by opponents of IP
as evidence of its policy failure.
There is an explicit desire on the part of policy makers to increase business
investment in the knowledge economy. However, IP protections are also scrutinized for
their cost implications. This is particularly the case for the pharmaceutical sector where
there is considerable contestation over IP standards and the perceived link to public
health care cost escalation.9,10 Canada’s tepid performance in the knowledge economy and

database, May 2013, as cited in: OECD, Main Science and Technology Indicators, 2013, 88; 103. All
figures in current US dollars. GDP figures calculated from World Bank GDP data, accessed September 14,
2014 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD
7
At current prices adjusting for purchasing power parity. In 2008, total Business Enterprise
Research and Development (BERD) spending in Canada was just 1 percent of GDP, well below the OECD
average of 1.6% placing it 18th among those 31 countries (Jenkins et al., 2012, 2-6).
8
A decline in pharmaceutical-sector BERD accounts for much of the total BERD decline.
According to OECD data, between 2006 and 2011 BERD conducted in the pharmaceutical industry
declined 43%. BERD performed in the pharmaceutical industry as a percentage of total BERD in Canada
declined 37%. Between these years, total BERD in Canada declined by $1.18 billion and pharmaceutical
industry BERD declined by $383 million, thus total pharmaceutical industry R&D decline as a percentage
of total Canadian BERD decline was 32% (OECD 2013). In other words, at least one third of Canada’s
most recent decline of business R&D investment could arguably be attributed to declines in one technology
sector. Author calculation based on OECD data.
9
For example, in order to secure provincial government support for the Comprehensive Economic
and Trade Agreement (CETA) with the EU, Canada’s federal government committed to compensate
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its historical aversion to intellectual property rights has seen the development of a strong
institutional response to the international IP regime, despite US pressure and market
power. Overtly, the basic provisions required to be TRIPS/NAFTA compliant have been
met including 20-years of patent protection and no routine compulsory licenses.
However, regulatory, judicial, and procurement institutional responses have acted to
shape and limit the IP regime’s real-world effects.11

Methodology
This dissertation employs process tracing under a critical or crucial case research design.
Critical case design is an approach that is logically structured to leverage a small number
of cases or a single critical case to examine a theory (Eckstein 1975; Levy 2008; Bennett
and Checkel 2015a). The incentives for Canada to acquiesce to US standards are clear
and self-evident. Fully 70.3%12 of Canada’s goods and services export market is

provinces for cost increases resulting from its arguably moderate expansion of intellectual property rights
for pharmaceuticals. “Should concessions to the EU in this area generate cost impacts on provincial and
territorial governments, the federal government is prepared to address these incremental cost impacts.”
Government of Canada, 2013 “Technical Summary of CETA Agreement in Principle,” accessed September
20 2014, http://www.actionplan.gc.ca/sites/default/files/pdfs/ceta-technicalsummary.pdf; See also, Federal
Trade Minister Fast and Chief CETA Negotiator Steve Verheul testimony, House of Commons, Standing
Committee on International Trade, November 7, 2013, accessed September 20, 2014,
http://www.parl.gc.ca/content/hoc/Committee/412/CIIT/Evidence/EV6293140/CIITEV04-E.PDF Back in
1987, the federal government had made a similar commitment to provinces offering them $100 million
over four years to offset potential costs to provincial drug plans. Minister Harvie Andre, Statements to
House Committee Study on Bill C-22, Tuesday, December 16, 1986, (1545).
10
This assurance was made following a joint provincial campaign opposing expanded intellectual
property protections as part of CETA and as a result of deep provincial involvement in negotiation rounds
and strategic planning (Standing Committee on International Trade 2014, 3); Heather Scoffield, “Provinces
Join forces to keep EU free-trade deal from upping drug costs” Globe and Mail, June 3, 2012.
11
Specifically, as discussed below, Canada was able to 1) implement a price control mechanism in
parallel with its trade-related intellectual property commitments; 2) implement uniquely Canadian patent
adjudication mechanisms; 3) preserve Canada-specific definitions of patentable utility at odds with
international regime language; 4) transform existing procurement mechanisms to constrain the impact of
increased patent protection for government insurance plans; and, 5) use the experience with NAFTA to
strengthen negotiating positions for subsequent trade and IP agreements.
12
Department of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Development, “Canada's State of Trade:
Trade and Investment Update 2011” accessed September 20, 2014,
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dependent on the US, which reflects a significant dependence for a small market of just
34 million people. Therefore, to the extent that Canada is strongly dependent on the US
economy, we would expect high incentives for Canada to adopt the US favored standards
when accompanied by any strong US pressure for reform. If Canada does not, or
significantly mitigates those standards as argued herein, then the market power
explanation would seem incomplete. Levy characterizes this analytical approach as
“Sinatra inference” or “If I can make it there, I’ll make it anywhere” (Levy 2008, 12).
The core advantage of critical cases is the extent to which a small n can have
asymmetrical inferential value in evaluating a hypothesis. Canada is used as a critical
case for the market power theory.
An alternate way of thinking about this is from the perspective of the opposite
hypothesis, that Canada as a standard-taker should be least likely to show strong
institutional path dependence. Levy (2008) describes the logic underpinning this
approach to critical cases:
If one’s theoretical priors suggest that a particular case is unlikely to be
consistent with a theory’s predictions—either because the theory’s
assumptions and scope conditions are not fully satisfied or because the
values of many of the theory’s key variables point in the other
direction—and if the data supports the theory, then the evidence from
the case provides a great deal of leverage for increasing our confidence
in the validity of the theory (Levy 2008, 12).
The expectation for Canada would be high compliance with the US-style protections and
that existing Canadian institutions and responsive policy feedbacks would not be
determinative of policy outcomes. If this expectation were disconfirmed than a marketpower explanation would be called into question. Similarly, this could lend support to an

http://www.international.gc.ca/economist-economiste/performance/statepoint/state_2011_point/2011_4.aspx?lang=eng.
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historical institutional hypothesis if path dependence, sequencing and feedbacks are
shown to play an important role where they would not be expected.
Within the critical case of Canada, the research design also leverages and traces
critical case policies that were most favorable to the US and thus should be most likely to
support the market power hypothesis. This “critical case, critical policy” approach applies
to intellectual property protection in general, and specifically to pharmaceutical patents,
where it is often assumed that Canada has essentially bowed to US pressure.13 The
approach is perhaps most apparent in Chapter 4 where US-style patent linkage policy is
shown to be implemented with surprising favorability to Canada.14

Case Selection
The choice of Canada under a critical case study design is appropriate for this research
question given the overwhelming and multidimensional dependence on the US with
respect to trade, industrial integration, defense, and technological production.

15

As

discussed, it was selected because it is most likely to support a market power hypothesis
and least likely to support an historical institutionalist hypothesis. We would not expect
13

See Senate Debates on Bill C-22, June 25, 1987, in particular Senator L. Norbert Theriault, (at
1404). Also, it should be noted that Canada has fairly high prescription drugs spending per capita that does
not make it an obvious first choice for an argument that domestic institutions constrain international patent
protection regime standards. This issue of the magnitude of Canadian institutional constraints is addressed
in Chapters 6 and 7. It is argued that Canadian market fragmentation and the private market portion of total
prescription drug spending accounts for much of this. Around half of prescription drug spending is on nonpatented drugs and middlemen mark-ups by the wholesale and pharmacy industries. The impacts of patent
protection on actual ex-factory drug costs are actually surprisingly constrained in Canada, particularly in
the highly scrutinized public market.
14
Additionally, a concise within-case comparison of Canadian public institutions versus the
Canadian private market is conducted in Chapter 6 to explore the significance and magnitude of public
institutional capacity.
15
As a small, open nation, Canada’s high reliance on access to the US market is a structural
political-economic feature that plays a role in many contemporary bilateral issues. These include: the
Keystone XL Pipeline; Beyond the Border initiative and the Regulatory Cooperation Council (RCC); US
“Buy America” procurement policy; the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiation; and indirectly, via
many foreign policy priorities where Canada often works strategically as a normative support to US policy
via participation in international coalitions.
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Canada to significantly mitigate the force and effect of international standards advanced
by its powerful trading partner.16
On this point of capacity and power asymmetry, Canada is more appropriate than
many alternatives. For example, the EU is the focus of some of the historical
institutionalism literature arguing that standard setting is a function of a system’s
attractiveness due to its “regulatory capacity” (Bach and Newman, 2010). However, the
EU is a major market and regulatory power and thus is an inherently less persuasive
alternative to Canada when arguing the importance of institutional over market power
factors. Canada is also more appropriate than some emerging economies such as China
given its growing power and increasing ability to project and protect its interests
independent of the US pressure. Furthermore, Canada’s considerable trade dependence is
highly relevant given that intellectual property regulation is now inseparably linked to
trade agreements.
The hypothesis is generated from explicit gaps in the IPE literature regarding
implementation17 and the failure of dominant theories in IPE to address issues beyond the
agreement of an international treaty. Levy and others note that selection bias in case
study research can be minimized “if scholars make a serious effort to test their
explanations against alternative interpretations…[by specifying] leading alternative
interpretations, the observable implications of each, and the evidence that would lead
them to accept or reject each explanation” (Levy 2008, 9; see also Bennett and Checkel

16

Furthermore, Canada traditionally had very weak intellectual property protection institutions and
this lack of a strong preexisting capacity does not predict strong policy feedbacks. This is because prior to
trade-related IP rights, Canada did not have an entrenched policy option to advance as an alternative to US
IP proposals. Following TRIPS implementation, some scholars have upheld Canada’s establishment price
control institutions as a model for emulation (Morin and Bourassa Forcier 2011, 202-5).
17
Discussed in Chapter 2 below.

11
2015a, 24). This dissertation provides such an analysis of alternatives with a particular,
but not exclusive, emphasis on market power. Despite market power expectations, the
practical reality gleaned through in-depth process tracing suggests that Canada’s
constellation of regulatory and legal institutions is resilient and act as a formidable source
of power. The implications for theory are that we cannot sacrifice accuracy for the
purposes of achieving parsimony on one theoretical approach. Multiple perspectives
including historical institutionalism are required to explain regime formation, domestic
implementation, and the evolution of standards over time.

Process Tracing
This dissertation traces the process of TRIPS and NAFTA implementation in Canada.
Process tracing is defined as “the use of evidence from within case studies to make
inferences about historical explanations” and was derived from cognitive decisionmaking approaches (Bennett and Checkel 2015a, 5). It has been applied in both
ideographic and structural-level analysis (Ibid). Process tracing involves “intensive
analysis of the development of a sequence of events over time, [and] is particularly wellsuited to the task of uncovering intervening causal mechanisms and exploring reciprocal
causation and endogeneity effects” (Levy 2008, 6). The technique has emerged as an
important tool in the arsenal of qualitative and multi-method researchers and is often used
productively in the empirical evaluation of critical case designs.
Process tracing has been proposed by the qualitative and multi-method revolution
in American political science as a methodological correction for the problem of
equifinality; the reality that there are often multiple causal paths to a given outcome
(Bennett and Checkel 2015, 19). One approach involves the exploration of necessary and
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sufficiency conditions. For example, market power may be a necessary condition for
regulatory bargaining leverage but it may not be a sufficient condition to induce change
(Farrell and Newman 2010, 614). Clearly to be routinely successful as a regime-maker,
market power is required, but it is a partial explanation to a partial question: one that
neglects domestic causes, domestic effects, and the resultant policy feedbacks that may
have a legacy effect on future outcomes.
Key figures in the emergence of the process tracing movement have insisted that it
must be practiced more systematically and with explicit attention to criteria for what
constitutes good process tracing (Bennett and Checkel 2015b, 260-1).18 Their criteria are
exacting and logically require the adoption of a meta-theoretical approach such as
scientific realism or its subset critical realism that is consistent with the possibility of
observable and unobservable causal mechanisms (Bennett and Checkel 2015a, 21
Jackson 2011, 76; Chernoff 2009, 388; see also Wendt 1999; Chernoff 2002).19
Furthermore, they caution that scholars must consider the broader “structural discursive
contexts” and probe alternative causal pathways to those central to the hypothesis
(Bennett and Checkel 2015a, 21).
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Bennett and Checkel (2015b) identify 10 “Essential Best Practices” for good process tracing
which are employed under a critical case design: “1. Cast the net widely for alternative explanations; 2. Be
equally tough on the alternative explanations; 3. Consider the potential biases of evidentiary sources; 4.
Take into account whether the case is most or least likely for alternative explanations; 5. Make a justifiable
decision on when to start; 6. Be relentless in gathering diverse and relevant evidence, but make a justifiable
decision on when to stop; 7. Combine process tracing with case comparisons when useful for the research
goal and feasible; 8. Be open to inductive insights; 9. Use deduction to ask ‘if my explanation is true, what
will be the specific process leading to the outcome?’; 10. Remember that conclusive process tracing is
good, but not all good process tracing is conclusive” (260-1).
19
Chernoff summarizes perhaps the dominant definition or approach derived from Wendt’s Social
Theory. Scientific realism is based on three core propositions: “First, the world is independent of the mind
and language of individual observers. Second, mature scientific theories typically refer to this external
world. And third, theories refer even when the entia to which they refer to are not directly observable. It is
important to remember that [scientific realism] is a very specific doctrine about science, its theories, and its
theoretical terms; it is not a general philosophical doctrine about the nature of knowledge or being”
(Chernoff 2002, 192).
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Given that the subject matter ultimately touches on many political and policy
areas, data gathering on this case is conducted using a wide range of primary and
secondary sources. Bennett and Checkel are instructive when recommending process
tracers to “be relentless in gathering diverse and relevant evidence” and using Bayesianinspired criteria and tests to contextualize the data (Bennett and Checkel 2015a, 27).
Primary data employed herein includes archival research; textual analysis of trade
negotiation documents; discourse analysis of case law and the language of judicial
decisions; analysis of data retrieved from commercial databases; unpublished public
statements made by policy makers; and, targeted interviews with officials. Considerable
secondary source material is also leveraged. Where useful, these data are interpreted
through the lens of Bayesian logical tests according to process tracing methodology. 20

Outline of Arguments and Chapters
By examining the implementation of international IP standards, this dissertation argues
that institutional path dependence impacts negotiating positions and negotiating
outcomes. Furthermore, the force and effect of the international standards are greatly
impacted by domestic implementation. Where there is freedom of interpretation, policy
choices will reflect historical realities. Market power arguments underrepresent the fact
that trade agreements and international regulatory regimes arise out of domestic
economic regulatory standards. They are historically cumulative in the sense that trade
agreements increasingly contain embedded domestic regulations and are modeled after

20

Logic tests include: hoop tests, smoking-gun tests, straw-in-the-wind tests, and doubly decisive
tests (Bennett and Checkel 2015a).
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past agreements. One set of standards arises from another.21 The pages that follow
leverage historical institutionalism to demonstrate several interrelated institutional
responses to the TRIPS/NAFTA regime. These feedbacks are not predicted by a market
power theory. Each chapter briefly identifies what would be expected under market
power then details how the perspective is falsified.
Chapter 2 provides a more detailed review of the relevant IPE literature. It argues
that the study helps to address current gaps with respect to intellectual property
protection, treaty implementation, and historical institutionalism in IPE. It explores
various theoretical alternatives and discusses the tension between market power and
historical institutionalism (HI). The chapter previews how the dissertation critiques
market power while addressing one of the key criticisms of HI. It argues that
“reinforcement” feedbacks are not the only empirical phenomenon that can support an HI
approach.22 When rooted in domestic policy feedbacks, policy resistance and repellence
also support the institutional perspective.
Chapter 3 considers regulatory feedbacks and the first chronological institution to
directly result from trade related intellectual property reform: the quasi-judicial Patented
Medicine Prices Review Board (PMPRB). Drawing on primary research and the policy
literature, the chapter details the mitigating role and impact that this institution plays in
Canada’s post-FTA pharmaceutical system as a unique price control mechanism
specifically for patented products. In the context of TRIPS/NAFTA negotiation and
implementation, it also shows how agreements tend to build on and accommodate
21

This proposition may seem obvious to trade negotiators who use the structure of past agreements
to organize negotiations around issue chapters and spend considerable effort liaising with domestic interest
groups regarding changes to domestic regulation. However, it is an idea that is under-reflected in IPE
scholarship.
22
See discussion below.
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existing institutions. The regulatory price control institution was formed in response to
trade related intellectual property reforms and then was leveraged, protected, and
strengthened as Canada’s trade policy evolved through TRIPS implementation.
Chapter 4 argues that regulatory feedbacks were also important as Canada
implemented US-style patent linkage provisions. Patent linkage is a key protection for IP
owners and ties the regulatory approval of a generic medicine to the patent status of its
reference brand (patented) medicine. Canada’s patent linkage system was based on
similar US provisions; however, these standards were only partially exported to Canada.
This policy was significantly shaped to reflect local institutional and political realities.
The chapter argues that Canada preserved domestic sovereignty by retaining flexibility to
limit and reduce IP protections in the future. Indeed, Canada continues to modify these
provisions as the international trade context evolves over time.
Chapter 5 considers judicial feedbacks and details the evolution of Canada’s case
law in the post-TRIPS era. Drawing on the legal literature and case-law discourse
analysis, this section identifies institutional responses on the part of Canada’s judicial
branch to constrain the breadth of and definition of patentable utility under the so-called
“promise utility doctrine.” This is a legal test derived from common law institutions to
invalidate patents granted by the Canadian Intellectual Property Office. The doctrine has
gradually evolved to attach a more onerous standard for the demonstration of patentable
utility in Canada, and thus produced international divergence on patentability outcomes.
The standard has had the effect of invalidating patents for many lucrative and potentially
lucrative products. It is a clear institutional response to companies pursuing advanced
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patenting strategies in the post-TRIPS era. This issue has become the central focus of the
USTR’s Canadian IP advocacy, yet Canada is shown to have resisted this pressure.23
Chapter 6 traces the emergence and assesses the impact of cost-constraining
procurement feedbacks that act to limit the number and price of patented technologies
funded by government. These technocratic procurement decision-making institutions
were adopted by subnational governments to help limit public exposure—but not private
market exposure—to the international IP regime (for a preview see Figure 6.7). This
institutional layering essentially narrowed the practical scope of the international
standards by screening out or creating conditions regarding public access to patented
technologies. Academic ideas and institutions were adopted by the state and converted to
provide cost-based technology assessment and decision making support. This has created
a model for international diffusion of similar mitigating regimes at the domestic level in
many countries. Canada was an international leader in this effort.24 Norms and
institutions diffused through international epistemic community cooperation and because
there existed an established set of useful tools, not due to market power. Market power
predicts that only large and powerful markets will determine regulatory standards,
however, this is shown to be an incomplete perspective. Standards diffuse internationally
through various mechanisms and for different reasons. HI layering and conversion is

23

This resistance calls the universality and practical effectiveness of Sell’s “naming and shaming”
or blacklist causal mechanism is called into some question (Sell 2010, 780). Naming and shaming is a term
that describes the mechanism of policy diffusion used by the US to encourage its trading partners to adopt
and enforce higher IP standards. Naming and shaming is not always effective in Canada’s case. Sell also
identifies the “technical assistance” causal mechanism that may be relevant for the diffusion of standards to
the developing world, but is less relevant for Canada.
24
The mechanisms of policy diffusion reflect a much less formal and centralized version of
international “best-practice” adoption where technocrats borrow select features from a “successful” system
and graft them on to their own institutional structure (Slaughter 2004, 3-4, 11, 34).

17
critical to explaining regulatory implementation outcomes. See Figure 6.1 for a graphical
overview of these arguments.
Throughout each chapter, the dissertation also shows relational feedbacks and
traces how TRIPS standards are advanced and referenced in second-generation trade
negotiations. Clear links are drawn between TRIPS implementation, Canadian
institutional policy feedbacks, and the next generation of trade-related IP regulations
whose IP measures are explicitly tied to TRIPS. For example, the Canada-EU
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) was significantly shaped by a
need to address legal issues created by NAFTA implementation. This history is important
to capture and document as part of longer-term cause and longer-term effect
relationships. Finally, Chapter 7 relates empirical process-tracing insights back to theory
and concludes with some recommendations for further study.

Scholarly Contribution
The central scholarly contribution of this work is to identify how historical
institutionalism matters even when overwhelming market-power dynamics are at play. It
critiques and supplements the limited universe of causal mechanisms identified in the
literature. As discussed above, it identifies and explains the significance of four distinct
varieties of policy feedback that may be helpful as a framework to evaluate the
implementation of other regimes and treaties. This work helps to address a key criticism
of historical institutionalism identified in the literature relating to the concept of
“repellence.” Repellence results when “actors respond to extant regulation by building up
their own technical and institutional capabilities in order to develop a viable alternative to
the hegemonic rules of the game” (Drezner 2010, 795). Critics of HI challenge the
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temporal sequencing of institutional capacity by pointing to the possibility and existence
of repellence institutions (Ibid, 796). Here the argument is that path dependence would
seem to predict that weaker regulatory actors will adopt and reinforce pre-existing
standards: once the international regulatory die is cast it is difficult to transcend. The
possibility of resistance and repellence strategies undermines this parsimony and the
temporal distribution of regulatory and technical capacity is thus less significant.
To the contrary, this dissertation shows that the existence of resistance and
“repellence”25 can actually lend considerable support to an HI approach when the analysis
is powered to do so.26 When domestic institutions for a very small and dependent country
such as Canada can resist and repel the standards of a dominant actor and even shape key
elements of the international standard, then the case for historical institutionalism is much
more powerful. Repellence and resistance do not undermine the causal power of path
dependence and sequencing when those responses are rooted in past domestic policy
choices.
This

argument

leverages

novel

empirical

research

on

the

domestic

implementation of intellectual property (IP) standards and the various institutions that
mitigate the force of those international standards. The dissertation contributes new
insights and practitioner perspectives gained through extensive archival research and
interviews with officials. It presents a detailed historical chronology of negotiation and
implementation processes specific to IP. It is also unique in drawing together diverse
25

Here the term “repellence” is not used exclusively as an “alternative” to the international regime,
but rather as a mitigating institutional feedback that develops in parallel and acts to set the range of
practical outcomes.
26
The problem with the “sequencing of regulatory capacity” arguments to date typified by Ferrell
and Newman (2010) is they are based largely on the EU providing a successful regulatory alternative to the
US. The EU is itself a major market power and standard setter and thus a comparison with the US
inherently has less explanatory leverage.
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spheres of policy that are often treated discretely.27 Regulatory, judicial, procurement,
and relational policy feedbacks are examined herein as an integral part of the outcomes
produced by the international intellectual property regime.

Each is an essential part of

the IP regime’s distributional and normative outcome. Together they help to form a more
complete answer to the question of how international regulatory regimes are designed and
implemented.
Understanding the causal mechanics of Canada’s implementation, compliance, and
institutional response to international IP standards may have implications beyond this
isolated case28 and for other areas of international regulatory standard-making. If
institutional resistance and repellence are a fundamental part of international regulatory
regime-making, this will have implications for both the international standard setting
process as well as the prospects for successful rules-based cooperation in various areas of
governance. Furthermore, regulatory challenges increasingly seem to be global in nature.
It is thus important for IPE to pay more attention to the various ways in which global
regulatory efforts intersect and interact with established local regulatory institutions.

27

Inter-linkages are traced between trade diplomacy, domestic economic regulation, IP law, and
even heath care management. Each area is examined in considerable depth and practitioners across these
fields should find empirical contributions beyond the theoretical IPE structure that binds them together.
28
For example, despite considerably different institutional dynamics, China has adopted similar
tactics to narrow the scope of IP protection through patent invalidations that are proving to be a
considerable irritant in US-China relations compounding the perennial bilateral issue of IP enforcement.
Inside U.S. Trade. 2014. “Following JCCT Pledge, China Shifts Reason For Invalidating Drug Patents”
Inside U.S. Trade - 09/12/2014, Vol. 32, No. 36, Accessed September 11, 2014, http://insidetrade.com/.
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Chapter 2 - Theorizing the Establishment of International Intellectual Property
Rights Standards

The purpose of this chapter is to review the IPE literature on intellectual property (IP),
the international IP regime, and regime formation more generally. It explores in greater
depth the theoretical approach employed in the dissertation. It argues that there are three
main gaps in the existing literature. These gaps are: 1) the relative dearth of consideration
of intellectual property protection in core IPE debates despite its clear importance in
contemporary global and local politics; 2) the gap in the literature regarding international
trade and regulatory regimes where the regime’s negotiation is typically the focus, with
scant attention to domestic implementation; and 3) the gap in IPE, as compared to
comparative politics, with respect to historical institutionalism. HI is only starting to
attract more IR and IPE scholarship.

After surveying the literature and discussing

theoretical alternatives, historical institutionalism is argued to hold considerable promise
as a lens to further investigate the evolution of trade and IP regulatory standards.

IPE and Intellectual Property
While IP protection and the promotion of R&D are widely discussed in legal,
technocratic and economic policy literatures, these essential “knowledge-economy”
related topics are comparatively understudied from an international political economy
(IPE) perspective and are only beginning to be discussed in that literature. A search of top
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IPE journals29 for intellectual property, R&D, and related terms reveals that a small but
growing number of IPE scholars have specialized in IP-related issues.30
Even those who see the recent emergence of “global intellectual property politics”
as a distinct area of study acknowledge the foundational role played by legal experts in
shaping the trajectory of analysis. Recent scholarship has been framed either in binary
oppositional terms or inordinately focused on the “legal standard” as the dependent
variable with little attention to “preferences, behaviors, practices, principles or
worldviews related to IP” (Morin et al. 2011, 93). In other words, there is considerable
study of IP, but IPE perspectives and the “social processes that lay behind laws” are just
beginning to emerge (Haunss and Shadlen 2009, 2). Scholarship from non-IPE journals
such as Intellectual Property Journal, WIPO Journal, Journal of World Intellectual
Property, or International Journal of Intellectual Property Management has framed this
work along technical rather than political or systemic lines of inquiry.
Clearly there are many critical and normative perspectives on IP; however, these
perspectives have not generally played a role in major IPE debates. References seem ad
hoc with few clear and sustained research programs. This is surprising for a number of
reasons: the comparably high volume of work on IP in related disciplines of law and
29

Review of International Political Economy; International Organization; International Studies
Quarterly; Millennium; World Politics; Global Governance.
30
These include Susan Sell, Christopher May, Christian Zeller, David Tyfield, Jean-Frédéric Morin,
Kenneth Shadlen, Duncan Matthews and Viviana Munoz-Tellez, and a few others. IP is studied or cited as:
1) a rent-seeking instrument imposed on powerless nations by powerful ones (Sell 2003, Sell 2010; Zeller
2008); 2) the product of competition between global capital and global civil society or between industry
sectors (Sell and Prakash 2004); 3) a barrier to the poor accessing medicines under a consolidation of
international standards (Shadlen et al. 2011; Keohane 2011); 4) an ineffective departure from the historical
function of property rights (May 2010; Sell and May 2001; 2006); 5) an imperfect vehicle for policy
learning between advanced and developing economies (Matthews and Munoz-Tellez, 2006); 6) the
handmaiden of “financialization” under the monetarist revolution (Tyfield 2008); 7) the object of
academic-NGO resistance and cooperation (Morin 2014); and, 8) as a key competency of select
international organizations (IOs), namely the WTO and the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO), which scholars are interested in as empirical cases of international regime formation (Sell 2010;
Muzaka 2013a).
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economics; IP’s clear importance as a distributional policy, both domestically and
internationally; the occurrence of major real-world political contests over IP; the
centrality of IP to new sources of wealth and the knowledge economy; the increasing
importance of IP in trade negations and regimes; and, particularly the centrality of IP to
the trade diplomacy of major powers.
The most IPE-centric work has used IP and IP-intensive industrial sectors as
lenses for understanding the formation of international regulatory regimes focusing on
the multilateral Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Protection (TRIPS)
agreement. Notably, Susan Sell has employed an historical institutionalist approach to
identify the US domestic political sources of TRIPS. According to Sell, the consequences
of TRIPS include “profound and costly domestic institutional changes,” where
“international market regulation has increasingly penetrated domestic regulatory
environments in ways that compromise domestic political bargains” (Sell 2010, 735-6).
Sell is particularly focused on the domestic institutional sources of US policy: how IP
diplomacy became such a priority for the US and the coalitions that formed around a
powerful and IP-focused US Trade Representative.
While IP has traditionally been viewed as a fairly technical and legal subject, its
emergence as a major component of the global trade regime has caused a few IPE
scholars to take notice and examine its proliferation in greater detail. This scrutiny has
drawn out important issues related to social equity and North-South power dynamics.
However, the oppositional undercurrents informing this work seem to have produced a
fairly narrow set of identified causal dynamics related to policy diffusion that in some
ways may exaggerate the power of the US to monopolize policy outcomes. In actuality,
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there has been very little study of outcomes that are realized at the domestic institutional
level following international standard setting. There is clearly a need for more work on
the causal dynamics of the international IP regime, specifically, the mechanisms related
to regime implementation. The handful of edited volumes, books and articles on
implementation have considered overt political opposition and coalition building as a
source of resistance (Krikorian 2009); issues of asymmetrical political mobilization
(Shadlen 2009); and have focused almost exclusively on the developing world finding
considerable cross-national variations in outcomes (Deere 2009; Krikorian 2009; Shadlen
2009).
Other work has considered policy implementation prospectively and focused on
the outlook and strategy regarding the recent World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO) development agenda (De Beer 2009). In the first comprehensive political
examination of TRIPS implementation focusing on developing countries, Deere (2009)
identifies considerable cross-national variation of implementation outcomes. This
variation “defies parsimonious explanation” but seems to be rooted in intense and
complex post-TRIPS political contestation with differing technical capacity and TRIPS
negotiation experience playing a determinative role (Deere 2009, 2, 20-23). Thus even if
this is not explicitly an historical institutionalist account, it is one with considerable
institutional and sequencing undercurrents. More specificity on the role of historical
institutionalism and IP regime implementation could enhance and clarify these
provisional insights on implementation.
With respect to standard-maker to standard-taker diffusion, Sell identifies two
mechanisms: the “naming and shaming” or blacklisting mechanism employed by the
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USTR and the “technical assistance” mechanism that is a prominent feature of the WTO
TRIPS regime (Sell 2010, 782). The US Trade Representative uses the Special 301 list of
IP offender nations to “name and shame” other countries into compliance with its norms.
Alternatively, technical norms are injected directly into the policy regimes of less
developed countries via the WTO’s technical assistance programs.

This focus is

characteristic of the cursory work to date on the international IP regime. Scholars across
theoretical perspectives have typically focused on mechanisms of diffusion—from
standard-maker to standard-taker—and have not robustly explored potential feedback
mechanisms in the opposite direction. They have not sufficiently addressed the impact of
the standard-taker’s institutional history. As such, there is a gap in the IPE literature on
the extent and severity of domestic institutional changes, the impacts of institutional
layering, and importantly, any policy feedback in effect as a given set of international
standards evolves over time (see Thelen 2003, 233). This is particularly important as it
relates to a regime’s effectiveness in shaping domestic institutional structures, given that
a realist argument would suggest that existing institutions of the standard-taker should not
have much determinacy independent of power. However, implementation feedbacks can
powerfully shape the net impact of the regime and are relevant as standards evolve over
time.

Explaining International Intellectual Property Regulation
The IPE literature on the creation of international IP standards has focused almost
exclusively on the role of US power, corporate interests, and the formation of domestic
interest coalitions around the USTR (Sell 2010; 2003). This instrument of executivebranch power has driven the globalization of US norms (Ibid). Even where norm
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formation is framed as an act of socialization—an exercise of soft power or
attractiveness—a hegemonic US is framed as a primary driver (Morin et al. 2011, 95).
Undergirding many of these accounts are implicit assumptions regarding business
interests, associations and lobbyists and their influence within the US political system.
The key determinant of the international IP standards and enforcement regime is
framed by Sell (2009) as the result of an asymmetrical “Cat and Mouse” power
competition between pro-IP business groups (the Cat) and anti-IP civil society groups
(the Mice), who respectively promote or resist American IP policy (Sell 2009). The idea
that the Cat shops for fora to articulate and enforce its interest helps to paint a disjointed
and somewhat ad hoc picture of the sources of international standards. Putting aside the
predatory and power asymmetry assumptions inherent in the metaphor, the very existence
of international IP standards suggests that the Cat has won or is winning the international
contest. More fundamentally, the analytical focus on standard-maker forum shopping
itself would tend to undermine the general argument that institutions can matter and be
determinative of outcomes. If the institution is simply a transient venue for interest
articulation between competitors who are unequally endowed with power, then
institutions and institutional development over time cannot really be attributed
meaningful roles. However, the study of comparative and American politics suggests
that institutions do matter. They are tenacious and have an impact on many different
political outcomes. So unless institutions only matter at a domestic level, then some
reconciliation of power and institutions at the international level is warranted. As argued
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herein, domestic institutions and politics can also have impact at the international level
(see also Katzenstein 1978, 4, 5, 11; Evans et al. 1993).31
There are a fairly limited number of causal mechanisms identified in the literature
that help to explain international intellectual property rights and the diffusion of
international regulatory standards. There is also a lack of precision about what matters.
Rejecting strict rational choice and liberal efficiency-based approaches, Sell weaves a
complex tapestry of structural factors such as the global ‘march of capitalism’ with agentcentric arguments such as lobby groups optimally organized to exploit national politics
(Sell 2003, 4-6). US institutions are framed by Sell as the fabric that stitches these
structural and agent-based accounts together in that structures and agents mutually
influence institutions, both shaping and being shaped by them (Ibid, 7). The structureagent-institution complex is a difficult one to unpack and leaves the observer wondering
if everything really matters (international power structures, capitalism, individual agents,
coalitions of agents, US state power, US corporate power, institutions, history, culture)
all at once? The legacy of the agent-structure debate in international relations (IR) is to
highlight important meta-theoretical issues while criticizing ontological reductionism
(Wendt 1987, 342). But it also has contributed to a proliferation of causes rather than
providing clarity and precision on the sources of international IP standards.
Others scholars have argued that there are broader, problematic, discursive issues
at play and make a normative case for decoupling the concepts of competitiveness,
innovation, and IP rights (Muzaka 2014b, 838). But how these discursive and
socialization factors compare vis-à-vis power and market size is not always clear. For
31

Katzenstein (1978) argues that role of domestic ‘structures’ and domestic politics in international
political economy is higher during periods of hegemonic decline and that systematic analysis of domestic
structures is necessary to understand IPE (5,11).

27
example, does European Commission naming and shaming via the designation of those
‘priority countries’ infringing European IP really matter given the absence of actual
sanctions with the force of the EU market behind it (Muzaka 2013b, 837)? Consider a
hypothetical case where a domestic IP policy change occurs in a mid-sized power (State
A) following naming and shaming by both the EU and a smaller market (State B) that has
a closer trade relationship with State A than the EU. Without an accompanying theory of
market power, or a detailed account that traces clear causal mechanisms linking cause
and effect, we have no way of knowing the source of the policy change. It could be the
result of EU pressure, State B pressure, some other State A factor such as domestic
producer interests, or 30 years of normative socialization linking IP rights to innovation
and competitiveness.
There is an ongoing gap in the literature regarding the sources, and especially the
practical evolution, of the international IP system. It is clear that US power and the power
of corporate actors play important roles. But to gauge the extent of that role, it is
important to track the manifestations and competencies of US power and how it may
extend into the local politics and regulation of those nations who are subject to it. In other
words, how encompassing and effective is US power to achieve its IP objectives? It is
proposed that because power is inherently relational, we must look to other polities to
trace this and not look solely at co-constitution of policy agents and political structures in
the US political system (Sell 2010). For example, Sell looks at the co-constitution of the
USTR and the IP lobby and the mechanisms used to advance IP interests. However, she
does not robustly address the relational dynamic of standard-taker implementation
tactics.
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Some legal scholars have looked at the issue of international IP standards from a
holistic perspective where local realities and institutions are more comprehensively
accounted for as part of the outcome variable. While critical of US power and the
political influence of US industry, one research program has stopped well short of
exaggerating that power by looking closely at institutional resilience. Helfer and Alter
(2014) examine the Andean Tribunal of Justice (ATJ) a regional supranational judicial
body in western South America. Its docket has come to be dominated by pharmaceutical
intellectual property matters. The authors argue that despite struggling from many
political challenges, the Andean integration effort has emerged as an institutional forum
for actors to push back against US IP demands (Helfer and Alter, 2014, 256). The
problem with views privileging the role of global capital in setting international IP
standards is that they obfuscate these local sources of power and the very real
heterogeneity that results in the application of a given international agreement. Overdeterminism of power asymmetry precludes the possibility of resistance and repellence.
It is true that as an American-driven regime, TRIPS is skewed to towards
American interests and there is no denying the role of corporate power in the US political
system. Equally, however, it is important not to overstate the ubiquity of the international
regime and its capability to set foreign standards at the local level. Even the most
hardened critics of the US pharmaceutical industry argue that TRIPS by no means entails
the type of power and standards ubiquity that some Marxists and others simultaneously
overstate to make a normative case against increased IP protection:
TRIPS does not impose uniform law in any manner or shape. It
established barely harmonized international minimum standards of
protection that, in the absence of any Agreed Statement or official Acts,
WTO members continue to apply differently…The hard truth that Big
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Pharma cannot swallow is that U.S. patent law did not become global
law under TRIPS, and that the United States cannot prescribe universal
patent standards for the rest of the world any more than France could
prescribe uniform patent law in 1883 when the Paris Convention was
first adopted (Reichman, 2014, 3-4).
This is not to say that TRIPS is not the primary set of standards comprising the
international regime or a useful tool for US multinationals: it is both. The key point is
that an international intellectual property regime cannot be conceptualized as one
monolithic international agreement such as TRIPS but rather the practical intersection of
international and local institutional standards. US power is significant but has not enabled
the transcendence of local political and institutional realities. Rational, liberal, and
Marxist perspectives have yet to address the fact that different regulatory standards can
emerge from one international agreement due to various domestic institutional realities.
This lack of attention to domestic institutions produces somewhat distorted accounts of
international IP regulation and a clear gap in the literature.

Explaining Regime Creation and Regime Complexes
There is no shortage of consideration in IR and IPE on the topic of international regimes.
The study of regimes played a central role in international relations theory in the 1970s
and 1980s and has been revitalized more recently in the IPE literature on international
regulatory regimes and regime complexes. With a few notable exceptions in the area of
environmental regimes,32 the trend observed for IP regimes regarding a relative dearth of
implementation literature reflects a broader gap in the regime literature. Theorizing on
international regimes has evolved from its early and now familiar articulations, to be
dominated by the study of network analysis and inter-regime interaction effects of the
32

See below Rosendal 2001; Oberthür and Gehring 2011; Gomar et al. 2014; Raustiala 1997.
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burgeoning “regime complexes” literature (Young 1980; Krasner 1982; Raustiala and
Victor 2004; Alter and Meunier 2009; Orsini et al. 2013).33
Definitions of regimes typically employ the concept of “expectation convergence”
between parties, where predictability is seen as a precondition for successful cooperation.
Regimes are also treated as a subset or somewhat synonymously with international
“institutions.” Young defined regimes as such:
Regimes are social institutions governing the actions of those interested
in specifiable activities (or meaningful sets of activities). As such, they
are recognized patterns of practice around which expectations converge.
It follows that regimes are social structures. It is important not to
mistake them for functions, though the operation of regimes frequently
contributes to the fulfillment of certain functions (Young 1980, 332).
Here Young differentiates between an international issue regime and its functional
manifestation. The extent to which a regime is codified is another element given that
‘recognized patterns of practice’ could involve a formal agreement or simply be an
accepted social practice. This fairly broad definition may be applicable to general social
institutions such as “intellectual property” but would seem less useful for describing
when common rules are established to encourage predictable behavior and cooperation.
In an alternative definition that is widely cited, Krasner brings the state actor and
the mechanics of the regime into shaper relief: “sets of implicit or explicit principles,
norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge
in a given issue-area” (Krasner 1982, 186). Krasner’s articulation introduces concepts
that would endow those actors with normative ‘rights or obligations’ as well as behavior
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The term “complexity” is used herein, generally, in the context of a proliferation of regimes as an
independent variable, per Alter and Meunier (2009) on “The politics of international regime complexity.”
Conversely, the term “regime complex” is used more in its context as a dependent variable. For example,
per Keohane and Victor’s (2011) question of what explains the existence of “a loosely-coupled set of
specific regimes” in a given issue area.
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rules and specific mechanisms of cooperative decision-making. This is more consistent
with contemporary notions of trade regimes, enforcement provisions and specific rules
with respect to intellectual property protection or other regulatory standards.
Explanations for regimes have traditionally been grouped into four non-mutually
exclusive categories: Structural, game-theoretic, functional, and cognitive (Haggard and
Simmons 1987, 502). More contemporary debates in IPE have taken a slightly different
theoretical approach: reframing structuralism in terms of market power and the capacity
to compel (Drezner 2007); neoliberal institutionalism (Keohane and Nye 1977; Keohane
1984) which privileges the costs and benefits of cooperation under a rational actor model
and melds earlier functionalism and neofunctionalism (Haas 1964) with rational choice
(Olson 1965); constructivism (Ruggie 1982; Onuf 1989; Reus-Smit 1997; Wendt 1999)
which stresses norms and identities; and historical institutionalism, a framework which
stresses institutional processes, policy feedbacks and sequencing of regulatory capacity
development and leverages different theoretical perspectives (Farrell and Newman 2010).

Structuralism / Neorealism – The Supply Side
Like the work on the internationalization of US IP standards, the various explanations for
the emergence of regimes often focus on the centrality of a hegemon to facilitate
international agreement. Haggard and Simmons note that structural interpretations of
hegemony and hegemonic stability are “not always clear about what hegemons actually
do to promulgate and maintain a given set of rules” (Haggard and Simmons 1987, 502).
Neorealist accounts stress market size as a primary independent variable (Lütz 2011, iv).
Scholars have given greater weight and consideration to the incentives of regime-takers
by shifting focus from large international organizations (IOs) themselves to consider the
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specific regulatory functions that IOs perform including capital market regulation, trade
regulation, health and safety, intellectual property and other issues. However, the critical
role of the dominant market has largely been upheld, for example, when explaining the
process of regulatory innovation (Simmons 2001, 615).
One problem with purely structural or neorealist accounts of international
regulatory regimes is that it is not fully clear what will happen in multi-polar systems
where there may be competing standards from major market powers. Bilateral regulatory
cooperation can become extremely challenging even between close economic allies such
as the US and EU (Lütz 2011, iv, xv). Structural explanations also typically reject
domestic institutional sources of policy, neglect institutional factors impacting the ability
to leverage market power internationally, and neglect different paths of institutional
evolution (Bach and Newman 2010; Farrell and Newman 2010, 614).
There is compelling evidence in support of the argument that domestic regulatory
institutions and regulatory capacity34 help to shape international market regulations (Bach
and Newman 2010, 667) thus calling strictly structural accounts into question. To fully
understand the regime other factors may also be needed such as functional and technical
capacity—how well a given set of national standards achieves its objectives and how
replicable it may be in different national contexts. While regime supply and market
power cannot be fully dismissed, the “unfulfilled” challenge has been in finding room
between causal perspectives as part an integrative framework that can combine “insights
from different social-theoretical toolkits” (Checkel, 2015 75).
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Regulatory capacity is an umbrella term used by Bach and Newman (2010) to encompass
“regulatory expertise, the coherence of regulations, and the extent of the regulator’s sanction authority” for
example the “power to exclude from the domestic market” in situations of non-compliance (671).
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Neoliberal Institutionalism – The Demand Side
The regimes literature of the 1980s and 1990s was primarily interested in the core IR
question of whether cooperation is possible under international anarchy (Keohane and
Nye 1977; Krasner 1982; Keohane 1982; 1984). It focused on how cooperation can
emerge and how institutions may sustain cooperation in the event of hegemonic
withdrawal or decline (Keohane 1984, 49, 135, 245-7). An important component of this
was the role of international organizations (IOs) in setting international agendas and
providing the forum for coalition formation (Keohane and Nye 1977, chapter 2-3). There
are some important differences in the various strains of liberal and functionalist thinking
in IR35 and even disagreement on whether neoliberal regime theory is fundamentally
liberal. However, in general terms neoliberal institutionalism explains international
institutions as the product of a rational calculation of the costs and returns of
collaboration, where institutions help to facilitate cooperation (Moravcsik 1997, 536;
Greco 1988, 487).
Neoliberal institutionalists stress the importance of reducing transaction costs, but
as with earlier functional and neofunctional theories, suffer from the central explanatory
flaw that “they are better at specifying when regimes will be demanded rather than
suggesting how or when they will be supplied” (Haggard and Simmons 1987, 506).
Furthermore, neoliberal institutionalism provides no clear guidance on which issue areas
will be most likely to produce formal institutions (Ibid, 508). The core assumption is one
of efficiency where the institutional form is determined by relative costs or the friction
created by varying national regulatory approaches (Bach and Newman 2010, 670, 675).

35

See Greco (1988) for a detailed account and critique.
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Liberal institutionalism owes debts to both the functionalist literature but also to
neorealism in so far as it is a response to supply-side structuralism (i.e. hegemonic
stability theory) and is explicitly a demand-side correction to it (Keohane 1982, 326). In
examining the demand-side economics of regimes, the prospect for nuances between
regimes emerges based on their function: cooperative or simply “insurance” against
uncertainty. While there is an enormous diversity of regimes, they most typically aim to
provide predictability through behavior “controls” rather than in the capacity of providing
collective insurance against risk (Ibid, 351). These demand-side nuances may help to
explain some instances of cooperation but the natural impulse of rational actors is often to
shirk on responsibilities when there is latitude to do so. Thus, the image of cooperation
that emerges from the rational-choice informed liberal institutionalism literature is that it
is possible, difficult, and will only occur if transaction-cost friction can be substantially
reduced to make cooperation worthwhile.
Most regulatory regimes would likely fall into the category of control regimes.
The intellectual property regime is clearly an attempt to create property certainty for
innovators who produce intangible property. But from the perspective of non-IP
producing nations, it is not a mutual problem in search of an efficient solution, but rather
more closely resembles a rent-extracting apparatus. Given that only one party, the IP
producer, actually has demand for the regime, issue linkage is absolutely critical to the
regime’s existence. For example, IP is linked to trade which non-IP producers may have a
much higher demand for. As such, in the case of IP it is easy to see why there is often a
default to more structural accounts and those from various perspectives stressing US
hegemony: The hegemon is the party demanding IP and the existence of an IP regime
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suggests that its power was leveraged effectively. It is surprising, however, that many
critics of IP policy and even some liberal free-trade advocates are themselves surprised
by the insertion of TRIPS into the Uruguay Round, and neglect to recognize the inherent
quid pro quo. After all, trade negotiators often link and horse-trade market access in one
sector for trade barrier concessions in completely unrelated sectors. Negotiating positions
and concessions are contingent on many different domestic factors and priorities.
In many cases of international cooperation and regulatory harmonization, there
are empirically supported neoliberal/functional arguments to be made about parties
wanting to harmonize clashing standards and examples of regimes that facilitate
cooperation. The functional parsimony of neoliberalism, however, largely precludes
domestic sources of policy and neglects how local social preferences are translated into
international cooperative efforts. Reflecting on theoretical progress of the approach, its
proponents acknowledge that for “international relations theory to make really significant
progress it will need to go beyond institutional theory’s analysis of institutional strategies
to explain variation in state preferences” by building on domestic institutions theory or on
social construction (Keohane and Martin 2003, 96).
Some accounts have sought to differentiate a distinct liberal approach
emphasizing social preferences and state-society relations (Moravcsik 1997, 515). Such a
differentiation, however, cannot save liberal accounts from the criticism leveled by
constructivists that both neorealism and (neo)liberalism fail “to explain institutional
forms that endure shifts in the balance of power and [are] contradicted by the emergence
of different fundamental institutions under similar structural conditions” (Reus-Smit
1997, 556). This insight begs the analysis and evaluation of international institutions over
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a longer timeframe, which is the aim of many historical institutionalists (e.g. Pierson
2004). However, macro-social analysis of fundamental institutions such as property rights
is a much taller order than evaluating the emergence of a specific set of IP rules or
regimes that are closer to contemporary policy debates regarding international regulatory
cooperation. The liberal perspective could be subject to the same criticism leveled against
structuralists: many different organizational forms may emerge under the same
“constitutional structures” and “fundamental institutions”36 (as defined by Reus-Smit
1997). As such, a theory with closer connections to the policy-making process and
domestic policy institutions seems warranted.

Constructivism
Keohane and Martin’s (2003) call for domestic factors and social construction as the next
step in the evolution of institutional theory is in some ways advanced by Judith Kelly’s
2004 Ethnic Politics in Europe, which introduces analytical balance between rational
incentives and ideational norms. Checkel notes that Kelly was among the first to consider
domestic implementation dynamics with policy outcomes (Checkel 2015, 83). He argues
the central contribution of this constructivist work is to argue that international
organizations “matter” and “shape state behavior only when they work through the
domestic politics of particular countries” (Ibid). Probing domestic implementation
dynamics as a central component of policy outcomes is a primary objective of this
dissertation. While looking at a different policy area, the rational and constructivist causal
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As defined by Reus-Smit, fundamental institutions are “deeper institutional practices that structure
modern international society” such as contractual international law and multilateralism. “They are ‘generic’
structural elements of international societies” which transcend “changes in the balance of power and the
configuration of interests, even if their density and efficacy vary” (Reus-Smit 1997, 555).
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mechanisms uncovered by Kelly’s process tracing are highly symmetrical with Sell’s
(2010) naming and shaming mechanism for IP. These mechanisms do not necessarily
need to have strong associated sanctioning penalties to be an effective constrainer of
action. “Normative pressure” as the constructivist causal mechanism in Kelly’s account is
similar in that “external actors do not link any concrete incentives to behavior but rely
solely on the use of norms to persuade, shame, or praise actors into changing their
policies” (Kelly 2004, 8). While similar, it should be noted that Sell’s mechanism is
actually backed up with market power in the form of sanctions for those cases deemed by
the USTR to be particularly deviant from the codified norm.
The constructivist perspective on international institutions is more nuanced than
neoliberal cost-benefit explanations due to its focus on primary social institutions, state
identity, and the corresponding impact on institutional practices (Reus-Smit 1997, 563).
In the earlier regimes debate, constructivists depicted regime formation and evolution as
the “concrete manifestation of the internationalization of political authority” or the
willingness to submit to the cooperative systems (Ruggie 1982, 380). Under “embedded
liberalism”—the American-led post-war manifestation of liberalism distinct from earlier
laissez faire incarnations under Pax Britannica—the willingness to submit to the costs of
multilateral cooperation is facilitated by compromise: an accompanying flexibility to
mute its impacts through domestic Keynesian fiscal policy (Ruggie 1982, 393).
Following this specific account we might view the adoption of IP standards into
the existing trade regime as an example of “norm-governed change” or “adaptive
restorations of prior sets of norms” (Ruggie 1982, 384). This would entail an economic
liberalism that extends property rights to the domain of knowledge. Conversely, however,
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some argue that the internationalization of IP rights fundamentally alters domestic social
bargains (Sell 2010). As such, it could also be argued that the IP regime marks a
departure from the embedded liberal bargain. This would depend on the empirical
magnitude of the departure from embedded liberalism, for example, the extent of changes
to domestic policy required to comply with the international regime. This varies greatly
across space and time.
Similarly, the “constructivist institutionalism” thesis that identities can trump
material concerns in international decision-making is surely correct in certain situations
(Schimmelfennig 2003). Outcomes, however, will likely be contingent on the magnitude
of the costs and the centrality of identities. For IP, it might be argued that exceptions to
the regime such as the Global Access to Medicines Initiative are an example of norms
and identities trumping material considerations. For example, US enforcement of its
material interest (higher international drug prices) is trumped by norms of fairness,
progress in human health, and the US self-identity as a liberal society and a nonpredatory force for good in the world. Critics, however, will be quick to point out that
the power of this identity has its limits.
Constructivist work of the mid-1990s emphasized the role of socially constructed
knowledge and the causal role of norms, values and associated state identities in shaping
world politics (Finnemore 1996; Jepperson et. al 1996; Onuf 1989; Wendt 1999).
Finnemore shows that international institutions are socially constructed and that
international organizations including the United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the Red Cross, and the World Bank “socialize states
to accept new political goals and new values that have lasting impacts” on IPE and state
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structures (Finnemore 1996, 3). This is operationalized via moral principles (Red Cross),
persuasion (UNESCO), or coercion (World Bank) (Ibid, 22).

Where Finnemore’s

account is innovative in refocusing agency from the state to IOs and conceptualizing
norms as social structure, Checkel points out that her account is weak on domestic
politics, lacks clarity on the co-constitution of agent and structure, and does not explain
asymmetrical norm diffusion (Checkel 1998, 332).
To this critique it should be added that the creation of a domestic science policy
and bureaucracy—whether or not informed by global norms propagated by UNESCO—
presumably has only limited distributional and normative impact on the body politic and
state identity. A host of more central factors such as history and culture likely shapes this.
The rapid proliferation of science policy in many countries is interesting and intuitively
points to a structural cause as opposed to a domestic one. However, there are perhaps
other more interesting structural factors associated with this policy outcome, such as the
material and labour impacts of globalization and its normative discourse. It seems likely
that UNESCO’s ‘persuasion’ may have only been the most immediate catalyst for policy
change and other factors are also at play. Applied to intellectual property, the most
relevant comparator for the role of UNESCO in socialization is not an international
organization but a state actor, the USTR. The USTR was socialized to the desirability of
IP by the US corporate IP Lobby and jointly advances its argument frames (Sell and
Prakash 2004, 156). While the WTO has a bureaucracy, the US executive branch is the
central enforcer of TRIPS and proposes TRIPS modernization through regional trade
agreements.
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Part of the problem with constructivism is its intuitive success—of course norms
and identities matter just as material power matters in shaping political outcomes at
different levels. However, given that socialization and norm formation have many
sources and context-dependent impacts it is difficult to differentiate signal from noise.
For example, IP norms become entrenched due to USTR advocacy (Sell 2010). Sub-state
linkages such as between developing state leaders and IP legal experts drive the export of
US norms (Morin et al. 2011). There may also be socialization-counterweights from
academics and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) who now have new and
incredibly powerful norm-shaping communications tools in the Internet era (Morin
2014). In the global discursive competition the question often becomes: whose norms
(Sell and Prakash 2004)? In other words, to explain why some norm-makers are
influential and others are not, we must consider other potential factors such as material
power, entrenched institutions, or communication tactics.

Regime Complexes
The proliferation and frequent overlapping of regimes has recently led scholars to look at
regime interaction effects. The more intricate and interactional image of international
regimes in the regime complex literature considers the politicization of regime
implementation as one of several dependent variables explained by international regime
complexity (Alter and Meunier 2009, 16; Hafner-Burton 2009, 33, 35). Like the work on
IP, scholarship in the area of trade and human rights has stressed the heterogeneity and
specificity of domestic outcomes as well as the political jockeying that helps to explain
diverging outcomes though such mechanisms as forum shopping (Hafner-Burton 2009,
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36). Diverging domestic outcomes are explained not by local institutional experience but
in terms of international regime complexity.
These outside-in dynamics of regime complexity shaping the local range of
options and cross-national variation are apparently also relevant to intellectual property.
At times regime complexity provides domestic governments with room to maneuver, but
complexity also “provides opportunities for powerful states to narrow the options
available to weaker countries to implement intellectual property rules into their national
legal systems” (Helfer 2009, 42-43). In other words, regime complexity provides forum
shopping opportunities for both regime-maker and regime-taker. Intuitively, this
proliferation and complexity may favour powerful nations (Drezner 2009, 66). However,
this apt insight from Drezner is clearly aimed at transnational regime-setting capabilities.
It is likely true that great powers (and highly organized actors such as transnational
corporations) are in a better position to establish regimes, enforce rules and secure
favorable outcomes in the international market and its various fora. However, this view is
incomplete. What if a weaker power turns to its own domestic institutional apparatus as
the chosen “forum” to secure favorable outcomes? Here the great power may not have
significant expertise or proximity to rule-making, and may not fully appreciate
institutional dynamics required to secure the outcomes it is looking for. It is hard to
know the extent to which Helfer (2009) is correct regarding the ability of powerful
nations to limit the range of implementation options. There simply has not been enough
study of implementation outcomes and associated causal mechanisms.
The present analysis may help to fill the gap. Canada and other smaller powers
are not typically in a position to establish new international fora to provide an alternative
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to TRIPS or many other issue regimes. However, there are many institutional corrections
and feedbacks evident as part of the implementation process. By focusing increasingly on
international complexity across the spectrum of regimes, scholars may be missing local
complexity and the “implementation clash” between international standards and domestic
institutions.
There are a few examples of regime implementation that should be noted. For
environmental regimes, this is clearly an area of considerable concern. Scholars have
studied the successes and failures of countries to implement standards within the context
of overlapping international regimes and have identified implementation coordination as
a challenge (Gomar et al. 2014, 127; Rosendal 2001, 96; Oberthür and Gehring 2011,
27). An earlier generation of work on environmental regime implementation also showed
the impact of domestic politics and institutions and specifically the anticipation of a
regime’s impact as complicating factors to its success (Raustiala 1997, 482). Others have
identified variables such as stakeholder participation and the state of economic transition
as determinates of implementation (Victor et al 1998, 306, 312).
Scholars have also looked at standards compliance and non-compliance within the
Euro-zone as an example of ‘regime’ implementation focusing on the interaction of
enforcement and management strategies (Tallberg 2002, 624-5, 637). Excluding these
and perhaps a few other pockets of work, it is fair to say that the dominant discourses on
international trade and finance regimes have not been similarly scrutinized. The trade
regime complex literature has produced some interesting insights with respect to
enforcement and compliance, for example litigant forum shopping between dispute
settlement fora such as the WTO and NAFTA (Davis 2009, 28). However, domestic
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institutional responses are not robustly considered. Furthermore, there is no consensus on
the positive or negative impacts of regime proliferation.
Like Drezner, this analysis is somewhat skeptical of the causality of regime
complexity itself, independent of power and interests. However, diverging from Drezner,
this analysis adopts the perspective that regime complexity should not be considered
independent of institutional history. The regime complexity literature is largely agnostic
on this point. It overstates the causal power of international regime complexity and
understates domestic complexity and interests related to implementation. In highlighting
the prospect for institutional forum shopping, this work in some ways degrades the
essence and importance of domestic institutions and the associated political context from
which they arise. One idea is to introduce these factors into complexity analysis. “Nonregime” theory predicts that “historically embedded conceptions” of economic rights and
domestic politics prevent some economic regimes from emerging (Dimitrov et al. 2007,
253). It should follow that historically embedded conceptions of economic rights and
domestic politics also play some role in the maintenance of incumbent domestic
institutions.
Historical institutionalism needs to better account for the impacts of forum
shopping (Drezner 2010). However, it is equally true that those adhering to a regime
complexity hypothesis should consider institutional history as a significant influencer or
modifier of capacity and thus a potential indicator of where regime complexity will
matter, and where it will not. For example, while not examined herein, it is plausible that
international regime complexity will be less significant when there exists a strong and
historically or politically rooted domestic institution in a given governance area.
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Institutional feedbacks clearly require further study. The regimes literature has
contributed several interesting innovations including the examination of path dependence
of international regimes—the impact of norms as reinforced by existing global
institutions (Zelli et al. 2013, 113; Orsini et al. 2013, 37). However, this is not an intuitive
fit with regime complexity as a strong independent variable. Reaching back into the
domestic sphere for other sources of path dependence and feedback is perhaps just as
important. This is a central task and contribution of the present dissertation.

Liberal Pluralism and Two-level Games
As discussed in the sections above, dominant international relations theories are poorly
suited to accounting for domestic political factors, and it is often the express purpose of
those theories not to (Waltz 1979, 121-2). This is challenging because we see daily
occurrences of domestic factors impacting international outcomes despite the need to
abstract and compartmentalize domestic and international domains for theory-building
purposes. International institutions, defined narrowly as explicit negotiated arrangements,
or those that are rationally “designed,” do not exist in a vacuum: they reflect the priorities
of their sponsors (Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal 2001, 762). As such, even under
rational choice approaches it may be necessary to “relax the unitary actor assumption to
incorporate key domestic political factors” to explain institutional design from a
“forward-looking” perspective (Ibid, 797).
Perhaps the most accepted approach in the literature remains the “two-level
game” framework, which treats domestic and international games separately but argues
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both are essential considerations for policy makers (Putnam 1988, 434; Lütz 2011, xiii).37
More generally, the pluralist “domestic sources” approach typified by two central
volumes (Katzenstein (1978) and Evans et al. (1993)) has recently been revisited in the
transatlantic-relations sub-set of the international regulation literature (Lütz 2011; Eimer
and Philipps, 2011). The Evans volume pays careful attention to the domestic influences
on international bargaining and takes an “integrative approach” to analysis. It argues that
“international bargains are not simply about relations between nations [but] are also about
the distribution of costs and benefits among domestic groups and about domestic opinion
divided on the best way of relating to the external environment” (Evans 1993, 397). For
example, one interesting comparison of developing countries’ structural adjustment
negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), demonstrates leaders’
bifurcated (domestic and international) decision-making processes (Kahler 1993, 337,
388-9). This work highlights the importance of domestic institutions and the domestic
political calculation of “win sets” in accounting for differential implementation outcomes
(Ibid).
Similarly, Katzenstein’s research program on domestic structures in the late 1970s
“petered out” in IR but was more robustly addressed in comparative politics and
historical institutionalism (Ferrell and Newman 2010, 610-11). This work explored how
domestic capacities could be determinative internationally. The account offered a
compelling critique of the popular bureaucratic bargaining model arguing that it did not
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Putnam defines the two-level game: “At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests
by pressuring the government to adopt favorable policies, and politicians seek power by constructing
coalitions among those groups. At the international level, national governments seek to maximize their own
ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments.
Neither of the two games can be ignored by central decision-makers, so long as their countries remain
interdependent, yet sovereign” (Putnam 1988, 434).
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sufficiently employ theoretical abstraction and overgeneralized the US system
(Katzenstein 1977, 598-99). The alternative approach proposed by Katzenstein was to
show there are substantial differences in political and economic structures even among
advanced industrial states and illustrate how these differences can influence each political
economy’s role in the world (Ibid, 590).
This pluralistic thread of domestic sources inquiry remains under-investigated and
is only now getting more attention from historical institutionalists in IPE whose focus is
primarily regulatory practices and the international competition to set regulation. This is
intuitive because international regulation is often the product of domestic regulation and
standards-exportation (e.g. accounting standards) (Posner 2010; Mosely 2010). This is
certainly the case for intellectual property norms, standards, and decision-making
procedures. The US-favored standards form the basis for the international regime.
However, the extent of its success in exporting standards requires further examination.
Reversing the causal arrow, in the last decade the focus on international
institutions and regimes has largely moved on from evaluating emergence to increasingly
look at the interactions with and impacts on domestic politics (Checkel 2014, 74; Clapp
and Helleiner 2012). Gourevitch provided an earlier articulation of this general approach
in his ‘second image reversed,’ which examined the international sources of domestic
politics (Gourevitch 1978). The most recent work on the impact of international rules on
domestic regulatory authority has examined the narrowing of national policy options or
“policy space” and the possibility for ongoing industrial policy autonomy through
sectoral “carve-outs” (Natsuda and Thobum 2014, 1346). Also, in some cases the
international regime bureaucracy has been examined as a source or modifier of norms
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and rules (Chorev 2014, 631). This has challenged the assumption of the IO as
“acquiescent receivers and passive vectors” of US policy (Ibid).
IP issues are fundamentally mediated at the domestic level and local IP laws only
approximate the international regime. It is therefore difficult to imagine a study
completely along structural lines without close attention to domestic factors as a source
of international policy or as a substantial modifier of how the regime operates in practical
terms. Rational choice and two-level game theoretic approaches may provide appropriate
lenses for specific negotiation outcomes and tools to monitor political actor behavior.
However, those approaches seem largely insensitive to institutions and history or take
them as given. Institutions greatly inform actors’ calculation of interest and are important
components of how domestic laws and practices evolve in the real world beyond the
negotiation table.
The strengths and challenges of neorealism, neoliberalism, constructivism, regime
complexes and the relative dearth of attention to domestic sources all point to the need
for an alternative approach. An expanded pluralist approach could draw on multiple
theoretical perspectives as appropriate for the facts of a given case. These challenges and
the nature of IP regulation all point to a pluralist historical institutionalism as a potential
framework.

An Historical Institutionalist Approach
Historical institutionalism is just beginning to migrate from comparative politics and
American studies to IR and IPE. Efforts to date have struggled to differentiate between
historical and market power factors. For example, demonstrating policy feedback and
institutional salience within the polity of a powerful regime-maker as Sell (2010) does in
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the domestic context of the US cannot truly differentiate HI from a realist, power-based
argument. It simply explains the mechanics of interest articulation. Sell’s use of HI to
explain the emergence of TRIPS—with strong qualifiers regarding the importance of
power—hints at an underlying realism to her argument. Her argument does not, however,
reflect a systemic approach regarding historical institutionalism and “when institutional
path dependence will matter at the systemic level” (Drezner 2010, 799). Rather, HI is
framed as a mid-level approach somewhere “between the determinism of structural
accounts and the voluntarism of rational choice approaches” (Sell 2010, 786). In trade
and IP this is a particularly important perspective given that neither narrowly structural,
nor narrowly voluntarist approaches have a very interesting story to tell. Of course
powerful nations will often get their way when dealing with smaller rational actors.
Furthermore, it is not particularly surprising that within those powerful states domestic
interests will shape state preferences, and that once established, supporting institutions
will help to reinforce those interests in various ways.38
Trade and IP agreements are largely about negotiating exceptions to free trade,
thus it is arguably the details and the process of practically enacting them that is truly
interesting. These details can tell us more about the nuances of power than some largely
self-apparent absolute measurement woven into a structural account. One value of HI is
to show where other causal mechanisms can play a role in regulatory design and standard
setting. For example, HI approaches have argued that technical capacity and its temporal
sequencing can propel one regulatory standard to international prominence over others
(Bach and Newman 2010).

38

For example, acting as a focal point for coalition building.
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Critics of the first forays into IPE by historical institutionalism identified the
possibility for “repellence” – building up technical and institutional capabilities in order
to develop a viable alternative to the hegemonic rules39—as a response to the
international regime (Drezner 2010, 796). This has been used as a basis to criticize the
significance of sequencing. In essence, the argument is that because repellence to the
international standard is possible, as opposed to solely reinforcing responses, the
distribution of technical capacity—which is historically and institutionally contingent—is
less significant (Ibid). In a world with multiple feedback possibilities including
repellence, the significance of a regulatory first mover advantage (the sequence of
capacity) is diminished and other factors such as market power will presumably be more
determinative of regulatory outcomes.
Contrary to Drezner’s perspective on the implications of repellence, repellence
itself can be a clear indication of capacity and can demonstrate the significance of
institutional history. If meaningful repellence can be demonstrated as a counterpoint to
tremendous market power asymmetry, then there may exist an argument for the
conditions under which HI and technical capacity matter independent of power
considerations: namely, in shaping domestic outcomes during and after the
implementation of agreement standards. In this case, HI’s multiple varieties of feedback
would not be damaging to the theoretical approach. This line of argument is thus distinct
from the existing HI literature that has focused on the role of technical capacity in the
competition to set an international regime standard. One contribution of this dissertation
is to ‘save’ HI from one of its criticisms by re-conceptualizing the dependent variable
according to its local characteristics (domestic implementation).
39

See full definition Chapter 1.
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Historical institutionalism is not a systemic theory and struggles with a lack of
predictive capacity regarding policy feedback. Adherents of HI acknowledge this (Farrell
and Newman 2010, 619). As such, HI is often grafted on to more established theories
such realism, neoliberalism or constructivism (Ibid). However, HI itself emerged from a
criticism of dominant theories to account for history, such as the dearth of attention to
long-term causes and long-term effects. Since Paul Pierson’s 2004 Politics in Time
scholars, particularly in comparative politics, have paid more attention to these important
issues of history and temporarily. HI has not emerged as a robust rival to established IR
theories, but rather more of a complementary or problematizing framework to those
theories. Farrell and Newman argue “historical institutionalism fills a major gap in
international relations theory: it sets out mechanisms that explain how actors respond to a
changing environment” (Farrell and Newman 2010, 611). This is one of the features that
make HI an excellent lens for trade and IP issues. Regulations, follow-on trade
negotiations, and IP case law are constantly in a state of flux. Accounting for change is
an important task and has led to some interesting insights on international regime
formation from an inside-out perspective, as well as starting to address the “monoculture”
in US IPE scholarship that had largely omitted HI accounts (McNamara 2009, 75-6;
Fioretos 2011).
Historical institutionalists utilize mixed-method approaches and sometimes use
process tracing to uncover causal mechanisms or “the intervening processes through
which causes exert their effects” (Goertz and Mahoney 2010, 24; see also George and
Bennett 2005, 205; Bennett and Checkel 2015). Mechanisms help to explain important
questions such as: “How do national rule systems shape outcomes in global markets?”

51
(Farrell and Newman 2010, 609). According to the limited IPE literature to date, the
answer typically involves powerful actors embedding themselves in the state’s
institutional structure, aligning state power to their interests: “interest groups and state
preferences have typically co-constituted each other over time, so that states have helped
create interest groups, which in turn come to shape state policy in specific directions”
(Ibid, 620). Strict adherence to this inside-out approach (or the outside-in approach it
counters) in explaining a regulatory regime’s establishment potentially misses important
causal mechanisms and policy feedbacks. If HI, as applied to IR, is to be true to its
foundations in comparative politics it must temporally extend the causal chain.
Canada’s case invites an “inside-outside-in” approach as a practical first step to
extending the causal chain. For example, international standards are set and influenced by
domestic institutions and actors such as the USTR; those standards then have an
exogenous impact on the evolution of domestic institutions of both the standard-maker
and the standard-taker. When new standards are adopted, an implementation-clash occurs
where domestic institutions demonstrate resilience, actors opportunistically embed policy
mitigations and regulatory outcomes only imperfectly approximate the original
international standards. The standards that matter are thus not only TRIPS, but also the
locally implemented and historically contingent regulations they produce.
This primary outcome variable is, however, not the end of the causal chain.
Alternatively, an “outside-inside-out” approach would, following Sell (2010), take the
initial sources of the international regime as given and look to how the international
regime impacts domestic institutions: how the feedbacks of the ensuing implementationclash impact the evolution of the regime going forward. For example, the experience of
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implementation feeds back to inform the next iteration of the international regime as new
agreements build on and layer over past treaties.
Historical institutionalism has been much more thoroughly explored in
comparative politics than it has in IPE. Comparative political scientists have identified
some common modes of institutional change including institutional layering. These are
partially derived from the study of US Congressional institutions. Actors layer new
measures on top of old to suit their interests thus making institutional development
considerably disjointed (Schickler 2001, 25; Thelen 2003, 225-6).

Institutions also

change by means of “conversion” when they are repurposed to suit new objectives
(Thelen 2003, 228). Sell (2010) adopts conversion as a conceptual framework for the
empirical argument regarding a repurposing of trade agreements to IP promotion. This is
a fruitful application of HI, but is incomplete in not explaining dynamics on the other side
of the relationship. For example, if HI is significant there should be feedback and
sequencing dynamics in the opposite direction as well. And if feedback and sequencing
matter in this direction for the regime-taker then HI can be argued to be important, even
in the context of tremendous power asymmetry. In some cases, institutional
developments may even offset power asymmetry. Some HI scholarship has begun to
document a similar dynamic (Posner 2010; 2009).
The literature is just beginning to take up the task of considering alternative
causal mechanisms, but remains largely focused on the mechanisms of diffusion. For
example, some work has used a constructivist lens to identify “socialization” as a causal
mechanism and show various socialization pathways through government, elites and nonstate actors (Morin et al. 2011, 95). While the identification of socialization is important
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because it considers some standard-taker dynamics, it is still arguably an outside-in
explanation of diffusion: the hegemon standard-maker is able to socialize the weaker
party to its standards to the point that they exceed TRIPS requirements (Morin et al.
2011, 99).40 As with much of the IPE scholarship on IP, this work has focused almost
exclusively on those developing countries that IP critics are most interested in. There is
an entire universe of underexplored causal mechanisms in the study of IP and few have
been tied back to the broader debates on international regulation and institutional change.
Earlier institutional work in the rational choice tradition focused on the role of
institutions in coordinating transaction costs. According to this work, institutional change
is often incremental and relates to policy actor preferences and underlying changes in
relative prices within a political economy (North 1990, 83). While there has been some
co-merging of historical and rational institutional approaches, a defining difference
remains the relative analytical privileging of ‘equilibrium order’ versus ‘historical
process’ (Thelen 1999, 370, 381). Each will naturally produce different images of
institutional change. Thelen’s way forward argues that the ‘key to understanding
institutional evolution and change lies in specifying more precisely the reproduction and
feedback mechanisms on which particular institutions rest’ (Thelen 1999, 400). This is
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This somewhat awkward quantitative examination of a social process uses such problematic
variables for intellectual property norm socialization as the aggregate percentage of country’s population
studying in the US, without making an explicit link to IP. It should be treated with caution. Beyond
potentially problematic variables, aggregate foreign direct investment (FDI) stock and aggregate “US
study” seemed to have much higher significance than participation in actual US IP “capacity building”
events. When controlling for USTR “naming and shaming” the significance of each dropped considerably
(Morin et al. 2011, 100). While providing an excellent review of the literature and a good idea for
expanding the range of causal mechanisms to include socialization, the authors might have instead
leveraged qualitative process tracing to explore such a social-centric causal mechanism. Also, failure to
publish individual country scores for each of their variables made replication and country-specific critique
problematic. This is, however, an appealing hypothesis for further examination.
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the approached pursued herein, however, more policy feedback is observed than
socialization.
To date, Thelen’s way forward has only been accepted by a very few IR and IPE
scholars, and there has been the beginnings of a debate on how HI might productively
emerge in IR. Some argue for more attention to the “processes that shape, reproduce and
alter international political institutions over time” (Fioretos 2011, 370). Others have aptly
criticized a narrow focus on preference formation and institutional choice (Nexon 2012).
Nexon advocates pluralism and that political analysts engage the full range of HI
approaches.
The leading edge of HI in IR has been in the area of international regulatory
development including the works cited above in the 2010 special issue of Review of
International Politics as well as other work examining the privatization of international
standard setting. The latter has sensibly argued against any separation of politics and
domestic standards from international technocratic rule making (Buthe and Mattli 2011,
12). History shapes the ability to coherently articulate interests, which has a significant
impact on who sets the international standard.41 Again, this work seems to focus on
standard setting and privileges the relative sequence of domestic standard development in
the articulation of interests. This is a compelling temporal extension of the independent
variable; however, the dependent variable is still treated in relatively narrow temporal
terms. This could be appropriate in the case of accounting standards, but is questionable
for trade and IP where the extent of exceptions to free trade and the subsequent changes
41

“Technical expertise and financial resources are necessary but not sufficient conditions for
successful involvement in global private-sector standardization. It is timely information and effective
representation of domestic interest that confer the critical advantage in these regulatory processes,
determining who wins or loses…[The] ability to speak with a single voice and effectively promote
domestic preferences, however, varies—mostly for historical reasons” (Buthe and Mattli 2011, 12-13).
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to domestic law are the real “outcomes” produced by the regime. A temporal extension of
the dependent variable would also seem to be required to capture the most relevant
effects of the international regime.
Regimes should be considered more in terms of evolution: as part of a multi-level
policy feedback process. For example, a regime is not simply comprised of a single
signed international agreement but involves multiple steps. These may include: 1) norm
formation and diffusion; 2) international standard setting and specific rule-making; 3)
practical domestic implementation by signatories; 4) integration dynamics between the
new rules and local institutions; 5) follow-on agreements cited or linked to the original
agreement such as bilateral and regional agreements; and even 6) pre-regimes, that
“prime the pump”42 for the emergence of an international standard. For example, Canada
played a key role in the emergence and inclusion of IP and investor state dispute
settlement (ISDS) provisions within trade deals. By recognizing longer chains of a
regime’s existence, it may be possible to distinguish institutional path dependence from
market power factors in some cases. “Outcomes” cannot merely be defined as regime
accession in exchange for some reciprocal benefit such as market access or investment
inflow. The practical implications and details of regime implementation must also be
considered as an integral part of that outcome. Thus the primary outcome variable
considered herein is the practical extent of market exclusivity produced by the intellectual

42

The pump-primer metaphor reflects an intentional action that provides a source of legitimacy or
impetus for some related action. It is often used in the context of fiscal policy following its use by Keynes.
The term pump-primer is used here to describe a role that Canada has often played in international trade
negotiations. For example, the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement played a key role as a normative
precursor to NAFTA. Similarly, NAFTA played this role and helped to provide an impetus to finalize the
multilateral Doha Round of trade negotiations. Canada’s negotiations with Europe in CETA helped to
establish a template on many issues for a potential future US-EU Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (TTIP). The idea here is that smaller negotiations can set a standard and facilitate a path for
larger agreements.
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property regime, not solely its negotiation or existence. The study changes the metric
used for understanding IP policy in order to preserve space, in theory, for the reality that
domestic institutions create cross-national variation of outcomes.
The present analysis offers another perspective on historical institutionalism’s
early forays into IPE. As suggested, a key task of this effort is to identify when policy
feedbacks and path dependence can be, in a sense, separated from related power
considerations. HI studies to date have demonstrated that technical capacity is one
potential counter-balance to market power, and that sequencing of capacity development
can impact regulatory outcomes. In the case of regime proliferation, where complexity is
increasingly framed as an independent variable explaining various domestic and
international outcomes, the same questions about determinacy independent of power and
institutional history are relevant. In contrast to the bulk of the literature on trade and IP
regimes, the analysis herein does not end with an international agreement and traces
implementation to capture historically relevant policy feedbacks.43
In summary, this dissertation advances the argument that intellectual property
standards and the practical extent of market exclusivity are meaningfully shaped by the
process of agreement implementation. Even under considerable power asymmetry, path
43

This perspective also provides a distinct and original alternative to negotiations literature that
typically look at one trade deal in isolation and focus on actor capabilities, negotiating objectives, and
tactics. For example, some of the NAFTA negotiations literature posits that the right combination of
“structure,” the material resources that “bring actors to the table,” and “process,” the tactics that states
employ, is the best way to divine negotiation outcomes (Robert 2000, 244). The negotiations literature
tends to reflect empirically rich, agent-centric accounts written by negotiators, or largely based on
negotiator interviews (Cameron and Tomlin 2000; Robert 2000; Hart, Dymond and Robertson 1994).
Sometimes these accounts keep score of wins and losses based strictly on the negotiation context (Robert
2000). They explain “how countries negotiate” with comprehensive “blow-by-blow” accounts on a range of
issues areas within an agreement (Cameron and Tomlin 2000). They do not seem to put those win-sets in a
broader societal or historical context, nor consider how the practical details of implementing trade
commitments might alter the conception of ‘winning.’ This approach may be sufficient for relatively static
outcomes such as a negotiated tariff rate. However, it seems less suited to agreements on complex
regulatory processes relevant to the knowledge economy such as the “new issues” of investment and
intellectual property protection. In these areas, the details of domestic implementation are critical.
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dependence matters where national institutions and politics have capacity to shape
outcomes: via the technocratic interpretation and domestic implementation of the
international standard. Market power dynamics between standard-maker and standardtaker nations are undeniably a central factor in the establishment of the international
regime; however, institutions shape its details. This builds on the emergent HI literature
in IPE that has stressed sequencing of technical capacity or the institutional sources of
political coalition formation (Bach and Newman 2010; Sell 2010).
In keeping with Bennett and Checkel (2015), a wide empirical net is cast to
capture related phenomenon such as price regulation for patented technologies, case law,
and domestic procurement institutions that might not be routinely considered in a
technical accounting of the IP regime.44 This diversity produces some interesting insights
related to the range of policy feedbacks at play as international and domestic IP regimes
integrate and evolve over time. Each chapter examines different policy feedbacks and
contributes to explaining the intersection of international standards and local institutions.

44

Also in keeping with Bennett and Checkel (2015), the broader discursive context is examined for
contributing factors and sources are considered critically for evidentiary bias. The temporal and idiographic
or “level-of-detail” parameters are identified and justified. Alternative theoretical explanations are robustly
assessed.
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Chapter 3 - Regulatory Feedbacks: Mitigating Regulatory Institutions

This chapter examines the regulatory aspects of Canada’s negotiation and implementation
of the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (the FTA), the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and Canada’s compliance with Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Protection (TRIPS) standard. The chapter shows that Canada had
considerable regulatory autonomy and an ability to constrain the practical extent of
increased patent protection through regulatory pricing controls.45 Through the trade treaty
implementation process, Canada’s domestic institutions narrowed the effective scope of
market exclusivity provided under the international standards. Despite considerable
market power asymmetry with the US, Canada preserved room for its domestic
institutions by helping to shape the specific language of the international standard.
Market power theory would predict that small market powers are not likely to be
effective in mitigating trade commitments that are contrary to the interests of larger
market powers. We would expect global standards advanced by the hegemon to
essentially alter or replace domestic rules without a strong compensatory domestic
institutional response. Furthermore, small powers should only secure minor concessions
and not be able to sway important elements of regime design nor protect unlimited future
regulatory capacity. Evidence contrary to either expectation (i.e. a strong institutional
response, full protection of regulatory capacity, path dependent implementation

45

Regulatory pricing controls were comprised of: a system linking the price of patented products to
an international basket of prices for that same product such that Canadian prices would not exceed various
international benchmarks; controls over price fluctuations (increases) to provide price stability and protect
consumers from significant price increases; and a system of monitoring the R&D investments by patentees.
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outcomes) would be a smoking gun that other important factors beyond market power
help to explain international regulatory design and implementation.
The analysis starts process tracing in Canada’s pre-1987, pre-FTA era. In 1984,
the

influential

Eastman

Commission46

was

struck

to

analyze

and

provide

recommendations on Canada’s patent protection regime for pharmaceuticals that featured
a strong role for compulsory licensing. 47 This period is chosen to start process tracing
because it marked 1) the establishment of the Patented Medicine Prices Review Board, a
powerful price regulation institution that would come to play a role in later trade-related
policy changes under TRIPS/NAFTA; and, 2) the consolidation of Canada’s antiintellectual property (IP) interest coalition. Starting any later, such as during the trade
agreement negotiation phase, would omit important historical causes and context related
to NAFTA/TRIPS implementation. These types of domestic historical and institutional
factors are underrepresented in dominant realist or “market power” based explanations in
IPE.48 For example, bargaining theory accounts (see Wagner 1988) correctly identify
asymmetrical interdependence as a source of power, but overemphasize this to the
detriment of other potential sources of power such as entrenched institutions.
Following analysis of the pre-NAFTA context, the chapter considers the
significant impact of these Canadian institutions on the TRIPS and NAFTA negotiations
and implementation. The distinction between negotiation and regulatory implementation
is important, as many key details are not specified in a negotiated text. Despite its
46

The Commission was a key precursor to the 1987-88 and 1993-94 Patent Act Amendments that
implemented IP-related outcomes of international trade negotiations.
47
Compulsory licences set the tariff rate when the state compels a patent owner to license its
technology to some other producer in service of a public policy objective. This came to be most associated
with the pharmaceutical sector, as brand drug manufacturers were often compelled to license their
technologies to generic producers in the pre-TRIPS era.
48
Newman and Posner (2010) provide a good critical overview and identify several examples of a
“dominant” market power approach including Drezner (2007); James and Lake (1989); and Wagner (1988).

60
importance, implementation is not typically central to negotiations analysis (for examples
of excellent negotiations work see Hart, Dymond and Robertson 1994; Cameron and
Tomlin 2000; Robert 2000). From a theoretical perspective, this empirical work shows
that local political institutions and historical policy choices can powerfully shape the
implementation of international regulatory standards. Regulatory history is an important
determinant of negotiating positions, negotiating outcomes, and how those outcomes are
implemented in domestic law and regulation. In short, trade-related regulatory regimes
are historically cumulative and institutionally contingent.

The Pre-FTA Context: Lacking IP Institutions, Canada’s Compulsory Licensing
Regime Consolidates a Powerful Stakeholder Coalition
This section explores Canada’s pre-US trade agreement era. It argues that Canadian IP
policy is significantly shaped by a history of compulsory licensing. This system was
based on similar policies of Canada’s colonial parent Great Britain (Eastman 1994, 278).
Canada instituted a British-style system of compulsory licensing on active
pharmaceutical ingredients in 1923 (Eastman 1985, xxxiv). In 1969, Canada significantly
expanded this regime to lower the prices of pharmaceuticals through compulsory import
licensing for finished products (Ibid). While Britain abandoned compulsory licensing in
1977, Canada’s compulsory licensing regime prevailed until it was significantly modified
in 1987. It was then effectively abolished in 1993 as part of Canada’s NAFTA and TRIPS
commitments. In advance of these reforms, compulsory licensing helped to solidify a
powerful interest coalition that would shape Canada’s future approach to intellectual
property rights.
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In the lead up to negotiation on the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (the FTA),
the issue of intellectual property had been a “top bilateral irritant” with US multinationals
concerned about delays to patent reform following the guidance set out in the 1985
Eastman Commission of Inquiry on the Pharmaceutical Industry 49 (Hart, Dymond and
Robertson 1994, 400). The Eastman Report recommended changes to Canada’s patent
regime which had prevailed since 196950 and was a major factor in the development of a
strong generic pharmaceutical sector in that it provided for compulsory import licences
and required only a limited licensing royalty of 4% of the licensee’s selling price
(Eastman 1985, xix). Strong revenue growth with only limited licensing fees was a major
source of power for the burgeoning Canadian generic industry.
This era was marked by much lower drug expenditures than experienced today. In
1990 there were only $3.8 billion in total prescription pharmaceutical sales in Canada
and of this only $1.7 billion or 45% were patented drugs. Generics had reached around
$300 million in sales representing 8% of the total industry and the remainder was
comprised of non-patented brand name drugs with $1.8 billion in sales or 47% of the
industry (PMPRB 2004, 9). Following patent reforms, Canada would not return to this
high level of spending on non-patented brand drugs, which by 2003 had fallen to 21% of
a total $15 billion market (Ibid).51 Even under patent reforms discussed herein, by 2013

49

Harry Eastman, Commissioner (1985) “Commission of Inquiry on the Pharmaceutical Industry”
(Eastman Report) Published February 28, 1985, accessed June 20, 2015, http://epe.lacbac.gc.ca/100/200/301/pco-bcp/commissions-ef/eastman1985-eng/eastman1985-eng.htm
50
In 1965-1968 the “Harley Commission,” whose terms of reference from Cabinet included “...to
consider and recommend, as it may deem expedient...a comprehensive and effective program to reduce the
price of drugs,” conducted public hearings on how to do so. In 1969 Parliament passed Bill C-102 to
facilitate compulsory import licensing in a direct and successful effort to reduce drug costs (Lang 2003, 45).
51
By 2003, generic sales had vaulted to $1.7 billion comprising 11.3% of the now $15 billion
industry and brand sales dominated the market with $10.1 billion or 67% (PMPRB 2004, 9).
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generic companies constituted three of the top ten pharmaceutical firms in the country.52
The extant policy literature on the compulsory licensing era in Canada attributes the rise
of the generic industry to this incentive structure (Cohen 2004, 7). The policy was also
heralded in generic industry advocacy materials. According to one major generic industry
stakeholder, “as a result of [compulsory licensing] legislation there was an unprecedented
boon to the generic companies to expand rapidly and make available good quality generic
pharmaceutical products to the public at affordable prices” (Dan 1997).
Unsurprisingly, the US branded pharmaceutical industry was highly critical of
Canada’s compulsory licensing regime and leveraged its proximity to the United States
Trade Representative (USTR) and the FTA negotiation to advocate for reform in
Canada.53 The US industry also presented the Canadian government with polling data
suggesting that Canadians were strongly in favour of patent reforms.54 Despite the push
from the US private sector and somewhat contentious politics in Canada, intellectual
property protection was new to bilateral trade negotiations. It was seen as somewhat of a
peripheral issue that US negotiators used periodically to bludgeon Canada for what it
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Government of Canada, Industry Canada (2014) “Canadian Pharmaceutical Industry Profile”
accessed December 23, 2015, https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/lsg-pdsv.nsf/eng/h_hn01703.html Apotex is the
3rd with $1.19 billion in annual sales, Teva is 6th with $0.97 billion, and Pharmascience is 9th with $0.77
billion.
53
For example, the industry leveraged its position within the primary private sector US advocacy
group to the USTR in the FTA negotiation, the “Advisory Committee on Trade Negotiations,” which was
chaired by Ed Pratt, Chief Executive Officer of Pfizer (Hart, Dymond and Robertson 1994, 400).
54
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of Canada Letter March 30, 1987, to Patricia Carney
Minister for International Trade: “more than eight in ten Canadians (82%) are in favour of the Federal
Government putting into place a law to protect pharmaceutical discoveries with patents – as long as there is
a way of making sure drug price increases would not be higher than the rate of inflation. Bill C-22 includes
such a provision. Also almost two out of three Canadians (65%) after hearing the main arguments for and
against Bill C-22 regarding patent protection for new medical discoveries believe that the legislation is a
good thing.” Accessed from Library and Archives Canada.
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viewed as unsatisfactory draft patent reform legislation (Hart, Dymond and Robertson
1994, 179, 225).55
Canada’s compulsory licensing regime was a central topic of bilateral discussion.
The impacts of the policy had been reviewed extensively by Canada in the mid-1980s and
were documented in a series of reports. In 1983, what was then Consumer and Corporate
Affairs Canada, Bureau of Policy Coordination conducted a “Survey of generic drug
manufacturers,” coauthored by its Director Tom Brogan (Brogan and Trepanier 1983).56
The report assessed the size and growth of the generic industry that had exploded under
this policy framework and had booked an impressive average annual growth rate of 20%
from 1980-1982. Compulsory licence revenue comprised around 30% of the generic drug
sector. This ranged by company with some reporting as much as 42% of their sales
resulting from this policy tool that Canada and other Commonwealth countries had
borrowed from Britain (Ibid, 3,4). While still a relatively small business sector
(approximately 1000 employees), full-time employment in the generic drug industry was
growing on average 4.5% per year in 1980-1983, a rare point of employment strength in a
period of acute recession and historic 12% unemployment in Canada.57 The report also
showed that firms were increasingly using Canada as a base for exports and decreasing
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As noted by FTA negotiators Hart et al., from the outset of negotiations in April-June 1986
“intellectual property, which neither side appeared to understand, was consigned to a working group with
instructions that the chief negotiators should not be detained further on it until a text was ready” (Ibid, 164).
Despite considerable discussion, this IP chapter never materialized in the final agreement because the US
“was not prepared to compromise on its demand that Canada dismantle compulsory licensing of
pharmaceuticals” (Hart, Dymond and Robertson 1994, 382).
56
The report was part of a policy review of the compulsory licensing provision under section 41 of
the Patent Act and appears to be one of the first government analyses of pre-FTA compulsorily licensing.
This report is available through Libraries and Archives Canada.
57
Government of Canada, Employment and Social Development Canada (2012) “Employment
Insurance Monitoring and Assessment Report,” accessed August 1, 2015.
http://www.esdc.gc.ca/eng/jobs/ei/reports/mar2012/chapter1.shtml
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Canada’s reliance on drug imports, with 168% export growth between 1979 and 1982
(Ibid, 7, 8, 10).58
Compulsory licensing was helping to fulfill industrial and social policy objectives
while at the same time creating a new and increasingly powerful domestic constituency.
The Brogan report was not prescriptive, but reflected an early attempt by the government
to quantify the industrial impacts of its intellectual property policy.59 This was also an
attempt to create a more accurate picture of the domestic industry most impacted by any
future changes to the compulsory licensing regime. Canada’s domestic regime was
attracting the attention and ire of the US pharmaceutical industry and was a likely target
for reform.

The Eastman Commission 1985
In April 1984,60 Dr. Harry Eastman was given a mandate by Order in Council to report on
the “current situation” in the pharmaceutical industry in Canada and make
recommendations on proposals for patent protection and other incentives. Eastman noted
that the origin of his Commission’s mandate was concern over Canada’s compulsory
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In 1981, imports represented 30% of medicine sales while the generic industry only derived
19.7% of its sales from imports The reverse engineering required to replicate US and European health
technologies also resulted in steady 24% average growth in Canadian generic industry research and
development (R&D) investment (Brogan and Trepanier 1983, 9). R&D was a major promotional objective
of government that also benefited Canada’s university sector.
59
The report’s author, Tom Brogan, led the intellectual property policy division responsible for
amendments to compulsory licensing reforms under Bill C-22 and held the pen on much of those legislative
changes. Brogan was a key architect of the Patented Medicine Prices Review Board (PMPRB) and later
served as its interim Director from December 1987 to June 1989. Brogan served under inaugural PMPRB
Chair Professor Harry Eastman whose 1985 report laid the groundwork for the establishment of the quasijudicial tribunal. The PMPRB was established under Bill C-22, and as discussed below, came to become a
key policy mitigation associated with trade-related patent protection. The growth of the generic industry
under compulsory licences complicated Canada’s interests in the trade negotiation. Canada wanted to
promote brand sector research and development and facilitate trade with the US but it now had to balance
these objectives with the interests of the growing and powerful generic export sector.
60
Twelve months after the May 1983 publication of Brogan’s generic drug industry study.
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licensing policy (Eastman 1994, 279). The Eastman report was a detailed 474-page study
that spanned regulatory measures and many other important facets of the pharmaceutical
industry.61 The Commission heard from members of the Canadian medical establishment
as well as members from both sides of industry including key generic industry
stakeholders Barry Sherman,62 founder of Apotex, and Leslie Dan,63 founder of
Novopharm.
The Eastman Report was supportive of compulsory licences but called for raising
the relatively low 4% tariff paid by generic producers to branded drug manufactures
forced to license their products (Eastman 1985, xix).

Specifically, Eastman

recommended a complex framework that would collect royalties from licensees and put
them into a common Pharmaceutical Royalty Fund to be redistributed to brand owners
based on licensee sales and the licensor’s Canadian research and development-to-sales
ratio (R&D-to-sales) (Eastman 1985, xxi-xxii). This proposed functional link between
generic company revenue, brand company revenue and a brand’s R&D contributions was
never implemented because the brand sector made a non-binding commitment to invest
10% of sales into R&D as part of patent reform legislation, Bill C-22 (1987). The
government also pointed to $770 million in actual announced industry investments in
support of Bill C-22’s passage.
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The lack of a hard and binding Eastman-style R&D

The most central material and recommendations related to patent and licensing policy and took
the various reports by the Bureau of Consumer Affairs under the direction of Tom Brogan one step further
with additional analysis and specific recommendations.
62
Net worth $4.6 billion, 13th most affluent person/family in Canada in 2015. Canadian Business.
“25 Richest Canadians, 2016” accessed December 4, 2015 http://www.canadianbusiness.com/lists-andrankings/richest-people/top-25-richest-canadians-2016/image/26/
63
Net worth $1.06 billion, and 83rd most affluent person/family in Canada in 2015. Canadian
Business. “100 Richest Canadians, 2016” accessed December 4, 2015
http://www.canadianbusiness.com/lists-and-rankings/richest-people/top-100-richest-canadians-2015/
64
Minister Harvie Andre, Statements to House Committee study on Bill C-22, Tuesday, December
16, 1986 (1555). The 10% R&D to sales ratio commitment was met from 1993-2000 for the members of
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formula was also likely attributable to its functional complexity which made industry’s
non-binding commitment attractive to government. Lack of binding R&D measures was
also a major point of contention between the Progressive Conservative government and
Liberals in the Senate.65
The Eastman report contains a succinct illustration of the interest coalition of
generic producers and provincial government payers that was institutionalized under the
compulsory licensing regime:
Compulsory licensing to import gave rise to the possibility of increased
competition. At the same time, provincial reimbursement plans
increased sensitivity to price differentials at the pharmacy level and
exploited the opportunities for lower prices through generic substitution
made possible by the federal legislation. Both together permitted the
growth of large and profitable Canadian-owned generic pharmaceutical
firms, which in turn has led to lowered prices to consumers and
taxpayers (Eastman 1985, xxxvi).
In other words, prominent observers at the time clearly linked the compulsory licensing
policy to the formation of a powerful interest coalition. The outcome of lower prices also
had tremendous popular support. Provincial governments which enjoyed regulatory
power over professions, made use of the federal IP framework to encourage pharmacists
the main brand pharmaceutical industry association, Rx&D (PMPRB Annual Report 2003, accessed
December 4, 2015, http://www.pmprb-cepmb.gc.ca/view.asp?ccid=908 ). This has gradually declined back
to 1988 levels as the multinationals’ business model in Canada increasingly moved towards acquisitions
and the provision of venture capital and less into direct Canadian R&D spending under the non-binding
target. Industry frequently argues the PMPRB’s R&D calculation methodology is out of date in that it does
not capture R&D spending from global clinical trial budgets controlled by a company’s international head
office (as opposed to the Canadian subsidiary) and other investments that benefit Canada such as the
provision of venture capital funds. Industry Canada internal documents suggest that the government is
aware of this changing landscape and the pressures on industry: “The pharmaceutical business model is
changing…The return on R&D investment is declining, necessitating consolidation and a new R&D
model…To combat lower R&D returns [multinational enterprise (MNE)] brand companies are investing in
home-grown Canadian biopharmaceutical [small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs)]…many new drugs
coming to market are complex products or biologics, with longer development times and more stringent
clinical trials…Generics invest in R&D, but [are] not aimed at developing new, innovative drugs.”
“Pharmaceutical Proposals in the Canada-European Trade Negotiations: Presentation to the Minister of
Industry” Draft – Secret - February 9, 2012.
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“Honourable senators, there are no commitments in Bill C-22 as passed by the House of
Commons dealing with R&D—not one commitment.” Senator Ian Sinclair, Senate Debates, October 28,
1987 (2093).
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to engage in generic substitution of branded drugs for licensed generic drugs. For many
years, pharmacies also received substantial rebates from generic companies to promote
generic products. This practice became so central to the pharmacy business model that
many provincial governments outlawed the practice beginning with Ontario in 2006
under Bill-102.66 Sparked initially by the compulsory licensing policy, these factors
helped to entrench and institutionalize a stakeholder coalition that would come to have
major influence on future intellectual property policy as it advocated its interests by
leveraging the interests of consumers of patented technologies.
Canada’s policy was a close replication of 1923 British compulsory licensing
legislation that Britain had repealed in 1977. Despite British reforms, Canada’s policy
remained law until Bill C-22 in 1987. This ten-year lag was critical to the generic
industry’s development in Canada. For example, Eastman reported that there were 559
licence applications to import and sell between the 1969 Patent Act amendments that
permitted import licences and January 31, 1985. This compared to only 49 applications
from 1935 to 1969 for patented processes, 22 of which were abandoned or withdrawn
(Eastman 1985, 2). Up until 1969, compulsory licences were only available for drug
process patents, not finished imported goods.67 According to Eastman, the Patent Act
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Statues of Ontario (2006) “Transparent Drug System for Patients Act” Bill 102, Section 11.5 (1)
“Rebates etc.,” accessed December 3, 2015,
http://www.ontla.on.ca/web/bills/bills_detail.do?locale=en&BillID=412&BillStagePrintId=773&btnSubmit
=go; According to one account, rebates paid by generic manufacturers to pharmacies in Ontario were up to
60% of the dollar value of drugs sold, massively inflating the price of generic drugs (Silversides 2006). See
also Sean Fine, “Supreme Court upholds Ontario ban on house-brand generic drugs” Globe and Mail,
November 22, 2013, accessed August 27, 2015, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-onbusiness/industry-news/the-law-page/supreme-court-upholds-ontario-ban-on-house-brand-genericdrugs/article15561005/
67
Up until Bill C-22 (1987), Canada only allowed process patents for pharmaceuticals. Bill C-22
introduced patents for natural occurring substances intended for food or medicine when linked to a process.
This was essentially a transition measure. After a period of 4 years, the prohibition on patents for actual
medicines would expire (per 41(1.1)) and it would become possible to patent them directly. Per 41(1), “In
the case of inventions relating to naturally occurring substances prepared or produced by, or significantly
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amendments in 1969 enabling compulsory import licences was the product of Canadian
government studies in the 1960s showing that drug prices were higher in Canada than
elsewhere internationally. Concern over drug costs was not unique to Canada, as
countries such as France had maintained a full ban (until 1960) or partial ban (until 1978)
on pharmaceutical patents (Ibid). However, Canada’s history of concern over cost would
be a recurring theme, a driver of policy, and source of leverage for the generic industry
whose advocacy material on intellectual property protection routinely employed cost
concerns and was closely aligned with the concerns of provincial government drug
insurance plans (public payers).

Bill C-22, 1987: A New Price Regulation Institution is Born to Counter-Balance
Trade-Related IP Commitments
This section examines Bill C-22 and introduces the Patented Medicines Prices Review
Board (PMPRB).68 The PMPRB was established as an important check and constraint to
expanded IP protections that the US pushed Canada to introduce in 1987 in conjunction
with the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (the FTA). Domestically, the
PMPRB was a major part of how the government would sell limitations to compulsory
licensing to the public.69 The PMPRB would be strengthened throughout the years as
Canada introduced new trade-related IP protections.

derived from, microbiological processes and intended for food or medicine, the specification shall not
include claims for the resulting food or medicine itself, except when prepared or produced by or
significantly derived from the methods or processes of manufacture particularly described and claimed”
(Bill C-22 1987, 1184).
68
A scanned version of Bill C-22, An Act to amend the Patent, Act and to provide for certain
matters in relation thereto, 1987, is available through Library and Archives Canada’s electronic Canada
Gazette database.
69
This was true both for Bill C-22 and later for Bill C-91 associated with NAFTA.
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Despite considerable discussion, no intellectual property chapter was ultimately
forthcoming in the FTA. Canadian and US lawyers concluded final text negotiations for
the FTA on December 9, 1987 and the agreement was tabled in the Canadian House of
Commons on December 12 (Hart, Dymond and Robertson 1994, 442).70 In the context of
the broader ongoing General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) discussions, the
US did not want to have its first IP chapter in a trade agreement be one with minimal
protections. Canada’s concessions on IP in the related Bill C-22 were sufficient for the
US to abandon the proposed IP chapter and proceed with the agreement (Ibid, 306, 341,
383). The FTA was seen by the US as a potential pump-primer71 for the broader insertion
of intellectual property protection into international trade agreements, but it was not until
NAFTA in 1994 that this actually materialized. NAFTA was the first international trade
agreement to include robust IP provisions (Hussain 2012, 83). However, the contentious
FTA negotiations on IP clearly set the stage for this development and Bill C-22 was
widely regarded as being linked to its agreement (Naylor et al. 2015, 90).72 The
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The Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (the FTA) entered into force January 1, 1989.
See notes to page 57.
72
The Senate debate on Bill C-22 makes this point clear. Senator L. Norbert Theriault quotes the
chief U.S negotiator on the FTA to highlight its role in the negotiations: “Ever since the production of the
new draft of Bill C-22, the Mulroney government has been using it as a chip in the bargaining over a free
trade agreement with the United States…a memorandum to Congressmen from the U.S. chief negotiator in
the free trade talks, Peter Murphy, leaked to the Toronto Star, shows that Bill C-22 is, in fact, a very
important part of the negotiations under way: ‘Intellectual property is another priority item for the U.S. In
these negotiations we are trying to convince Canada that it is in our mutual interest over the long run to
strengthen IP – meaning, intellectual property – protection. We have put together a draft text, reviewed by
our private sector and we will use this as a basis for the negotiations. We have also indicated that we are
not satisfied with Canadian compulsory licensing of pharmaceuticals or the lack of copyright for cable retransmissions and that these must be resolved to have an agreement.’” Senator L. Norbert Theriault,
quoting Peter Murphy, Senate Debates, June 25, 1987, (1404). Senator Sidney L. Buckwold makes a
related point when reflecting on committee testimony: “during the hearings of the committee brief after
brief said point blank and it has never really been denied-that this bill is part of the free trade deal; that
somewhere along the line the U.S., which is irked by the fact that Canada has not, in their opinion,
protected intellectual property in a satisfactory way, is insisting that the level playing field has to be
established in order that free trade between our two countries can be looked at seriously.” Senator Sidney
L. Buckwold, Senate Debates, Nov. 18, 1987 (1346).
71
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government of the day downplayed this link, however, due to the contentious politics
associated with intellectual property.
Bill C-22 was based on creating a balance of producer and consumer interests. It
operationalized five key pillars: intellectual property protection, industrial benefits,
multilateral relations, health care, and consumer protection.73 The responsible Minister
stated that the intent of Bill C-22 was to strike a balance between enhancing Canada’s
research and development investment climate and consumer protection:
In essence, the amendments I propose in Bill C-22 will create a climate
favourable to new investment in research and development by giving
patent holding pharmaceutical firms in Canada a guaranteed period of
protection. These changes will also ensure consumer protection by
creating a drug prices review board to monitor drug prices. The
amendments will also allow the government to review and alter the
policy after a period of four years, and again in the tenth year to ensure
the policy works to the benefit of all Canadians…
The question of intellectual property, and respect for it, is on the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the GATT. And it is entirely
possible that in fact we might have been compelled by some future
GATT agreement to make these changes, in order to remain a member
of GATT. Doesn’t it make a lot more sense that we do it ourselves? 74
The automatic review and ability to amend the legislation was an integral component
from the beginning. Canada seemed to recognize the benefits of making changes on its
own terms in advance of policy proposals being entrenched in the multilateral GATT.
Another explicit intent was to lock in lower drug prices for Canada than existed in the
US: “We are calling for the creation of a drug prices review board, to monitor the
existing prices of drugs, and the prices of any new drugs to ensure that the kind of market
73

Minister Harvie Andre, Statements to House Committee study on Bill C-22, Tuesday, December
16, 1986 (1530).
74
Harvie Andre, Second Reading of Bill C-22, House of Commons Debates, November 20, 1986,
1369, accessed October 15, 2016, http://parl.canadiana.ca/view/oop.debates_HOC3302_01/1374?r=0&s=1;
see also CPAC House of Commons Debates, coverage at 3:10:00 and 3:19:00:
http://www.cpac.ca/en/programs/house-of-commons/episodes/90004461/.
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situation that exists now, where our drug prices are at about 80 per cent of those of the
United States, remains in place.”75
Bill C-2276 received royal assent on November 19, 1987, just days before the FTA
was tabled in December of 1987 (Bill C-22 1987). It provided the Governor in Council
with regulatory powers regarding the “form and contents of applications for patents” (Bill
C-22 1987, 1176).77 The bill articulated many basic requirements for a patent system
regarding filing and priority dates,78 definition of a “patentee,” provisions for “prior art”79
regarding patent applications, provisions for a register of patents, applications fees, and
so on. More substantively, Bill C-22 extended the length of all patents from 17 to 20
years but only for patents granted after the legislation came into force (Ibid, 1202).
Importantly, it limited compulsory licences granted under section 41 of the Patent Act. A
ten-year prohibition on compulsory licences to import would apply for medicines with a
“notice of compliance” (NOC)80 granted after June 27, 1986 (Ibid, 1185).
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Harvie Andre, Second Reading of Bill C-22, House of Commons Debates, November 20, 1986,
1372, accessed October 15, 2016, http://parl.canadiana.ca/view/oop.debates_HOC3302_01/1374?r=0&s=1
76
Harvie Andre, Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs tabled Bill C-22 in Parliament.
77
It also carried into effect the terms of the Patent Cooperation Treaty signed in Washington, June
19, 1970.
78
According to the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the priority date is the date of
first filing in a Paris Convention signatory country. This allows a patentee to claim the date filed in one
country as the same date in other countries, thus conferring priority over other applications filed after that
date. This is an important tool for inventors, especially in competitive markets, given that IP rights are
typically conferred to those “first-to-file” a patent. For more details see: WIPO, (2015) “What is Meant by
Priority Date,” accessed October 20, 2015, http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/faq/pat_faqs_q9.html Canada
moved to a first-to-file system under C-22.
79
Prior art is defined in different ways, but is generally linked to an existing state of patented
knowledge. The Patent Cooperation Treaty defines Prior art as: “Everything which has been made available
to the public before the relevant date anywhere in the world by means of written disclosure and which can
be of assistance in determining whether the claimed invention is new and involves an inventive step (i.e. is
not obvious) for the purposes of international search and international preliminary examination.” WIPO,
(2015) “Glossary,” accessed October 20, 2015, http://www.wipo.int/pct/en/texts/glossary.html#P
80
A Notice of Compliance, or NOC, is the notification provided by Canada’s federal drug regulator,
Health Canada, when a therapeutic product has been successfully reviewed for safety and effectiveness and
has approval to be marketed in Canada. Like other national regulators such as the US Federal Drug
Administration (FDA), Health Canada maintains a searchable database of all products approved for use
within Canada.
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prohibition included an attempt by Canada to phase in the protections for products with
NOCs dated before June 27, 1986. This entailed a seven-year prohibition if an NOC had
already been granted to a generic manufacturer but no licence had yet been issued; a
seven-year prohibition if a licence had been issued to a generic manufacturer but not an
NOC; or an eight-year prohibition for those products with no current licensee and no
generic NOC (Ibid).81 In other words, existing licences were to stand as valid provided
Health Canada had also issued marketing approval to the generic licensee. This was a
commitment the government made to stakeholders that it would not remove existing
licences under Bill C-22.82 The bill was hotly contested and was held up in the Senate in
the summer and fall of 1987.83
The United States was undoubtedly aware of these legislative manoeuvres and
evidently viewed them as an acceptable compromise given that the parties ultimately
proceeded with the FTA. However, it is also possible that the US saw this as an
81

Per section 41.11 subsection 4 “Restriction of certain licences,” those restrictions did “not apply
in respect of any licence pertaining to a medicine where on June 27, 1986, a licence has been granted in
respect of the medicine and a notice of compliance in respect of the medicine has been issued to the
licensee” (Bill C-22 1987, 1186).
82
Michel Cote, Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, Letter to Canadian Federation of
University Women, June 16, 1986, accessed from Library and Archives Canada: “[the estimated $211
million of annual savings as a result of compulsory licensing] will continue since at no time and under no
circumstances has the Government considered removing or limiting the sale of those generic products now
available.” Here Cote was responding to the Canadian Federation of University Women (CFUW) who
advocated against C-22 in light of its concerns over potential drug cost increases, particularly for the
elderly. CFUW and the Canadian Drug Manufacturers Association (generic industry) shared information on
their advocacy “We will add [CFUW Legislation Committee] to our mailing list and sen[d] them relevant
information, as it becomes available…I would like to ….commend you on your letter to the Honourable
Michel Cote, a very effective statement of our mutual concerns and interests.” Debra Eklove, Executive
Director, Canadian Drug Manufacturers Association letter to CFUW, September 12, 1985, accessed from
Library and Archives Canada.
83
Harvie Andre, Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, letter to “Colleagues,” including
Patricia Carney, Minister for International Trade October 6, 1987. According to media reports attached to
the Minister’s memo, Liberal Senators wanted a prohibition on compulsory licences of only 4 years,
whereas C-22 provided for 10 years, and the generic industry wanted a compromise of 7 years. Montreal
Gazette, “Few back Senate delay of drug bill, poll finds” October 2, 1987. The generic industry supported
its argument with polling data that the government viewed as employing “loaded questions” and not
undermining the bill being obstructed by the Senate: “despite these leading questions, the results of the poll
overwhelmingly support the passage of Bill C-22.”
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opportunity for future forum shopping.84 In 1999 the US successfully challenged Canada
at the World Trade Organization and received a favourable ruling in 2000 that found the
distinction between pre- and post-1987 patents that Canada had advantageously
incorporated into Bill C-22 indeed violated TRIPS (Lexchin 2003, 15; Douglas and Jutras
2008, 2-3, 7).85 Canada eventually amended domestic law in June 2001 to modify this
distinction to be TRIPS compliant through Bill S-17.86 This bill also addressed another
provision regarding stockpiling that was ruled inconsistent in a separate WTO challenge
against Canada by the European Communities (Smith 2001).87
Canada did not decide to abolish compulsory licensing in 1987, deciding instead to
limit such licenses to 10 years while simultaneously extending all patents to 20 years.
This was effectively a compromise that excluded the pharmaceutical industry from the
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The term “forum shopping” can be applied in various areas but is often discussed in a legal, policy
and regulatory context. Generally, it refers to litigants or stakeholders searching for the most favorable
venue to secure advantage. In a legal context this may be the most advantageous court system or
international arbitration process to litigate, or to re-litigate when another fails to secure satisfactory
outcomes. In policy terms forum shopping may be used to find the most advantageous jurisdiction or venue
to advance an interest through legislation. De Bièvre and Thomann provide one application of this general
concept to Global Intellectual Property Regulation (De Bièvre and Thomann 2010).
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See also: WTO, “Canada- Pharmaceutical Patents DS114,” accessed November 5, 2015,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/1pagesum_e/ds114sum_e.pdf
86
Statutes of Canada (2001) “An Act to Amend the Patent Act,” Bill S-17, accessed September 5,
2015,
http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Language=E&Mode=1&DocId=2331026&File
=16#1 .
87
As illustrated by the Library of Parliament assessment of Bill S-17, not all patents would be
impacted by the legislation: “Clause 1 would amend section 45 of the Patent Act by providing that for
patents filed before 1 October 1989 where the 17-year term had not expired before the date on which the
section came into force, the patent term would be the later of 17 years from the date the patent had been
issued or 20 years from the date the patent application had been filed. This amendment would extend the
term of certain Old Act patents to 20 years from the date the applications for these patents had been filed.
Patents filed before 1 October 1989, however, whose 17-year term expires before clause 1 comes into
force, would not be extended” (Smith 2001). In other words, Canada’s phase-in mechanism was offside of
TRIPS but those patents whose 17-year term had already expired as of the coming into force date were not
impacted and thus only enjoyed 17 years protection despite the WTO ruling. S-17 was assented to on June
14, 2001 and came into force shortly thereafter. Government of Canada, Privy Council Office, Orders in
Council Database, accessed September 5, 2015, http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/oicddc.asp?lang=eng&Page=secretariats&txtOICID=&txtFromDate=&txtToDate=&txtPrecis=&txtDepartmen
t=&txtAct=An+Act+to+amend+the+Patent+Act+&txtChapterNo=&txtChapterYear=&txtBillNo=&rdoCo
mingIntoForce=&DoSearch=Search+%2F+List
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full protection that the US was pushing to become the global patent term standard under
TRIPS. While this still reflected a win for US IP producers, it maintained some shelter
for Canada’s generic industry and drug insurance plans. The compulsory licensing
framework in Bill C-22 effectively guaranteed 10 years of market exclusivity while
simultaneously allowing Canada to cap protection at that level.
Bill C-22 ushered in the Patented Medicine Prices Review Board (PMPRB), a
major policy innovation at the time, and marked the beginning of a long institutional
response to increased patent protection. This provided many key innovations in the
Canadian system that were directly aimed at mitigating the new IP regime for medicinal
technologies. The PMPRB was a unique regulatory scheme internationally and positioned
Canada on the leading edge of controlling patent pharmaceutical costs through
international benchmarking. As noted by the PMPRB in its own call for policy renewal
after nearly 30 years:
In 1987, when the PMPRB price referencing model was conceived, the
concept of benchmarking domestic prices against prices in other
countries was in its relative infancy. Today, price referencing is widely
used in international price regulation but increasingly as an adjunct to
other forms of cost containment. Between 2010 and 2012 alone, 23
European countries began planning or executed significant reforms to
their pharmaceutical price regulatory framework to achieve greater cost
savings (PMPRB 2015).
Benchmarking was successful for many years. As other countries also started
benchmarking many added other cost-containment measures as part of their pricing and
health insurance reimbursement regimes. The success of the PMPRB’s mechanisms has
been examined to some extent in the pharmaceutical policy literature and has been
evaluated as a model for potential international policy export (Eastman 1994; Morin
2011). However, its specific model now seems somewhat out of date and there are many
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calls to revisit its mandate to promote “affordability” or put downward pressure on prices
as opposed to its strict legislated role of preventing “non-excessive prices” (Naylor et al.
2015, 30, 89, 91; PMPRB 2016). Nevertheless, the original legislation, Bill C-22,
established a powerful institution and provided the Board with considerable scope for
future reform.

Bill C-22 and the PMPRB
The government clearly anticipated that a powerful constraint to unbridled IP protections
was needed. For example, the government considered and rejected the idea of industry
self-regulation on the basis that it would not provide a sufficient guarantee of protection
to the public.88 There were several measures in Bill C-22 to constrain the impact of
enhanced patent protections.
Bill C-22 included reporting requirements for prices in “any Canadian market”
and costs of “making and marketing” such as research and development (Bill C-22 1987,
1187). This was an important provision for the government and public to ensure some
transparency and monitor the pricing of patented technologies.

Under the Act,

information such as pricing provided to the Board by patentees was to be in a “form and
manner and at such times and subject to such conditions as are prescribed” (Ibid, 1191).
Much of the technical details of the provision of information were to be outlined in
regulations and the Board’s own Guidelines. Where a patentee failed to provide
information or “a medicine pertaining to a patented invention is being sold in any market
in Canada at a price that in the opinion of the Board is excessive” the Board was
empowered to order the patentee to reduce its price to a non-excessive level (Ibid, 1188).
88

Canada Gazette, Part I, July 2, 1988 (2572).

76
In support of an excessive price determination the Board was directed in the Act
to consider “to such extent as the Board deems reasonable” a range of factors including
that product’s five-year pricing history (s. 41.15(5)a); prices of other medicines in the
same therapeutic class sold in the market during the preceding five years (s. 41.15(5)b);
international pricing for that medicine and others in its therapeutic class (s. 41.15(5)c);
and the consumer price index (s. 41.15(5)d). In the event those four previous factors were
considered but were not instructive in the determination of excessive price, the Board was
empowered to consider the Canadian cost of making and marketing (s. 41.15(6)a) and
“such other factors as are prescribed, or in the opinion of the Board, are relevant in the
circumstances” (s. 41.15(6)b). More specific use of these factors was later incorporated
into regulations and the Board’s Guidelines.89
A key feature of the PMPRB not robustly addressed in the pharmaceutical policy
literature is the fairly broad scope of its powers to interpret its legislated mandate. Bill C22 arguably spelled out very little of how the PMPRB would come to its determination of
“excessive pricing” and empowered the Board with considerable latitude for interpreting
the excessive pricing factors outlined in the Act. The Act was really just the starting point
for the establishment of the pricing regulator. Many of the most important technical
details of the price control mechanisms were developed over time and did not appear in
the initial legislative package. For example, the years 1989-1991—a period that the
PMPRB has colloquially termed “Ironing Out the Details”—included many important
discussions, consultations and policy refinements. These included: 1) the calculation of
the Consumer Price Index adjusted methodology, or how allowable prices would be
89

For a clear technical definition of how the Board defines ‘excessive pricing” see page 16 of:
PMPRB, (2015) “Compendium of Polices, Guidelines and Procedures,” version June 20, 2015, accessed
July 5, 2015, http://www.pmprb-cepmb.gc.ca/CMFiles/LRG/Guidelines/Compendium-June2015_E.pdf
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impacted by inflation; 2) supplementary guidelines on the Board’s price review
jurisdiction; 3) consultation on the methods used for determining excessive pricing; 4)
how the PMPRB would address therapeutic class comparisons, or the currently marketed
therapeutic comparators that would help benchmark the status quo pricing in a given
clinical area; 5) international pricing comparison data sources for those countries already
identified in regulation which would substantially impact allowable Canadian pricing; 6)
policy regarding comparable dosage forms, for example, the strength and amount of
active patented ingredients and how that should compare to other dosage forms; and
perhaps most importantly, 7) the definitions and pricing tests used by the PMPRB for
different categories or tiers of value ascribed to the patented technology, and thus, to
what extent that technology reflected a scientific “breakthrough” (PMPRB Newsletter
Volume 16, Special Issue No. 5, December 7, 2012).
These details and pricing tests were the sharp end of the PMPRB’s regulatory
spear. To have so many of these details largely subject to the pricing regulator’s
discretion was an important feature of the emerging institution that empowered it
considerably and created room for future policy change. This is illustrated in the
PMPRB’s own framing:
Given the open-ended nature of the exercise contemplated under the
legislation, many of the core administrative concepts which give
effect to the PMPRB’s consumer protection mandate have been
developed through the Guidelines….While the factors in the Act are
immutable (save amendment by Parliament), their open-ended nature
allows for a flexible and contextually driven interpretation of
excessive pricing under the Guidelines that evolves with time and
changing circumstances (PMPRB 2016).
In contrast to the “ironing out the details” phase, the PMPRB framed the actual 1987 Act
amendments and 1988 regulations as the phases of “creation” and “setting the stage,”
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respectively (PMPRB Newsletter Volume 16, Special Issue No. 5, December 7, 2012).
Clearly, the Canada-US compromise over the FTA and C-22 was only a starting point
and Canada retained considerable regulatory autonomy and administrative flexibility
despite the new patent rules.
Bill C-22 also specified the composition, appointment procedures, annual
reporting requirements, and details related to tribunal hearings of the quasi-judicial body
vested with “all such powers, rights and privileges as are vested in a superior court of
record” (Bill C-22 1987, 1197). Provisions for Board Staff who came to play a central
role in the work of the PMPRB were also referenced. In addition to Board Staff, the
PMPRB would also establish the Human Drug Advisory Panel (HDAP) to recommend
appropriate comparators from a scientific perspective for the therapeutic comparisons the
Board was empowered to make under the amended Patent Act (PMPRB, Human Drug
Advisory Panel: Terms of Reference, 2015b). This body was the primary mechanism
through which the clinical benefits of a patented product were evaluated as a determinant
of allowable price. This effectively created a regulatory system that evaluated the
incremental clinical benefits of patented products and tied the maximum price of those
products to the level of improvement provided over existing technologies.
The primary data considered in this evaluation process were the clinical trials
used to support a product’s marketing authorization that were compared to the similar
trial data for existing comparator technologies already on the market. This required
HDAP’s membership to have considerable clinical expertise to make an assessment of
comparative therapeutic advantages. Similarly, the PMPRB’s staff required considerable
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economic expertise, as their role was to conduct the relevant pricing tests as informed by
the HDAP clinical review. These pricing tests are discussed below.
Separating C-22 and its implementing regulation from the trade deal was an
important win on Canada’s part that allowed the PMPRB to grow and evolve as an entity
separate from the FTA’s commitments and implementing legislation. The Act to
implement the Free Trade Agreement between Canada and the United States of America,
was assented to 30 December 1988, just over three months after C-22’s implementing
regulations were adopted (Bill C-65, An Act to implement the Free Trade Agreement
between Canada and the United States of America, 1988). This allowed Canada to
demonstrate progress to the US on IP reform while maintaining considerable autonomy
for future regulatory action. In other words, Canadian policy makers were able to secure
a critical trade deal and fine-tune price control measures later in separate regulations and
technical guidance. The trade-off for expanded IP rights in the form of limits to
compulsory licensing and an extended patent term was a powerful new pricing regulator
whose price controls would come to be a key object of discussion in the subsequent
multilateral TRIPS negotiation (Interview with a Canadian official, December 5, 2015).
Two aspects of jurisdictional breadth further support the PMPRB as a powerful
pricing regulator. The PMPRB would take a broad approach to the interpretation of its
legislated jurisdiction and in 1996 the Federal Court of Appeal affirmed this view. The
appeal court defined the PMPRB’s jurisdiction as applying when there existed even a
“slender thread of a connection” between a patent and a medicine. 90 This meant that the
PMPRB could claim jurisdiction in essentially any case where a patent existed even if it
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ICN Pharmaceuticals Inc and ICN Canada Ltd v. Canada (PMPRB) [1996], Federal Court of
Appeal 68 C.P.R. (3d), 417 – 441.
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was a process patent only tangentially related to a product. The PMPRB’s jurisdictional
breadth was further entrenched by the Federal Court of Appeal who affirmed the PMPRB
view that “a person need not own the patent over a particular medicine to be considered a
‘patentee’ in respect of that medicine within the meaning of subsection 79(1) of the
Patent Act.”91

The court held that the existence of a licence or an “implied” licence

could infer PMPRB jurisdiction over a non-patent owner. Secondly, the PMPRB also
claims “retroactive jurisdiction to the ‘patent pending’ period and will assert jurisdictions
in the event of a patent dedication” (Critchley and Dietrich 2014, 56). Speaking in 2002,
then Executive Director of the PMPRB, Wayne Critchley, noted that Board policy was
that “once a patent is issued, its price review jurisdiction extends back to the date the
patent application was laid open for public inspection” and as many as 18% of new drug
products were launched on the Canadian market before the issuance of a first patent
(Critchley 2002, 15). The PMPRB’s logic here was that “because the patentee obtains the
benefit to sue for reasonable compensation during the laid-open period, it also incurs the
obligation to comply with the excessive pricing provisions” (Ibid).

PMPRB Implementing Regulation
Following Royal Assent of C-22 in November of 1987, the Government of Canada
initiated a regulatory consultation.92 It received comments from five provinces, several
pharmaceutical manufacturer associations and patent lawyers. Many of the comments
related to the difficulty of establishing foreign prices for the purpose of comparison. The
government noted that this was absolutely central to the PMPRB “fulfilling its mandate”
91
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and thus no changes were made to the international requirements (Patented Medicines
Regulations 1988, Canada Gazette Part II, SOR/88-474, 3955). The Canada Gazette II
announcing the passage of this regulation by Order in Council reiterated the brand
industry’s commitment to double its Canadian R&D-to-sales ratio from 4.9% to 10% by
1996 (Ibid, 3956). Importantly for the PMPRB’s capacity and future R&D investments,
these targets were not in any way binding upon industry even though referenced in the
regulatory package.
In September 1988 the Governor in Council, on recommendation of the Minister
of National Health and Welfare, enacted the Patented Medicines Regulations (Patented
Medicines Regulations SOR/88-474, 1988 Canada Gazette Part II, 3921).93 The
Regulations specified with greater precision what information patentees would be
required to file with the PMPRB and included all of the detailed forms and paperwork to
be filled out by the patentee for submission to the Board. The PMPRB regulates exfactory prices: what the manufacturer charges customers prior to the application of any
non-manufacturer mark-ups at the wholesale or pharmacy level. A primary feature of the
regulations was to indicate the list of foreign comparators that the PMPRB would use for
its calculation of “maximum non-excessive price.” Manufacturers would be responsible
for filing their prices in these countries with the Board.
The selection of comparator countries and pricing data (pricing sources) used in
those countries was an important decision that would greatly influence allowable prices
in Canada. The countries selected were Germany, France, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland, the
United Kingdom and the United States. These were all justifiable comparators for
93

The regulations were enacted November 15, 1988 with the full title “Regulations Respecting the
Reporting of Information Relating to Medicines and the Extent to Which Patented Medicines are Invented
and Developed in Canada.”
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Canada, but only a subset of the 23 OECD countries that were apparently considered by
policy makers (PMPRB 2015). According to the PMPRB, policy makers ultimately
focused on these seven countries for aspirational reasons as they reflected high R&D
investment jurisdictions.94 The application of those international prices and the method of
comparison was perhaps equally important. For example, it was consequential to patentee
prices whether the Canadian maximum non-excessive price was tied to the international
average, maximum, lowest, median or other pricing benchmark.
These important details were not specified in C-22. Also, the specific source of
international pricing data was not specified at this time. It should be noted that prices
within each international market can range considerably. The PMPRB’s use of publicly
available US “list” prices, which do not include confidential rebates and perhaps obscure
actual average net prices, has been a flashpoint for criticism in recent years. Some argue
that US pricing data should be excluded completely, or if used, US pricing should be
established exclusively on the Federal Supply Schedule (FSS). This is the price that some
US federal government drug plans pay and are typically much lower than US list prices
published in the “Red Book.” 95 Such an alternative comparison would force the Board’s
calculation of Canadian maximum non-excessive pricing down in many cases. As such,
this is a common point raised by advocates of PMPRB reform who want to achieve lower
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“At the pre-publication stage of these regulations, policy makers initially proposed a more
representative cross-section of 23 OECD countries for the Schedule; however, by the time of final
publication, they opted for a more aspirational list in the sense that the selected countries had ‘R&D
expenditures at levels that we (Canada) intend to emulate’” (PMPRB 2015).
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The “Red Book” is a commercial publication of publicly available list prices and is one of the
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Price Verification and Formulas: 2015,” accessed July 5, 2016, http://www.pmprbcepmb.gc.ca/view.asp?ccid=1142,.
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patented drug prices. The PMPRB eventually incorporated the FSS price as one source
for average US price comparisons.96
The 1988 Patented Medicines Regulations reiterated the objective of Canadian
research and development (R&D) and clinical trials promotion. The regulations defined
the “Extent to Which Medicines are Invented and Developed in Canada” as such:
A medicine is invented and developed in Canada if the major part of the
inventing and the major part of the developing of the medicine to a
marketable state have been conducted in Canada, including the major
part of the design and control of Phase III clinical trials and, where
possible, the major part of the conduct of Phase III clinical trials”
(Patented Medicines Regulations 1988, Canada Gazette Part II,
SOR/88-474, 3925).
The regulations articulated the mechanisms to assess this contribution in considerable
detail. This included a definition of R&D that would come to be a source of future
consternation with the patented pharmaceutical industry.
The regulations specified “‘research and development’ means those activities for
which expenditures qualify, or would qualify if the expenditures were made by a taxpayer
in Canada, for an investment tax credit in respect of scientific research and experimental
development under the Income Tax Act as that Act read on December 1, 1987.” The
industry would later contest that many of their investments made in Canada such as
funding for venture capital and some expenditures on employment were not captured
under the calculation and worked with the government to compile an alternative
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This was implemented in 2000. PMPRB NEWSletter January 2000, accessed October 25, 2015,
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calculation.97 However, the R&D measurements would prove to be a satisfactory general
metric. To date, this method for calculating R&D remains in place.
The promised benefits of enhanced R&D spending and the PMPRB as the new
institutional mechanism to monitor these investments was part of an explicit bargain for
limitations to the compulsory licensing regime and attempted to reflect balance between
new IP rights and “protecting consumer interests” (Patented Medicines Regulations 1988,
Canada Gazette Part II, SOR/88-474, 3952). The regulatory package noted the
government’s intent of aligning Canada more closely with international patent norms;
implicitly, those being championed by the US.98 The 7 to 10-year limit on compulsory
licences was not a full attempt at harmonization with US standards but did provide a
major new advantage to the US drug industry.
As a limitation to this expanded market exclusivity, the PMPRB was “empowered
to require corrective action by the patentee in respect of the selling price of the patented
medicine or to direct that the product…of the patentee is no longer eligible for
exclusivity” (Ibid, 3956). A Board order in this regard was not initially retroactive in the
sense that the government could not reclaim excessive revenues accumulated by the
manufacturer above the regulated price. The novel ability to order lower prices was a
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KPMG (2014) “Summary of 2013 R&D Spending and Investments by Rx&D Members,” June 13,
2014, accessed January 4, 2016,
http://sharing.canadapharma.org/CMFiles/Our%20Industry/Industry%20Facts/2014-0620_RxD_RD_Report_FINAL_EN.pdf ). The steering committee for this alternative calculation of R&D
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R&D methodology. However, the regulations have not been changed perhaps due to the contentious
politics of regulatory amendments in this area.
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“While the amendments to the Patent Act are based on a restriction of competition, such
restriction is a normal aspect of the protection provided by the patent process. The amendments and these
Regulations will improve Canada's competitive position in international pharmaceutical research and
development by bringing Canada's patent protection in respect of pharmaceuticals more into line with that
of other industrialized countries” (Canada Gazette Part II, SOR/88-474, 3954-5).
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substantial power embodied in the new regulatory institution and set the stage for later
expansion of PMPRB powers regarding retroactive revenues.99
This regulatory flexibility is important to note. The introduction of the US Federal
Supply Schedule (FSS) price is an excellent illustration of the PMPRB’s general latitude
in interpreting the regulations and powers to articulate this interpretation in its own
Guidelines. From the beginning, the PMPRB Guidelines did not require that companies
file FSS prices. In its argument for later inclusion of the FSS price, the Board cited its
“view that the Patented Medicines Regulations require patentees to file publicly available
prices listed in the U.S. [Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA)] formulary along with
the other foreign prices filed.” This interpretation was unassailable, despite considerable
contestation from IP owners. But at the same time, there was nothing strictly forcing the
PMPRB to include the FSS price in its calculation of the international price comparison,
as the Guidelines had reflected since inception. The DVA formulary contained a couple
of different price points—some lower than the FSS price—that were not used by the
PMPRB as part of the new policy. The inclusion of the FSS price in the international
price comparison was transitioned in over two years and precipitated price reductions in
excess of 10% for only a small minority of cases.100 However, the PMPRB technically
could have chosen other lower prices on the DVA formulary. The point here is that
throughout the implementation process, the Board retained considerable power in its
application of the Patent Act and the more detailed regulations. Regardless of trade
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Ibid, 2.
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commitments, Canada maintained considerable autonomy and future flexibility when
implementing them.

1989–1991: “Ironing out the details” and the Excessive Price Guidelines
As discussed, implementation of the PMPRB’s price control function was centrally
articulated in regulations and the drafting of its Excessive Price Guidelines as the Act
only identified broad factors the Board should consider in its determination of excessive
price. Consultation on the Guidelines commenced in 1988 and its first iteration was
published in July of that year. The Board defines its Guidelines as providing “transparent
predictable guidance to patentees on the approach Board Staff uses when determining
whether prices of patented medicines are excessive… Even though the Guidelines are not
binding on the Board… [it] considers the Guidelines an articulation of the methodology
used in applying the factors in the Patent Act” (PMPRB 2006, 3). The Board has
exclusive jurisdiction over the Guidelines and in the few instances when it has made
substantial changes to them has engaged in robust consultation with provincial Ministers
of Health, manufacturers, patients and physician groups.
The Excessive Price Guidelines are important because they articulate the
methodology and analytical tests used to tie the allowable price of a patented product to
its comparative therapeutic value over existing products. For example, the Board would
reward a “breakthrough” or “substantial improvement” product a higher price than those
with only a “modest improvement” or those essentially equivalent to existing
technologies. Breakthrough or Category 2 patented technologies were granted the
international median price for that same product, often at a premium over Canadian
prices in that drug class. Drug products providing “moderate, little or no therapeutic
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advantage over comparable medicines” or Category 3 drugs were granted a maximum
non-excessive price according to a “Therapeutic Class Comparison” (TCC) test. This
compared “the price of the new patented drug product to the prices of other clinically
equivalent drug products used to treat the same disease, and sold in the same markets” as
identified by the Human Drug Advisory Panel (PMPRB 2006, 8-10).
As the name suggests, this Therapeutic Class Comparison (TCC) test helped to
hold prices for drugs with only marginal improvements to a price comparable to existing
products in the same therapeutic area. Category 1 products, which included new strength
or dosage forms of an existing medicine, would be priced according to a “reasonable
relationship” test, which would ensure that minor modifications to marketing or dosing
forms101 did not result in any premium price (Ibid, 9-10). Figure 3.1 summarizes the
pricing tests and thresholds used by the PMPRB in its early Guidelines. For information,
ANNEX A summarizes the rules as modified to provide additional categorical
specificity.102
Figure 3.1: PMPRB Pricing Categories and Associated Tests, as of July 1989103

PMPRB Category Definitions

Allowable pricing test and PMPRB
Definitions
One - drug products are a new strength
Reasonable Relationship (RR) test:
(e.g., 50 mg v. 100 mg) or a new dosage considers the association between the price
form (e.g., tablet v. capsule) of an of the new strength of the existing
existing medicine
medicine and the prices of other strengths
of the same medicine in the same or
101

Dosage forms are the final preparation that includes an active pharmaceutical ingredient.
“Dosage forms include, among other groups: oral solid (e.g., capsule, tablet, caplet); oral liquid (e.g., drops,
solutions, powders for solution or suspension); topical (e.g., aerosol, cream, patches, powder) etc” (Ibid,
10).
102
New rules with additional details on each regulatory category became effective January 2010. As
is typical of Guidelines amendments, this followed an extensive stakeholder consultation that began in May
2006.
103
Originally released in July 1988 and amended in July 1989. PMPRB. 2006. Discussion Guide for
the Consultations on the Board’s Excessive Price Guidelines. Accessed January 3, 2016 http://www.pmprbcepmb.gc.ca/cmfiles/consultations/BoardsExcessivePriceGuidelines/DisGuide-e38LSN-1262006-7439.pdf
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Two - a breakthrough or substantial
improvement over existing medicines
A breakthrough drug product is the first
one to be sold in Canada that effectively
treats a particular illness or effectively
addresses a particular indication.
A substantial improvement is one that,
relative to other drug products sold in
Canada,
provides
substantial
improvement in therapeutic effects (such
as increased efficacy or major reductions
in dangerous adverse reactions) or
provides significant savings to the
Canadian health care system.

comparable dosage forms
International Price Comparison (IPC)
test: compares the average transaction
price of the new patented drug product
with the publicly available ex-factory
prices of the same dosage form and
strength of the same medicine sold in the
countries listed in the regulations (France,
Germany, Italy,
Sweden, Switzerland, the U.K. and the
U.S.).

Median of the International Prices (MIP)
test: is mainly used for category 2 drugs
but may also be applied to category 3
drugs when it is impossible or
inappropriate to identify comparable drugs
in Canada.
Three
- moderate, little or no Therapeutic Class Comparison (TCC)
therapeutic advantage over comparable test: compares the price of the new
medicines
patented drug product to the prices of other
clinically equivalent drug products used to
treat the same disease, and sold in the same
markets at a price that the Board considers
not to be excessive.
In the context of a TCC test, the price of a
new medicine is considered excessive if it
exceeds the highest price of the
therapeutically comparable drugs in
Canada.
At the time of the Guidelines’ establishment, there was considerable controversy
over what formula to use, specifically for the international price comparison. The price
determination factors in the Act directed the Board to consider the price that the medicine
is sold at in other countries. Industry “considered the median an arbitrary and inflexible
measure having inherent statistical problems of measurement” whereas others thought
that “Canada should not be expected to contribute at a premium” pricing level (PMPRB
2006, 17). While the Board technically had the power to use the minimum price, or some
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other average price, it resisted opposition to the international median price for
breakthrough products. It deferred to the Act to justify the use of international pricing
benchmarks in general terms, and did not bow to the pressure of industry over the
specific issue of the median (Ibid). Again, this feature was a product of an
implementation process that was light on details and allowed officials considerable
latitude following legislative implementation.
US industry also took issue with the Therapeutic Class Comparison (TCC) and
noted it would put downward pressure on pricing, for example, in cases where a low
priced generic drug was the only drug in a therapeutic category. In its justification for
keeping the TCC test, the PMPRB noted a key provision in the Act that “does not
differentiate patented medicines from non-patented or generic medicines” (Ibid). Thus in
the Board’s view the comparison to lower priced generics was justifiable in some cases
even if it was the only comparable marketed product. Taken together, this is a good
illustration of how the Board uses its flexibility at some times but also leverages the more
rigid elements of its legislated constraints both in service of its consumer protection
mandate.
In addition to pricing regulation on introductory prices at product launch, price
increase controls according to changes in the consumer price index (CPI) were
introduced. The Patent Act amendments mandated that CPI is one factor that the PMPRB
must consider. The Board has interpreted this such that patentees cannot typically
increase prices in excess of inflation. The CPI methodology outlined in the Guidelines
has been subject of debate and refinement over the years. However, the core function to
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cap price increases for patent products has remained. The 1989 version of the Guidelines
spelled out the technical details of the Board’s CPI methodology:
the price of a [drug identification number (DIN)] at the time of a review
(the current price) will be compared with the benchmark price of the
medicine adjusted for the cumulative change in the Consumer Price
Index (CPI-adjusted price). Where the current price of the DIN is
greater than the CPI-adjusted price, the current price will be presumed
to be excessive unless there is significant evidence to the contrary
(PMPRB, Price Increases for Patented Medicines: Discussion Paper,
2005).
In other words, normally CPI would bound the upper limit for price increases but the
Board empowered itself with some discretion over justifiable exceptions. This CPI
component has added a price stability component to the PMPRB’s impact over patented
medicines, which is a key difference from the more market-based US system where price
increases for patented and even non-patented drugs are sometimes an issue.104 US
stakeholders often cite Canada’s system of price control as a potential model even though
it is not always understood that the PMPRB only regulates patented products and nonpatented drug prices are regulated to various degrees by provincial governments that have
constitutional responsibility for “property and civil rights” under section 92(13) of the
Constitution Act, 1867. In fact, the constitutional authority of the PMPRB to regulate
prices of patented drugs has been subject to challenge105 and the courts have validated the
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Andrew Pollack “Drug Goes From $13.50 a Tablet to $750, Overnight” The New York Times,
September 20, 2015, accessed December 18, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/21/business/a-hugeovernight-increase-in-a-drugs-price-raises-protests.html?smid=tw-nytimes&smtyp=cur&_r=0
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In response to a PMPRB hearing, one company sought a court order “Declaring that sections 83
through 86 of the Patent Act RS. C. 1985, … are ultra vires the Parliament of Canada in that the price
regulation scheme created by the impugned provisions exceeds the powers granted to Parliament under s.
91(22), or other federal power, of the Constitution Act, 1867 and improperly intrudes into provincial
jurisdiction over property and civil rights in the province under S. 92(13) of the Constitution Act, 1867”
Alexion Pharmaceuticals v. Patented Medicine Prices Review Board and Attorney General of Canada.
“Notice of Application Under Sections 18(1)(a) and 18(1)(b) of the Federal Courts Act” T-1537-15.
Accessed September 26, 2015, http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/2431416/alexion-federal-courtfiling-sept-11-2015.pdf. The Federal Court dismissed this constitutional challenge in June 2016.
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Board’s jurisdiction on numerous occasions (PMPRB 2016). This included the validation
of the Board’s “consumer protection” mandate by the Supreme Court of Canada.106
CPI was also an important metric for Canada’s transition to regulated prices. One
of the policy issues that the Board had to consider was if and how to apply its pricing
methodology to products already on the market. Immediate implementation of the TCC
and even the more generous median test would have likely had a substantial impact on
prices and faced considerable backlash from manufacturers and the United States. The
PMPRB decided to apply those more restrictive tests to new products and use CPI to cap
future prices for existing marketed products. The Board leaned on the Act to justify this
decision: “After careful consideration of the factors in the Act to be used in determining
whether a price is excessive, the Board decided that it was reasonable to place the
greatest weight on the Consumer Price Index (CPI) factor in assessing the prices of
existing medicines and to establish the benchmark price as the selling price on December
7, 1987” (PMPRB 2006, 16). Per this transition measure, the Guidelines’ therapeutic
pricing tests would not be retroactive but price increases would be controlled going
forward. The effect of this was to delay the full impact of the Guidelines somewhat.
While there were immediate impacts for new patented products, it was not until 1994 that
aggregate average prices actually fell below the international median of prices
(Government of Canada 1997, 14, 19).
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Celgene Corp. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2011 SCC 1, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 3, accessed August
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protection objectives by preventing it from protecting Canadian purchasers of medicine.”
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The combination of therapeutic benchmark pricing and CPI pricing controls
would ensure that pricing in Canada was tied to a patented product’s value, and that
average Canadian prices (adjusted for exchange rates) were typically lower than many
international prices. According to the PMPRB:
In 1997, 78% of patented drug products were priced below the median
international price in Canada; in 1987, only 45% were priced below
the median international price. By 1997, prices for patented drugs in
Canada had come down relative to the seven other countries in the
basket. In 1987, Canada had the highest price in over 21% of the
cases, but this had dropped to less than 2% of the cases in 1997
(PMPRB 1998, “Road Map for the Next Decade,” 22-3).
This pricing differential had international political implications, particularly for CanadaUS relations. Given that drug prices were considerably lower in Canada as a result of
pricing regulations and exchange rate factors a drug “reimportation” industry emerged
where US citizens increasingly sought to purchase their drugs from Canada.
Reimportation refers to products supplied by US companies to the Canadian market that
are then sold back into the US market at lower prices than paid by other US customers.
This bilateral irritant has ebbed and flowed in recent decades and often resurfaces during
periods of Canadian dollar depreciation. Drug reimportation is prohibited in the US but
the practice has nevertheless proliferated under a personal use exemption (Drabiak 2005,
139).
Critics of high US drug prices have most recently reinvigorated this debate led by
Senator Bernie Sanders, who introduced the Prescription Drug Affordability Act of 2015.
The Bill would facilitate the reimportation of drugs from Canada.107 Sanders even
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highlighted a 1999 trip he took as “the first member of Congress to take Americans
across the border to purchase lower-cost drugs in Canada.”108 Presidential candidate rival
Hillary Clinton similarly highlighted reimportation in her campaign plan for Lowering
Prescription Drug Costs.109 Reimportation and Canada’s market remains attractive to
advocates of US drug reform largely due to the combination of favourable exchange rates
and the price controls of the PMPRB.
In summary, Canada established a new pricing institution for patented products
with broad, open-ended powers in the context of implementing its FTA. This institution
would substantially mitigate the effect of IP reforms. The following section examines the
evolution of the institution to address additional IP protections under TRIPS and NAFTA
and shows how the preservation of price regulation institutions helped to shape those
negotiated outcomes.

Adoption of the Draft TRIPS in NAFTA
This section argues that an important Canadian goal of the international negotiations was
to preserve the PMPRB’s capacity to regulate. The PMPRB was a key component of the
domestic sales pitch for NAFTA’s IP reforms and was significantly strengthened in the
NAFTA context. The section also argues that timing and sequencing of NAFTA and
TRIPS were important factors in the ultimate negotiated outcomes, and perhaps the
ultimate conclusion, the Uruguay Round and TRIPS. Power, existing institutions, and
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historical sequencing of agreements are all required to understand the NAFTA/TRIPS
outcome on intellectual property.
While the impacts and regulatory feedbacks of Bill C-22 were playing out in
Canada, negotiations in Geneva on the Uruguay Round and TRIPS continued on much of
the same subject matter. Canada’s 1987 limitation on compulsory licences actually
reflected a considerable policy accomplishment by the generic drug sector given that
qualified abolishment was clearly imminent and Canada’s Progressive Conservative
Government under Prime Minister Brian Mulroney explicitly preferred this option. The
position was manifest in early submissions Canada made in October 1989 on the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade’s (GATT) TRIPS negotiations. Canada supported
compulsory licences only under certain circumstances:
Compulsory licensing should be available to parties only under certain
limited conditions and in accordance with the Paris Convention. This
Convention contains certain safeguards but is not sufficient. In
particular, it does not require adequate compensation or access to
judicial review. Accordingly, the legitimate public interest purposes for
which compulsory licensing could be required by participants to a
TRIPS agreement should be defined. In addition, important safeguards
should be provided in order to protect the rights of the patentee in terms
of: [In bulleted list] Full transparency; National Treatment; Nonexclusivity; Adequate compensation; Judicial review (Government of
Canada, 1989a, MTN.GNG/NG11/W/47 October 25: 6).
Judicial review was an important element of Canada’s submission that would provide a
patent owner the ability to challenge any compulsory licences issued. This would affirm
the power of domestic courts to have the final word on interpreting whether granted
licences complied with TRIPS exceptions to exclusive use (i.e. acceptable compulsory
licences). The excerpt also supports a central contention of this study that trade
agreements and IP regulation are historically cumulative and agreements typically build
off of and address issues with past treaties, in this case, both the Paris Convention and
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Canada’s earlier commitments on compulsory licences. International regulatory positions
are shaped by history.
On patentable subject matter, Canada called for explicit reference in TRIPS given
that the Paris Convention did not address this. Canada also provided its favoured
definition:
The [Paris] Convention is silent with respect to patentable subject
matter, necessary conditions for obtaining a patent and term of
protection and it deals only marginally with the rights conferred by a
patent. Accordingly, Canada considers that significant improvements
should be added to those standards in the Paris Convention, and that
these should be developed as part of a TRIPS agreement…Patents
should be available under the first to file principle. Patents should be
available for inventions that are new, useful and unobvious
(Government of Canada 1989a, MTN.GNG/NG11/W/47 October 25:
6, 11).
This shows that Canada was attentive to the issue and importance of the definition of
patentable subject matter that would come to be an issue in subsequent patent utility
litigation (discussed in Chapter 5). Canada did not propose a definition of “useful” at this
time and there were no references to utility as being linked to industrial application as
contained in the final TRIPS text. TRIPS reads “patents shall be available for any
inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they
are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application” (TRIPS
1994, Article 27(1) Patentable Subject Matter). Canada’s GATT submission on TRIPS
refers at least five times to where “National laws” should prevail and its proposed
definition of patentable subject matter would leave considerable latitude for national
courts to interpret the terms “new, useful and unobvious.”
Canada also submitted a separate position on TRIPS enforcement. This similarly
encouraged national flexibility and general international harmonization of enforcement
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standards, while not necessarily creating identical systems: “a TRIPS agreement should
recognize that individual participants will want to maintain reasonable flexibility in the
application of basic international enforcement obligations within their own national legal
systems” (Government of Canada 1989, MTN.GNG/NG11/W/42 September 5: 2).
Canada appears to have been keenly aware of protecting sovereignty as part of the TRIPS
Agreement. It also wanted to assure “reasonable” but not “excessive” compensation to
inventors and balance this “against the rights of the public-at-large to reasonable access
to the innovation/creation at reasonable prices and to legitimate access for such purposes
as research and education” where rights are granted by the government “representing the
broad

interests

of

the

public-at-large”

(Government

of

Canada

1989a,

MTN.GNG/NG11/W/47 October 25: 4). This language regarding balance and a public
bargain would resurface throughout Canada’s history of intellectual property legislation
and litigation (see chapter 5).
Senior officials commenced negotiation on the North American Free Trade
Agreement in Toronto on June 18, 1991 with intellectual property as one of six broad
areas established by the senior negotiators. From the outset, the model established in the
bilateral agreement between Canada and the United States in 1987 formed the basis of
negotiations (Cameron and Tomlin 2000, 82). As noted by one Canadian official, “the
whole concept of NAFTA came out of the fact that we already had a free trade agreement
with the United States” (Interview with a Canadian official, December 15, 2015). This
follow-on agreement to the FTA took many of the IP provisions negotiated but not
published in the FTA one step further. Canada initially resisted further change to its
compulsory licensing regime beyond what was agreed to under the FTA and Bill C-22.
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However, by December 1991 the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
Uruguay Round’s negotiators had reached a draft of TRIPS contained in the “Dunkel
Text”110 that would effectively prohibit most compulsory licensing. Canada’s then Trade
Minister Michael Wilson indicated that Canada would accede but positioned that Canada
would not stray too far from the TRIPS draft in NAFTA (Cameron and Tomlin 2000, 97,
104). The adoption of TRIPS effectively neutralized much of the negotiation regarding
intellectual property as part of NAFTA and Canadian negotiators centrally focused on
exemptions from free trade for cultural products that Canada was ultimately able to
secure (Ibid).
The timing and sequencing of NAFTA and TRIPS were major factors in the
ultimate negotiated outcomes, and perhaps the ultimate conclusion of a Uruguay Round
that included TRIPS. On intellectual property, NAFTA largely replicated what had
already been negotiated, but was yet to be formally agreed upon in the multilateral
context. With the Uruguay Round stalled in 1992-3 over agricultural issues, the trilateral
NAFTA deal was seen as a pump-primer111 to help drive the Uruguay Round to
finalization. According to one Canadian official:
at that point the Uruguay Round was stalled…The whole purpose of
NAFTA was to give the Uruguay Round some impetus or at least
convince others, that, see, we can do it trilaterally, so you better do that
for the world. And so it only seemed natural to sort of almost mirror the
Uruguay Round [TRIPS] in some ways…The interesting thing about
NAFTA is although it looks like it came first, it in fact came
second…and you will notice that NAFTA is almost word for word, 90
110

The Dunkel text was an early Draft of the multilateral trade agreement named for GATT
Director-General Arthur Dunkel. Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, GATT Doc. No MTN.TNC/W/FA (Dec. 20, 1991), accessed September
13, 2015, https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/92130093.pdf
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As discussed above, the pump-primer metaphor reflects an intentional action that acts as a source
or impetus for some related action. The term pump-primer is used here to describe the role NAFTA played
in helping to provide an impetus to finalize the multilateral Doha Round of trade negotiations.
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percent, what’s in the TRIPS Agreement. And that’s because the TRIPS
Agreement had already been largely settled by the time NAFTA really
started…So clearly it was the view of all three participants, that having
negotiated hard for the last two-and-a-half, three years in Geneva, it
didn’t make much sense to re-invent the wheel…and as a result you
will see that a lot of the language in the TRIPS Agreement, is in fact,
what’s in NAFTA. Now ultimately NAFTA came first because…the
Uruguay Round had an agricultural issue that had to be resolved, and
that didn’t get resolved until after NAFTA. In fact, the Americans
would claim that having…signed NAFTA is what gave impetus to
conclude the Uruguay Round. In the TRIPS context, most of the TRIPS
and certainly, most of the patent stuff, had already been agreed among
[Canada, US, Mexico], and the most difficult one in the Uruguay
Round context, among the three of us…was obviously compulsory
licensing. And that language on compulsory licensing had already been
agreed in the TRIPS Agreement (Interview with a Canadian official,
December 5, 2015).
This account is consistent with the historical institutionalist notion that the sequencing of
events can be a determinant of international and domestic regulatory regimes. As a matter
of practicality, NAFTA’s IP content was largely determined by TRIPS. TRIPS, while
largely resolved from a negotiation perspective, required considerable impetus to be
finalized from a political perspective and NAFTA was central to that legitimation
strategy. Market power was perhaps a necessary but not sufficient condition to finalize
Uruguay and TRIPS. Legitimation through NAFTA seems to have been a key precursor.
The final GATT and TRIPS negotiated outcome published for party signatures on
April 15, 1994 also largely reflected the Dunkel text of December 1991 (Dwyer 1999,
221). A change of power in Washington following the November 1992 election saw
President Clinton’s administration adopt a strong multilateral liberalization agenda and
resume GATT Uruguay Round negotiations. These had previously been launched in 1986
under the Reagan administration, but were extensively negotiated under the George H.W.
Bush administration. However, there was a considerable stalling of the Uruguay Round
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as the Clinton administration in 1993 prioritized passing NAFTA through Congress and
sought changes to the Dunkel draft with respect to TRIPS in response to calls from
business sectors including semiconductors, music, film, and pharmaceuticals. The
pharmaceutical industry wanted TRIPS patent protection to apply for products in their
current research “pipeline” and shorter transition periods for developing countries to
phase in developed-country standards than those that were provided in the Dunkel draft.
Pipeline protection referred to policy that would essentially provide TRIPS patent
provisions to drugs that had already been patented but were still in the research phase of
development and had not yet been marketed when TRIPS came into effect (Dwyer 1999,
515, 518, 533).
Such concerns were not simply minor obstacles associated with a fringe US
business constituency. The US “knowledge economy” and service sectors were
incredibly important to the negotiations and perhaps the very existence and future of the
US multilateral agenda. Before Canada’s Parliamentary Trade Committee, eminent trade
scholar and former Canadian official Dr. Sylvia Ostry discussed, at length, the impact of
those sectors and the undergirding political dynamics:
The last round of the Uruguay Round was unique in that it is unlikely
that the United States would have maintained its commitment to the
multilateral system without the support, and the active support, of the
American business community. The reason for that is many in the
United States believed it was easier, since they were a superpower, to
get things unilaterally or bilaterally. If you're powerful you can use
aggressive unilateralism or bilateralism, so why do you need this
cumbersome
international
rule-based
system
in
Geneva?
The administration was worried about that, and rightly so, since in the
mid-1980s there was an enormous protectionist surge in Congress
stemming from Reaganomics, from the growing deficit and the
overvalued dollar. Indeed, I would argue that this is why we had the
[Canada-US] FTA. It was an insurance policy, because we [Canada]
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would have been killed if any of those 114 bills [protectionist bills
proposed in US Congress] had come through.
What happened was that there was an amazing rallying of the business
community, both in the intellectual property and in the service area,
which said to the administration, if you can deliver these new issues, as
they were called—services, intellectual property, and investment—we'll
deliver the multilateral support, which they did. They organized
coalitions, dragging the Japanese Keidanren [Japan Business
Federation] in, the European business round table, and so on. Their deal
was, we want the new issues and we'll support the multilateral system.
That's in fact what happened (Ostry, Standing Committee on Foreign
Affairs and International Trade, Tuesday, April 27, 1999, at 0920).
To summarize, US internal politics and the legacy of Congressional isolationism
provided the IP and services industries with an enormous opportunity for alignment with
the US executive branch and a vital source of support for the GATT Uruguay Round.
“New issues” such as intellectual property and investment protections were a driving
force in those multilateral agreements. Intellectual property had in fact been one of the
original 15 Uruguay Round subjects at the launch of that round in 1986.
While the overarching interest and support was critical, it is important not to
overstate the ability of this corporate power to translate into specific desired outcomes in
every instance. All negotiations conclude with some compromises. For example, after
considerable discussion of the Dunkel text, the US pharmaceutical industry did not
ultimately achieve so called “pipeline protection” in TRIPS. NAFTA, namely 1709
section 4, was thus in some ways more protective than TRIPS: “Given that ‘pipeline
protection’ had been secured in the NAFTA agreement, the U.S. pharmaceutical industry
was dismayed by their inability to have the same protection in the TRIPS [A]greement”
(Dwyer 1999, 534-535, 568). The lack of pipeline protection for pharmaceuticals in the
final TRIPS Agreement was apparently part of a trade-off made by the Clinton
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Administration for modified compulsory licensing provisions requested by the
semiconductor industry in the form of more restrictive (fewer) exceptions to compulsory
licensing specific to those technologies (Dwyer 1999, 528, 536).112 In exchange for this
concession to Silicon Valley, the USTR essentially abandoned its positions on pipeline
protection and shorter transition periods for developing countries despite a strong
lobbying effort by the US pharmaceutical industry (Ibid).
NAFTA also went further than TRIPS in terms of offering a specified period
during which data used in the application for a marketing approval would be protected.
TRIPS only specified that confidential data submitted to a regulator would be protected
against “unfair commercial use” (TRIPS, Section 7: Protection of Undisclosed
Information, Article 39(3)). By contrast, NAFTA specified that no other manufacturer
could “rely on such data in support of an application for product approval” during a
period of “not less than 5 years from the date on which the Party granted approval to the
person who produced the data” (NAFTA, Article 1711: Trade Secrets, Section 5-6). This
“data protection” was “a NAFTA innovation” in that it had never before been
incorporated into a trade deal and was thus a “ground breaker” for international IP
negotiations (Interview with a Canadian official, December 5, 2015).113
It is perhaps not surprising that the IP protections (pipeline protection and data
protection) in NAFTA went slightly further than TRIPS despite Canadian ministerial
declarations to the contrary. Likely due to its pump-primer status and negotiation
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TRIPS Article 31 “Other Use Without Authorization of the Right Holder” section C, “Scope and
duration” differs from its sister provision in NAFTA Article 1709 “Patents” Section 10(C) “Scope and
duration” in that it specifies licenses for semi-conductors as only for “public non-commercial use” or to
remedy anti-competitive practices as determined by judicial review (NAFTA 1993) (TRIPS 1994).
113
It would have a major impact on future trade negotiations such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership
where this period of data protection for biologic drugs would feature prominently in the talks.
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dynamics, the US appears to have been willing to offer more in NAFTA to get that deal
done than it was willing to offer all countries in the Uruguay Round context and TRIPS.
The issue of data protection was in fact negotiated in both agreements but the US was
only able to “pay enough” for it in the NAFTA context:
There were a number of things that were included in NAFTA… which
weren’t included in TRIPS, and that’s because there was a number of
things that, well first of all, the dynamics of NAFTA were somewhat
different, and the price paid for them were somewhat different…in the
context of the TRIPS negotiations there was pretty much an
overwhelming opposition, including from Canada by the way, [to]
pipeline protection…and as a result… you could say that the
American’s couldn’t pay enough for it… that may be an appropriate
way of thinking about it in the negotiating context…
There were things that Canada paid [for] in NAFTA that it didn’t get in
the Uruguay Round, which were very important from a Canadian
perspective, and ultimately…. what that means in a negotiating context
[is] one tends to put a price on the number of concessions. And in the
context of the Uruguay Round that price was not met, but in the
NAFTA context it was.
… [Data protection] was debated in TRIPS too…it was kind of like the
pipeline stuff…it was a concession that Canada was willing to make in
NAFTA but not willing to make in TRIPS… and partly ‘cause a) we
were in really good company in TRIPS and b) because [there were]
additional concessions that were being made in NAFTA that weren’t
being made in the Uruguay Round (Interview with a Canadian official,
December 5, 2015).
In other words, the US was highly intent on seeing NAFTA settled with strong IP
protections and was willing to incentivise that agreement to go further on IP than the
draft of TRIPS as it was negotiated to that point in time.114 It is reasonable to infer that
the “price” paid by the US on NAFTA reflected its importance as a precursor to the
114

Linking trade to IP reforms within a treaty was a long-standing US goal. As noted by FTAnegotiators in a comprehensive book on those talks the “US interest in intellectual property was driven by
broad policy concerns and a desire to demonstrate to the world the feasibility of including intellectual
property in a trade agreement… [t]hey also wanted to resolve the long-standing pharmaceutical…. issues in
the context of an intellectual property package” (Hart, Dymond and Robertson 1994, 306).
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multilateral deal. Here again we see a balance between market power and temporal
considerations related to NAFTA as a pump-primer agreement. Knowledge of both
power and the sequencing of agreements is required to understand the outcome on
intellectual property.

Bill C-91 1993: Regulatory Institution Strengthened in Response to NAFTA
As Canada’s intellectual property regime transitioned to be NAFTA and TRIPS
compliant, past policy choices such as compulsory licensing and regulatory pricing
controls continued to have a powerful institutional legacy and shaped the regime going
forward. Canada’s existing institutional system even helped to shape international
regulatory standards as Canada acted to preserve the capacity of its domestic price
control institutions to constrain the impact of expanded IP protections. This section
explores these dynamics.
Many of Canada’s NAFTA and TRIPS intellectual property commitments were
implemented through Bill C-91, the Patent Act Amendment Act, 1992, which received
Royal Assent on February 4, 1993 (published in Canada Gazette III, Vol 16 (1), May 10,
1993). This was the last piece of major legislation passed before the February 24, 1993
announcement of the resignation of Prime Minister Brian Mulroney amid extremely low
popular support after eight and a half years of power.115 One key provision in C-91 was
to repeal section 39 of the former Patent Act enabling compulsory licensing.116
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CBC Digital Archives (1993) “Brian Mulroney steps down,” accessed December 12, 2015,
http://www.cbc.ca/archives/entry/brian-mulroney-steps-down
116
The Patent Act as it read in 1992 contained the following text that was amended by C-91: Section
39 (4) Licence under patent relating to medicine “Where, in the case of any patent for an invention
intended or capable of being used for medicine or for the preparation of production of medicine, an
application is made by any person for a licence to do one or more of the following things as specified in the
application, namely, (a) where the invention is a process, to use the invention for the preparation or
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Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement, entitled Other Use Without Authorization of
the Right Holder is the provision that effectively prohibits broad granting of compulsory
licences for patented products. As noted by a position paper on the WTO website the
actual term “compulsory licensing” is not specified in the TRIPS Agreement and there
are multiple exceptions to the prohibition including “national emergencies,” “other
circumstances of extreme urgency” or “public non-commercial use.”117 In other words,
TRIPS permits compulsory licensing only in certain situations and even ensures
compensation to patent holders. However, much of the language regarding those
exceptions is ambiguous (Ford 2000, 959, 963). This ambiguity allows for some latitude
with respect to national interpretation. Beyond those exceptions, however, the impact of
Article 31 is a general prohibition on compulsory licences.
For practical purposes, TRIPS would prevent a signatory government from
granting licences in support of a domestic commercial interest or strictly for costcontainment purposes. As noted above, compulsory licences had previously been used in
Canada to limit public health expenditures on patented pharmaceuticals, and in doing so,
supported the development of the Canadian generic pharmaceutical sector. TRIPS would
thus require substantial change to Canada’s compulsory licensing regime limited earlier
under Bill C-22. Canada did, however, build in two exceptions to patent infringement that
would help to soften the removal of compulsory licences.
For obvious reasons, Canada’s generic pharmaceutical industry was vehemently
production of medicine, import any medicine in the preparation or production of which the invention has
been used or sell any medicine in the preparation or production of which the invention has been used, or (b)
where the invention is other than a process, to import, make, use or sell the invention for medicine or for
the preparation or production of medicine, the Commissioner shall grant to the applicant a license to do the
things specified in the application except such, if any, of those things in respect of which he sees good
reason not to grant a licence.” (Patent Act as it read in 1992, as cited by: Zischka, Ing and Chung 2012, 28).
117
WTO, (2006) “TRIPS and pharmaceutical patents,” Online Fact Sheet September 2006, accessed
September 10, 2015, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/tripsfactsheet_pharma_2006_e.pdf
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opposed to the abolition of compulsory licences and according to one Canadian official,
these were among the most contentious parts of the TRIPS resolution (Interview with
Canadian official, December 5, 2015). In response to generic industry concerns, the
government noted the sector had prospered despite the passage of Bill C-22, growing
180% between 1987 and 1992.118 Canada’s TRIPS and NAFTA accession was a major
policy loss for the generic industry. However, during the implementation process via Bill
C-91, the generic industry was able to secure two important concessions. The first was a
so-called “early working” provision that allowed manufacturers to develop generic
products during the patent period. This appeared prominently at the beginning of C-91,
Section 55.2 (1):
It is not an infringement of a patent for any person to make, construct,
use or sell the patented invention solely for uses reasonably related to
the development and submission of information required under any law
of Canada, a province or a country other than Canada that regulates the
manufacture, construction, use or sale of any product (Bill C-91,
Canada Gazette III, Vol 16 (1), May 10, 1993).
This implementation manoeuvre by Canada was designed to advance the interests of its
generic industry. Manufacturers could work towards product approval during the patent
period and would be ready to compete in the market at the moment of patent expiry.
The second measure was a so-called “stockpiling” provision which was designed
with a similar objective to facilitate immediate generic market penetration. Section 55.2
(2) provided that:
It is not an infringement of a patent for any person who makes,
constructs, uses or sells a patented invention in accordance with
subsection (1) to make, construct or use the invention, during the
applicable period provided for by the regulations, for the manufacture
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Michael Wilson, Third Reading of Bill C-91, House of Commons Debates, December 10, 1992,
15021, accessed October 15, 2016, http://parl.canadiana.ca/view/oop.debates_HOC3403_12/219?r=0&s=1
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and storage of articles intended for sale after the date on which the term
of the patent expires” (Ibid).
This implementation manoeuvre allowed generic manufacturers to mass-produce and
store drug products in their Canadian and international facilities to immediately flood the
market upon patent expiry or a successful legal challenge of a patent.
Neither of these measures were part of the Dunkel Text, NAFTA’s intellectual
property chapter, or the final TRIPS Agreement although they were “without a doubt a
subject of discussion” (interview with a Canadian official, December 5, 2015). They
reflected Canada-specific policy mitigations and clear concessions to the generic
industry. In fact, stockpiling actually violated the TRIPS Agreement and the provision
was successfully challenged at the World Trade Organization. In February 1999, the
European Communities launched a WTO dispute under TRIPS Articles 27 (nondiscrimination), 28 (patent owner rights), and 30 (exceptions to patent owner rights). A
dispute panel was struck and ruled in March 2000 that the stockpiling provision in
Canada’s Patent Act violated TRIPS Article 28.1 and could not be saved under the
exemptions in Article 30. As summarized by the WTO:
Canada practically conceded that the stockpiling provision violated
Art. 28.1, which sets out exclusive rights granted to patent owners…
Concerning Canada's defence under Art. 30, the Panel found that the
measure was not justified under Art. 30 because there were no
limitations on the quantity of production for stockpiling which resulted
in a substantial curtailment of extended market exclusivity, and, thus,
was not “limited” as required by Art. 30. Accordingly, the Panel
concluded that the stockpiling provision was inconsistent with Art. 28.1
as it constituted a “substantial curtailment of the exclusionary rights”
granted to patent holders.119
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WTO, (2015) “Canada- Pharmaceutical Patents DS114,” accessed November 5, 2015,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/1pagesum_e/ds114sum_e.pdf ; See also Report of
the WTO panel: WTO, (2000) “Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products.” WT/DS114/R,
March 17, 2000, accessed November 5, 2015, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/7428d.pdf
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Had Canada implemented this provision differently, namely, with specific limitations on
the allowable quantities, stockpiling might have been justifiable on the basis that it did
not constitute “substantial curtailment” of the patent owner’s rights. But such a specific
delineation would be very difficult to word appropriately (i.e. what would a stockpiling
threshold be?) given that it would apply not only to pharmaceuticals but to all patented
technology sectors. Under NAFTA (1709(7)) and TRIPS (27.1) patent rights must be
enjoyable “without discrimination as to the field of technology.”
Furthermore, any thresholds would likely undermine the original purpose of the
stockpiling provision, namely, for generic companies to accumulate enough product
volume to quickly and decisively flood the market on patent expiry or a successful patent
challenge. Following the WTO ruling, Canada removed the stockpiling exemption from
the Patent Act in Bill S-17 2001, at the same time as it redressed the parallel challenge
from the US regarding Canada’s phasing in of the 20-year patent term (Smith 2001). The
early working provision was found to be TRIPS compliant and thus enables generic
manufactures to rapidly market following patent expiry. However, the immediacy of high
market penetration is somewhat less than it would have been had the stockpiling
provision also been deemed TRIPS compliant.

PMPRB in Bill C-91
A significant portion of Bill C-91 1993 was dedicated to modernizing the Patented
Medicine Prices Review Board. The legislation provided the Board with significant new
powers that would help to offset the new IP rights provided under NAFTA and the draft
TRIPS. Notably these included the power (per Section 81(2)(c)) to issue an order for the
payment to the Federal Government (Her Majesty in right of Canada), to offset an
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amount of “excess revenues estimated by the board to have been derived by the patentee
from the sale of the medicine at an excessive price” (Bill C-91 1993, Section 81(2)). In
keeping with the historical legacy of Bill C-22 1987, the determination of an excessive
price (and thus excessive revenues) was significantly subject to the Board’s “opinion”
(Ibid).120 This considerable discretion continued to be manifest in the Board’s Excessive
Price Guidelines.
The Guidelines would continue to be non-binding on the Board as a matter of law
(s. 96(4)) and were exempt from the constraints of the Statutory Instruments Act which
sets normal rules around Canadian statues, regulations, and required consultations. In
establishing the Guidelines, the Board was however mandated to consult with the
Minister of Health, provincial Ministers of Health, representatives of consumer groups
and the pharmaceutical industry (s. 96(5)). Bill C-91 built on the PMPRB’s flexibility
and power. The Board would now be empowered to order financial penalties of up to
two-times the amount of excess revenues accumulated when it deemed, based on the
“extent and duration” of excess sales, that this was a matter of patentee policy.121 When
implementing the legislation, the government affirmed that the strengthened PMPRB role
related to consumer protection regarding patented medicines:
With Bill C-91, we also wanted to strengthen consumer protection, so
that consumers can continue to obtain patented medicine at reasonable
prices…the bill increases the power of the [PMPRB]. These new
120

“Where the Board finds that a patentee of an invention pertaining to a medicine has, while a
patentee, sold the medicine in any market in Canada at a price that, in the Board’s opinion, was excessive,
the Board may, by order, direct the patentee to…pay…an amount specified in the order” (Bill C-91 1993,
Canada Gazette III, Vol 16 (1), May 10, 1993: s. 83(2)).
121
“Where the Board, having regard to the extent and duration of the sales of the medicine at an
excessive price, is of the opinion that the patentee…has engaged in a policy of selling the medicine at an
excessive price, the Board may…direct the patentee or former patentee to do any one or more of the things
referred to in that subsection as will, in the Board’s option, offset not more than twice the amount of the
excess revenues estimated by it to have been derived by the patentee …from the sale of the medicine at an
excessive price” (Bill C-91, Canada Gazette III, Vol 16 (1), May 10, 1993: s. 84(4)).

109
powers will enable the board to more effectively control the prices of
both existing and new medicines. The bill provides for fines and prison
terms for those who do not comply with the board’s orders…The board
will thus be able to provide all Canadian consumers with even more
effective price control. These new powers will authorize the board to
order a reduction of prices it considers too high. It will also be able to
impose fines of up to $100,000 a day to compensate for previous
overpricing and to discourage such practices.122
In other words, the government wanted to leverage the existing institution to further
constrain the full impact of patent protections as well as bolster penalties and incentives
for compliance.
Board orders for price reductions and payments to the Crown were to be effective
within one month (s. 84(1-2)) or as otherwise ordered by the Board and were considered
a debt enforceable in the Canadian court system (s. 84(3)) where a Board order was
“enforceable in the same manner as an order of the court” (99(1)). Board orders could
simply be filed with the (Federal) Court to become an order of that Court (s. 99(2)). C-91
contained a clause implying, but not strictly mandating, that excess revenues reclaimed
by the Federal Government could be redistributed to provincial governments (s. 103).
The PMPRB has prominently framed the new power to order the payment of excessive
revenues as being necessary “[i]n order to fill the vacuum created by the abolition of
compulsory licenses” and “thereby further protecting the interests of consumers”
(PMPRB 2015a, A1.3). These were substantial new powers that further helped to protect
consumers from potential excessive prices under a patent monopoly.
Notwithstanding international trade agreements and pressure from the US, a large
part of the public justification for increased patent protections under Bills C-22 and C-91
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Pierre Blais, Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, House of Commons Debate on Bill C91, third reading, December 10, 1992, 14998-15001, accessed October 15, 2016,
http://parl.canadiana.ca/view/oop.debates_HOC3403_12/196?r=0&s=1
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was to increase research and development in Canada. To help secure Bill C-91, the
industry, via its association the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of Canada
(PMAC), reiterated its commitment to invest 10% of sales in R&D. Per a June 1993 letter
to Minister of Industry Michael Wilson, this PMAC commitment remained non-binding
and heavily qualified by conditions related to the consistency of the business and
regulatory environment:
Now that Bill C-91 has passed I would like to take this opportunity to
discuss the investments our members expect to achieve. The
achievement of these investments assumes that the international and
national business and regulatory environments (including but not
limited to such elements as patent protection, federal and provincial
pricing regulations, approval of products for safety and efficacy and
access to provincial formularies) for the pharmaceutical industry will
not undergo substantial change…Association members stand by the Bill
C-22 commitment to invest 10% of sales revenues in R&D by the year
1996 and to extend that commitment for as long as Bill C-91 stays in
effect.123
The earlier Bill C-22 commitment set an important path of voluntary and non-binding
commitments that was maintained during 1993 reforms. The industry also made $650
million in advance investment commitments that the government was able to leverage in
helping to make the case for C-91.124 This was part of a massive public relations effort
that the government undertook in the face of considerable criticism of the bill.
Figure 3.2 compiles key insights from a comprehensive qualitative analysis of
over 200 mostly unpublished speeches delivered by Michael Wilson, Minister of
Industry, Science and Technology, and Minister for International Trade between April
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Letter from Judith A. Erola, President of PMAC to Hon. Michael Wilson Minister, Industry,
Science and Technology, June 10, 1993, as published by the Government of Canada: Government of
Canada, “Review of the Patent Act Amendment Act, 1992 (Bill C-91): Information” February 1997
Industry Canada, Distribution Services, Ottawa ON.
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Notes for Michael Wilson Speech on Bill C-91 to “Senate committee,” January 21, 1993.
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1991 and June 1993.125 Many of the quotes illustrate the cumulative nature of trade
agreements and that market power, while important, is not the only factor that explains
the NAFTA IP outcome. For example, the legacy of Bill C-22 and the existence of a
successful pricing regulator was key to securing support in Canada.
In summary, as trade-related intellectual property protections expanded, Canadian
consumer protection institutions evolved to build their capacity as a counter weight.
Institutions developed new safeguards with new financial teeth, to prevent the abuse of
patent monopoly power. As shown in the next section, protection of these institutions
substantively shaped the establishment of the international IP regulatory regime.
Figure 3.2: Excerpts from Minister Michael Wilson Speeches 1991-1993
Speaking
Engagement
Arthur
Andersen
Symposium St.
Charles Il, June
2, 1992

Notes for an
address at the
conclusion of
the North
American Free
Trade
Agreement
August 12,
1992

125

Quote

Significance

“The GATT was the foundation upon which the Canada-U.S.
Free Trade Agreement (the FTA) was built. Equally it is the
basis for negotiation of other trading arrangements, such as
the proposed [NAFTA]. Furthermore, the GATT will provide
the basis for expanding continental trade with the emerging
European Community and the high-growth Asia-Pacific
region.”
“Canada has benefited from the dispute settlement process
established in the FTA. We have won a majority of cases. And
now we have negotiated a strengthened dispute settlement
system with safeguards to ensure that the system runs fairly.
The rule of law, not power, will prevail in settling disputes.”
“The NAFTA itself need not be a closed club. Perhaps, too,
this deal will lend some impetus to the worldwide trade
negotiations in the GATT, where Canada has been playing a
leading role”

Shows how policy
makers view trade
agreements as
cumulative. New
standards build on
previous standards.
Shows how rulesbased trading and
dispute resolution
institutions are
explicitly intended to
mitigate power factors.
NAFTA was designed
for expansion.

Library and Archives Canada maintains the original Minister’s Orator documents which are
typically typed or faxed with frequent hand written notes between Minister Wilson and his staff. These
speeches duplicate many of the same key messages. Frequently these notes are candid and humorous: “J.F.:
This is a badly written. We MUST talk about these speeches. We have got to do better. Who is writing
them. Are we paying them?!... This is a terribly written page. High School!” “Whoever wrote this is not
thinking in today’s terms. – See my changes and reflect in future.” A more detailed version of this table
providing additional interesting context is provided in the ANNEX.
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Speaking
Engagement
Wall Street
Journal
Conference,
New York,
September 24,
1992

Quote

Significance

“Rather than hindering the multilateral process, the NAFTA
should provide an impetus to the successful conclusion of the
Uruguay Round… It will … show other newly industrialized
and developing countries that they, like Mexico, can
successfully enter into freer trading relationships with
developed countries. This is very important to us.”

Illustrates the view of
NAFTA as a pumpprimer.

Talking points
Faxed to
Minister
November 25,
1992 in
response to
Canadian Press
wire by Dennis
Bueckert on
opposition to
Bill C-91.

Talking Point: “[C-91] is good for Canada: more investment
($500 M plus); more high skilled jobs; more research; better
medicines; strong price control; reward for innovation…
Canada has been holding its own, but, if we want investment
we must act now, [Canada is] at a critical juncture…Note [the]
track record of C-22:[drug] prices [increasing] below [the
consumer price index]; investment up; jobs up.”
Minister Wilson additional hand written notes:
“[Canadians] say they want R&D, [Investment], high tech
jobs…But you can’t just wish this…C-91 will help... Delaying
treaties risks [investment];
Should concentrate on price control regime”
“opponents [of Bill C-91] say that drug prices will soar as a
result of Bill C-91. They won’t. They haven’t in the past and
they won’t in the future. The [Patented Medicines Prices
Review] Board has been given new power over both new and
existing patented drugs. These powers include the ability to
roll back prices, recover excessive revenues, impose fines and
imprison offenders. This Bill has teeth – sharp teeth.”

Shows responsible
Minister’s thinking
and that price control
regime was central to
legitimizing increased
patent protection;
illustrates how the
legacy of previous
institutions under C-22
1987 was key to the
argument for C-91
1993.
Shows how the record
of drug pricing under
the FTA-era institution
was used to justify
further IP protections
and a strengthened
PMPRB.

“Canadian Businesses gain new intellectual property
protection in the NAFTA…As the Canadian Economy moves
into higher value-added, knowledge-based growth areas, this
protection…will protect our ability to expand into the NAFTA
area”

Shows an important
link and trade-off on
intellectual property.
Enhanced IP
protection would
facilitate Canada’s
access and expansion
into the NAFTA area
market.

Notes for an
address by
Michael
Wilson, Third
Reading of Bill
C-91 December
10, 1992.
Third Reading
Debate on Bill
C-115, The
NAFTA
Implementation
Act, Ottawa
ON, May 27,
1993

Canadian Institutions Shape International Regulatory Outcomes
Canada’s existing price control regime was also a major subject of discussion in the
TRIPS context. According to Canadian officials, a key subject of discussion under TRIPS
was the so-called “nullification or impairment” provision in GATT Art. XXIII. Among
other causes of action, these provided GATT signatories with “non-violation complaint”
remedies where they alleged another signatory was nullifying or impairing an objective
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of the agreement.126 Protecting Canada’s right to regulate was an import point of
discussion:
[The PMPRB was discussed] less so in NAFTA, but a hell of a lot more
so in the context of the TRIPS Agreement… Because, certainly, Canada
was not willing to take on any obligations that would affect the ability
of how you price pharmaceuticals, domestically, and the controls, and
the price controls, in essence, which the Patented Medicine Prices
Review Board is… And I don’t recall this coming to a head in the
NAFTA context, but by that time we had kind of fought to a draw in
the…WTO…[a key issue was] the nullification [or] impairment
provisions of the GATT… there were lengthy debates as to whether the
nullification [or] impairment provisions of the GATT would apply to
TRIPS. And ultimately the saw-off we reached, which was in fact
subsequent to NAFTA, but nevertheless, the final version of the TRIPS
Agreement was that it wouldn’t apply, but it would be reviewed every
five years. We included it in the text as applying, and then, in essence,
negated that inclusion for five years to be reviewed every five years,
and since then every five years they’ve continued to apply that waiver,
so, nullification [or] impairment hasn’t applied…One of the issues that
was foremost in the Canadian context was, would the pricing of
pharmaceuticals be deemed to be a nullification of rights, even though
it wouldn’t be an actual violation of the agreement… and that’s why
[Canada] fought pretty hard to insure that that wasn’t going to be the
case. Now the Americans always claimed, ‘no, no, there couldn’t
possibly be a nullification [or] impairment in a non-violation case based
on pricing’ but [Canada wasn’t] convinced of that (Interview with a
Canadian official, December 5, 2015).
This refers to Article 64.2 and 64.3 of the TRIPS Agreement that excludes non-violation
and “situation complaints” for the first five years of the WTO and required the TRIPS
Council to submit recommendations on continuance of the moratorium for “ministerial
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Article XXIII:1 of GATT 1994 provides three scenarios for a nullification or impairment or
impediment of attaining any objective of the agreement: “a) the failure of another contracting party to carry
out its obligations under this Agreement, b) the application by another contracting party of any measure,
whether or not it conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement, or c) the existence of any other situation.”
Pursuant to Article XXIII:1(b) of GATT 1994, provision (b) could lead to a non-violation complaint: “A
non-violation complaint may be used to challenge any measure applied by another Member, even if it does
not conflict with GATT 1994, provided that it results in “nullification or impairment of a benefit”. WTO,
“Types of complaints and required allegations in GATT 1994” Article XXIII:1 of GATT 1994, accessed
December 10, 2015, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c4s2p1_e.htm
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consensus.”127 It is clear that the preservation of Canadian pricing institutions was a
major factor in the negotiated outcome on TRIPS. With this issue of nullification or
impairment being negotiated in the TRIPS context, Canada was confident to affirm the
role of the PMPRB as “hereby continued” (Bill C-91, s. 91(1)) and was thus provided
considerable latitude to further shape its function under domestic law and regulation. In
fact, NAFTA negotiations did not substantively cover specifics of the Board itself, but
Canada was careful to preserve the ability of its institutions to function appropriately. As
recalled by one Canadian official “the actual review Board, as such, was never the subject
of negotiations, [however] the issue of whether pricing [regulation] of pharmaceuticals
could or could not happen was very much at the forefront of all [of Canada’s] thinking”
(Ibid).
Canada’s attainment of limits to non-violation actions to protect its price
regulation institution provides context to the idea that international regulatory outcomes
can be significantly shaped by existing domestic institutions. The expanded powers for
the PMPRB and other elements of Bill C-91 show that implementation of an international
standard can contain many other features not feasibly covered in broader multi-party
negotiations. Particularly in the regulatory context there is a clear domestic institutional
and historical bias that shapes negotiating perspectives:
Now-a-days, international trade policy is really the parallel to domestic
economic policy… Everybody goes into any kind of international
negotiation on the basis that ‘my system is best’…[and] particularly in
the regulatory context, that’s ten-fold increased. Because every
regulator thinks that ‘my regulations are ok, and everybody’s got it
127

Despite some controversy among WTO members regarding the potential status of the
moratorium in absence of TRIPS review and ministerial consensus, no TRIPS non-violation or situation
complaints have been brought forward as of 2015. WTO, “Types of disputes in the TRIPS Agreement,”
accessed December 10, 2015,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c4s5p1_e.htm
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wrong’… and interestingly, the countries that tend to do best in these
kind of negotiations are the ones that manage to bridge the gap between
the… trade negotiators and the domestic regulators and come up with
positions that resolve both their interests (Interview with a Canadian
official, December 5, 2015).
This local regulatory bias and institutionalized negotiation strategy must be better
factored into scholarly accounts of international regulatory regimes and their
determinants through historical institutionalism. From this account it would seem that
those countries that have existing internal bureaucratic linkages between regulators and
trade officials would have some advantages in securing their own domestic rules as part
of the international standard. If such internal state linkages can be considered a function
of negotiation capacity, this practitioner insight would seem consistent with other HI
work on regulatory standard setting that attributes significant importance to the
sequencing of institutional capacity (Bach and Newman 2010).
One of the key manifestations of this phenomenon in the TRIPS context was the
definition of patentable subject matter with respect to microorganisms. Due to high
politicization and international impasse between the US and the rest of the world, TRIPS
effectively adopted Canada’s standard regarding the patentability of microorganisms:
the history of patentability of life forms…was the Americans
desperately having to prove the patentability of the Harvard Mouse;
wanted that to be the standard…Nobody else in the world wanted…it to
go that far, except the Americans, and that included [Canada] and the
Europeans and of course a whole range of developing countries. There
was massive lobbying done, particularly by the agricultural lobbies, in
that regard…and ultimately…we came up with a Canadian solution.
Because we had a lengthy theological debate that we were never going
to get out of. And the question that [Canada] asked ourselves…and
subsequently asked everyone else is, well, what the hell do we do now?
And well it turned out that the practice in most countries was that we
did patent microorganisms… we took what in essence was the practice
in Canada, and that was acceptable to everybody, ultimately. And that
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is what became the TRIPS text…(Interview with a Canadian official,
December 5, 2015).
This reflection provides some clues as to how historical and power factors can combine
to produce international regulatory outcomes. Where American market power and intense
lobbying by a powerful business sector was not a sufficient condition to produce an
outcome, regulatory history and the ability to leverage an existing standard was
determinative to Canada’s advantage. It leveraged the existing institutional framework in
Canada and elsewhere to design and entrench those local standards in an international
treaty. In other words, the path dependence of historical policy, and not strictly US
market power, set the standard.
Regulatory institutions are sticky in the sense that once a standard is set there
seems to be a natural inclination to see reinforcing policy feedbacks. This can greatly
complicate the process of standard harmonization and regulatory cooperation. When
there is conflict between established standards, it is difficult to predict which standard
will be adopted, for example, when an international standard is proposed by a large
market power but a smaller power has a history with something different. Both the
international standard and the local standard will have its own associated pathdependence “impulse” or “force”—for lack of a better term. Market power is one
potential predictive explanation for which institutional legacy will be more powerful and
set the standard. Another potential explanation is functionality or which standard does the
best at achieving its goal. A related but distinct concept to functionality is legitimacy
where social norms may be a determinant. Another still is temporal proximity where an
older entrenched standard may face the lowest barriers to adoption. The historical
institutionalist notion that the longer a standard is in effect the more entrenched and
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resilient it will be is intuitive, particularly when considering macro-social institutions
such as property rights, or even intellectual property rights. This would seem less
applicable to individual rules and regulations that may be more fungible. And in new
areas of regulation there may be completely different predictive principles, for example, a
first-mover advantage where the first to regulate is the party to set the standard.
This concept of a first-to-market advantage is also intuitive.128 We can predict
first-movers will have an advantage in new areas of regulation. Cooperation may also be
easier when working jointly from the outset or early stages of a technology or new
regulatory area. The cooperative challenge for policy makers—and the predictive
challenge for scholars—comes when divergent regulations are already established. Even
for power asymmetries as stark as Canada-US relations, insights arising from a market
power hypothesis are not always predictive. Nor does historical institutionalism as a
backwards-looking framework have much to offer from a predictive perspective. Perhaps
the only predictive insight that can be taken from this chapter is that local regulatory
institutions will impart a local regulatory bias and new regulatory systems will
significantly reflect past policy choices.
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In the context of bilateral regulatory harmonization, former US Ambassador to Canada Bruce
Heyman has made apt comments regarding the temporal challenges associated with international regulatory
cooperation: “there are existing regulations, and there are new regulations… existing regulations where
there are [international] differences, those are the hardest to actually deal with because everybody digs their
heals in a bit in terms of believing their way is the right way. But in new regulations, no standards have
actually been set yet. And it gives you an opportunity…. to create jointly the set of regulations. That
happens more easily where we’re doing something together and we’re actually creating something at the
same time…Where it’s a bit more challenging is a regulation is set on something that is not yet in the other
country. And so you end up finding a new innovation, or creation…that the country in which its starting in,
ends up regulating” Ambassador Bruce Heyman, Remarks, June 9, 2016, Ottawa, Canadian International
Council.
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Conclusion
This empirical work provides support for the hypothesis that local institutions matter
even when at odds with considerable power dynamics. Price control institutions initiated
under the Canada-US FTA provided a base for elaboration under NAFTA and TRIPS
implementation. Canadian officials preserved space for price regulations with a
renewable exemption from nullification or impairment provisions thus significantly
shaping the international standard. Where US power failed to establish definitions of
patentable subject matter, Canada’s pre-existing path provided the model and set the
international TRIPS standard.
This helps to illustrate several interesting aspects of institutions and sequencing.
When market power is insufficient to produce an outcome, a pump–primer or
legitimation strategy may help to produce a regulatory outcome. This was true both for
the novel insertion of intellectual property provisions within a trade agreement as well
providing impetus to finalize a broader multilateral treaty. When setting specific
standards within a negotiation, small powers can have asymmetric influence by
recognizing temporal opportunities and by leveraging and protecting existing domestic
standards. Given the interrelationship between trade and economic regulation, it also
seems helpful to have well-established working relationships at the domestic level
between trade officials and regulators.
This chapter supports the notion that trade agreements and regulatory standards
cumulate and build off of past standards. International regulatory regimes and the
domestic regulations they produce are clearly impacted by historical policy choices.
Historical institutionalism can help illuminate valuable nuance undergirding more
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obvious power relationships. The following chapter picks up this argument and
chronology by examining the next phase of NAFTA and TRIPS regulatory
implementation.
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Chapter 4 - Regulatory Feedbacks Part 2: Regulatory Implementation and
Evolution

This chapter argues that domestic institutions and interests powerfully shape the
implementation of international standards. Market power is less significant in this
regulatory implementation context. The chapter continues the analysis and chronology of
NAFTA and TRIPS implementation with a particular emphasis on patent dispute
mechanism regulations. A central feature of Canada’s adoption of US-style intellectual
property (IP) protections was to link the marketing approval of a generic drug to the
patent of its corresponding brand drug. This is commonly called “patent linkage.” Patent
linkage was implemented in 1993 via the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance)
Regulations (PM(NOC)). The regulation was designed to offer an effective injunction
period under intellectual property (IP) litigation but was implemented in a way that
diverged considerably from those US standards it was based on.
Market power theory would predict that standard-taker nations simply adopt the
standard-maker’s regulatory approach. Evidence of a full policy diffusion of US
standards would support a market power approach. Evidence of a partial policy diffusion
heavily influenced by entrenched domestic interests would tend to support an historical
institutional approach. A powerful standard-maker should be able to completely translate
its standards and ensure that they are binding within a treaty. Evidence that the standardtaker can keep key regulatory elements out of the treaty and implement international
standards according to its domestic interests would be a smoking gun that market power
does not fully explain regulatory outcomes.

Indeed, some points of international
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negotiation are not even codified in trade treaty text but are related concessions where a
country agrees to alter domestic economic regulations. As such, these policies are subject
to future domestic refinement and elaboration.

From a theoretical perspective, the

discussion of patent linkage is important because it shows how trade negotiations are
inseparable from domestic economic regulation. A key standard-maker objective of
negotiations is to alter domestic economic regulatory policy of the standard-taker. This
objective is never fully realized because standard-taker nations retain institutional
sovereignty and international policy translation is often incomplete.
Best practices for process tracing suggests that we should be equally tough
examining alternative explanations and combine process tracing with case comparisons
when useful for the research goal (Bennett and Checkel 2015b, 260). As the most USstyle IP protection modeled after US policy, patent linkage could easily be raised in the
context of the alternative market power hypothesis. For example, one could argue that
under patent linkage, Canada simply bowed to US market pressure and adopted its
favoured standard “in exchange for preferential trade terms” (Bouchard et al 2011, 5). In
other words, patent linkage requires examination because it presents a most critical-case
policy within the critical-case of Canada. However, even here we find considerable
domestic institutional resilience and resistance. The path forged by the US system of
patent linkage was only partially exported to Canada. It clashed with a domestic path,
legal institutions and an institutionalized interest coalition.
First, the chapter discusses patent linkage in greater detail. These standards did
not go nearly as far as the US standards they were modeled on. It leverages a within-case
comparison of the PM(NOC) Regulations related to patent disputes and the Patented
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Medicine Regulations related to the PMPRB pricing regulation discussed in the previous
chapter. It shows that patent linkage regulations, which expand IP protections, were
implemented carefully to narrow and limit the full impact of those new patentee
benefits.129 The chapter then considers NAFTA implementation and argues that the
politics and sequencing of treaty implementation matter. If power asymmetry fully
explained the NAFTA outcome then the sequencing of implementation should not matter.
However, this was a factor in Canada’s case. Finally, the chapter considers a statutory
review of NAFTA-era intellectual property reforms and the evolution of patent linkage in
contemporary debates. It argues that Canada preserved domestic sovereignty by retaining
flexibility to limit and reduce IP protections in the future. A powerful institutionalized
interest coalition continues to shape these IP policies on an ongoing basis. In 2017,
Canada’s patent linkage policy is slated to be replaced following significant domestic
stakeholder lobbying, and much to the chagrin of the US industry. If only US market
power mattered, Canada would not have been able to maintain its flexibility to
unilaterally reform patent linkage in support of its domestic industry.

Patent Linkage: A New Patent Adjudication Process and Injunction Period Under
The Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulation 1993
This section traces the implementation of patent linkage. It compares this IP-expanding
regulation (patent linkage) to the IP-restricting regulations (the Patented Medicines Prices
Review Board) discussed in earlier chapters. It argues that the details of regulatory
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By comparison, the PMPRB and its Patented Medicines Regulation is an inherent constraint to
intellectual property protections. The PMPRB has broad jurisdiction and its scope and role was
strengthened in the NAFTA-implementation context. This jurisdictional comparison illustrates important
nuances within these distinct but complementary regulations and their treatment within Canadian courts.
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implementation mattered for Canada’s IP regime. The policy imparted important local
nuances that distinguished it from the parallel US policy. 130
Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations (PM(NOC)) are a
distinctly Canadian regulatory alternative to “interlocutory injunction” in patent
litigation. Interlocutory injunctions are temporary interventions by the court that prevent
parties from engaging in certain activities such as marketing a product while a matter is
being litigated. Injunctions are particularly important for patent holders in the event of a
patent dispute because they can prevent a competitor from entering the market and
eroding market share during the lengthy litigation process. Canadian courts historically
had high standards for interlocutory injunction and thus did not have an effective, routine
mechanism for injunction in pharmaceutical patent litigation. A new mechanism modeled
after the US system was created under the PM(NOC) Regulations. In simple terms, this
policy created a separate stream of litigation for pharmaceutical patent disputes where the
marketing approval131 of a generic drug was linked to the patent status of its
corresponding brand product (Lexchin 2011). The process provided temporary relief
from competition during a streamlined judicial review process. This initially offered a 30month period of protection but was subsequently limited to 24 months following a review
by Parliament. This was possible due to an inherent flexibility for future amendment
combined with a strong stakeholder coalition response.
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As illustrated below, these local nuances included: 1) a summary adjudication mechanisms rather
than a full patent infringement hearing; 2) no appeal rights for patentees in this summary process; 3) no
patent term restoration for regulatory approval time as found in the US Hatch-Waxman Act; 4) special
damages provisions with considerable potential penalties for patentees; and 5) other jurisdictional and
application nuances and practical impacts created subsequently in case law such as a “reverse onus” (as
summarized in Figure 4.1 below).
131
Health and safety regulatory approval is administered by Health Canada, which is the equivalent
body to the Federal US Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
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Canada’s patent linkage regime continues to govern how pharmaceutical patents
are protected and disputed. It became a major subject of Canada’s subsequent
international trade negotiations such as the Canada-EU Comprehensive Economic and
Trade Agreement (CETA). The regime was loosely modeled on the US-style system
established under the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984
(Hatch-Waxman Act). This US legislation also provided a 30-month stay for patent
litigation. The US law was generally more favorable to patent owners because Canada’s
linkage adjudication provided them with no rights of appeal. Additionally, Canada’s
system diverged significantly from the US Hatch-Waxman Act in that it did not offer a
compensatory period of protection for the time that products undergo regulatory
approval. This is typically referred to as ‘patent term restoration’ or supplementary
protection certificates in Europe (Hore 2000).
Neither the TRIPS nor NAFTA text specifically states that the marketing approval
of a generic drug needs to be “linked” to a brand product’s patent status. Indeed not all
countries have a system that does so. However, to comply with the patent rights conferred
in TRIPS Article 28, and its corresponding Article 1709 (5) of NAFTA, signatories must
offer effective protection. Per TRIPS, signatories must prevent third parties from
“making, using, offering for sale, selling or import” (TRIPS 1994). Per NAFTA,
signatories must prevent “other persons from making using or selling the subject matter
of the patent” (NAFTA 1993). As such, countries must extend effective protection
throughout patent litigation.
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The appropriateness of Canada’s pre-Bill C-91 regime for injunctive relief in
pharmaceutical patent disputes has been an ongoing point of concern and debate.132 Legal
practitioners in Canada will be aware of the high judicial standards of “irreparable harm”
for normal injunctions. According to one legal practitioner “interim injunctions are
rarely, if ever, granted in patent infringement cases before the Federal Court of Canada
and…a high threshold of irreparable harm must be met by the party requesting such an
injunction” (Steele 2003, 4). In the absence of introducing routine recourse to patent
infringement injunctions via legislation, a new measure was required in Canada’s case so
as to conform to international trade agreement requirements regarding “effective
protection.” Despite the lack of reference to patent linkage in treaty text, Canadian and
Mexican patent linkage provisions clearly arise from trade commitments. As noted by
Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, his government’s enactment of the PM(NOC)
Regulations was a key part of the NAFTA implementation process:
In order to harmonize the protection for innovation offered by its
principal trading partners…Under both NAFTA and TRIPS, Canada
agreed to provide expeditious and effective remedies to prevent the
infringement of intellectual property rights and recognize the value of
the confidential data submitted by innovative pharmaceutical
companies seeking approvals for new drugs. As such, the Patented
Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations came into force in
March of 1993 (Mulroney 2012).
The idea of protecting clinical trial data from being used for a generic manufacturer’s
market approval for a period of five years is one aspect of this commitment (5 years of
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For example, see the testimony of John Manley, Minister of Industry before the Standing
Committee on Industry during its retrospective review of Bill C-91 and the PM(NOC) Regulations. Manley
highlighted the issue of effective injunction: “There is no doubt that you will want to look at the fairness of
these regulations. [Is it] true, as some claim, that traditional injunctive relief in Canada is not sufficient to
address pharmaceutical patent infringement?” Hon John Manley, Testimony Before the Standing
Committee on Industry, Monday, February 17, 1997, accessed June 11, 2016
http://www.parl.gc.ca/content/hoc/archives/committee/352/indu/evidence/42_97-02-17/indu42_blk-e.html
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data protection is found in NAFTA only). Another is preventing generic marketing
approval based on a patented product’s submitted clinical data until the courts have
adjudicated disputes on that patent. For practical purposes, harmonization with “trading
partners” can be considered shorthand for harmonization with Canada’s most important
trading partner, the United States. The US pharmaceutical industry and its subsidiaries in
Canada pushed strongly for patent linkage.
Canada adopted a modified Hatch-Waxman-style system of patent linkage
(Faunce and Lexchin 2007). General alignment with the US was a practical, yet
somewhat contentious, alternative to overriding years of Canadian case law on
interlocutory injunctions via legislation. It was contentious partly due to the obvious
barriers it would create for the market entry of generic drugs. Equally, linkage was
controversial due to the US policy it was modeled after. For example, the US HatchWaxman Act was viewed as incentivising so-called patent “evergreening.” Evergreening
is a general term applied to various patenting strategies that attempt to prolong the
effective patent life of a compound. Hatch-Waxman did not prevent multiple automatic
injunction periods for the same product (Ibid, 2). This loophole was later closed in both
the US and Canada.133
The provision of regulations on patent linkage were outlined in Section 55.2(4)(ae) of Bill C-91. The section empowered the Governor in Council to make regulations
regarding the timing of market approval for persons other than a patentee (i.e. a
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In 2003 Congress limited automatic injunctions under the Hatch-Waxman Act to one per product.
Similarly in 2006, Canada amended the PM(NOC) Regulations in part to add safeguards against multiple
patenting through a patent list “frozen” as of the date of a generic company’s market approval submission.
Health Canada (2015) Guidance Document: Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations, 15101151-734, accessed December 2, 2015, http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/dhpmps/alt_formats/pdf/prodpharma/applic-demande/guide-ld/patmedbrev/pmreg3_mbreg3-eng.pdf .
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subsequent generic producer). This included the power to set the conditions and earliest
day of marketing approval of a generic drug, the dispute resolution mechanism, remedies
available to the competent court, and general provisions governing the regulatory market
approval of generics that could potentially infringe a patent.134
This power was implemented through the PM(NOC) Regulations on March 12,
1993, just over a month after C-91 was assented to (Canada Gazette Part II Vol. 127, No.
6, SOR/93-133). The PM(NOC) Regulations created a patent registry to be maintained by
the health products regulator, the Minister of National Health and Welfare (now the
Minister of Health) (3(1)). 135 This would be separate from the full national patent registry
maintained by the Canadian Intellectual Property Office (CIPO). Producers of patented
medicines could file their patents and associated expiry dates with the Minister who
would include them on the Health Canada patent list (s. 4(2)). Generic producers would
not be granted marketing approval (a notice of compliance or NOC) if its reference brand
comparator was listed on the patent registry. On application for an NOC, the generic
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Under Section 55.2(4) the Governor in Council was empowered to make regulations: (a)
“respecting the conditions that must be fulfilled before a notice, certificate, permit, or other document
concerning any product to which a patent might relate…;” (b) “respecting the earliest date on which a
notice, certificate, permit or other document.. that is issued or to be issued to a person other than the
patentee may take effect and respecting the manner in which that date is to be determined;” (c) “governing
the resolution of disputes between a patentee…and any person who applies for a notice, certificate, permit
or other document…as to the date on which [it] may be issued or take effect;” (d) “conferring rights of
action in any court of competent jurisdiction with respect to any disputes…and respecting the remedies that
may be sought in the court, the procedure of the court in the matter and the decisions and orders it may
make;” (e) “generally governing the issue of a notice, certificate, permit or other document ... in
circumstances where the issue of that notice, certificate, permit or other document might result directly or
indirectly in the infringement of a patent” (Bill C-91 1993).
135
The Patent Register for medicines is maintained by Health Canada and is provided in searchable
form by medicinal ingredient, brand name, strength and dosage form, drug identification number (DIN)
patent number and expiration date. Health Canada, Patent Register, accessed December 12, 2015, http://prrdb.hc-sc.gc.ca/pr-rdb/index-eng.jsp
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producer would be required to state they accept “that the notice of compliance will not
issue until the patent expires; or allege that…the patent is not valid” (s. 5(1)). 136
In the event of a Notice of Allegation, the generic company would be responsible
for providing “a detailed statement of the legal and factual basis for the allegation” (per
3a) and serving notice to the patent holder (per s. 3b). Following this notice, the patentee
would then have 45 days to apply to the court for “an order prohibiting the Minister from
issuing a notice of compliance” until patent expiration (per s. 6(1)). The Minister would
be prohibited from issuing a notice of compliance to the generic producer for 30 months
following confirmation of patent owner’s application to the court. This prohibition would
terminate on patent expiry (per s. 7(2a)), withdraw of the application or termination by
the court (per s. 7(4)), or if the court “declared that the patent is not valid or that no claim
for the medicine itself and no claim for the use of the medicine would be infringed” (per
s. 7(2b)). The court was empowered to shorten or lengthen this period of time under some
circumstances such as unreasonable delays of the proceeding (per s. 7(5)).
The generic industry was able to secure some important trade-offs in relation to
these patentee protections. Section 8 of the regulations dealt with patentee liabilities for
any time a generic was unjustly blocked from the market. It provided relief to generic
manufacturers through court ordered damages. In practice, an assessment of so-termed
“Section 8 damages” would have to identify a time period and construct a scenario over
which hypothetical generic company profits would be assessed. In essence, the
government punted the details of this section to be determined by the courts. This deferral
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This is called a “Notice of Allegation.” The basis for a Notice of Allegation are: a patentee’s
statement of ownership is false (per s. 5(1)b i); the patent “has expired” (per s. 5(1)b ii); the patent is “not
valid” (per s. 5(1)b iii); or “no claim for the medicine itself and no claim for the use of the medicine would
be infringed” by the application (per s. 5(1)b iv).
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would shape the ultimate extent of the damages provisions. The lack of regulatory
direction on the calculation of Section 8 damages has led to considerable confusion and
some questionable case law. For example, patentees risk penalization when
unsuccessfully protecting patents in PM(NOC) litigation. One IP practitioner explains
how the court has created the potential for generic company windfalls:
The damages under [the Section 8] provision have been likened to
damages owed if an interlocutory injunction is granted but the case is
not proven. However, a "hypothetical world" must be created by the
Court to try to recreate the scenario that would have occurred [sic]…
As a result of the legal uncertainty surrounding the conditions of this
hypothetical world, recent Court decisions have resulted in a windfall to
generic companies when these damages are calculated in the face of
multiple NOC Proceedings against multiple different generic
companies… the size of the generic market can be determined for each
of them independently, and without any real-world knowledge of when
each company actually entered the market after the conclusion of their
respective NOC Proceedings… This is contrary to the purpose of
damages, which are meant to compensate for loss, not provide a
windfall (Moore 2015).
In other words, the uncertainty created by the regulation and a lack of specific conditions
associated with the calculation of hypotheticals has impacted real-world financial
outcomes for some patentees. This observation is interesting for several reasons. It
appears that case law has greatly altered the penalties and incentive structure associated
with litigation under the original PM(NOC) Regulations. The root cause appears to be an
imprecise approach to trade commitment implementation and considerable deference to
the courts. This has apparently amounted to substantial new costs for any drug patenting
that might be overturned. Of course this will not stop companies from patenting or
employing the linkage regulation to delay generic market approval. However, it does
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create a new notional penalty (as opposed to simple compensation) not conceived of in
the Patent Act as amended during TRIPS and NAFTA implementation.137
Additionally, the courts have interpreted that the patent owner assumes a de facto
burden of proof (on a balance of probabilities) that none of the allegations made by a
generic producer are justified (Richardson et al. 2004). Despite generic company
displeasure with the existence of linkage regulations, the issue of windfall damages and
burden of proof both seem to be highly favourable to those litigants. Some legal
practitioners have written on the questionable logic of the de facto reverse onus:
In any practical context, it is logical that the person making an
allegation should bear the burden of proving its veracity.
Notwithstanding logic, the PM(NOC) Regulations requires the first
person [brand owner], in bringing the application, to effectively
disprove each and every allegation made by the second person [generic
producer] in the [Notice of Allegation]. It is especially bizarre in the
context of an allegation of noninfringement where, the proof of the
allegation rests in the hands of the second person (or its drug supplier).
The problem is further exacerbated by the fact the Courts have held that
allegations in a NoA are presumed to be true (Richardson et al. 2004).
These insights are of a high profile IP lawyer acting for patent-owning clients. In keeping
with Bennett and Checkel (2015b), the normative elements of this commentary should be
viewed under the lens of potential bias. However, there can be no doubt that the onus
system is structured—and has evolved in case law—to be highly favourable to second
entrant companies who seek market approval before a patent has expired.
A further feature of the system was its design as a summary adjudication
mechanism to be used in advance of a generic market entry. It did not include the normal
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By contrast, the US system has 1) full patent hearings under an automatic 30-month injunction
period, 2) full appeal rights for both litigants, and 3) a 180-day period before other generics can enter the
market to compensate the first generic entrant for successfully challenging a patent. When a patentee wins,
the brand company can claim up to triple damages in some cases (see discussion below).
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features of a full trial including appeal rights. PM(NOC) proceedings can be appealed by
a disappointed generic litigant. This opportunity is not afforded to a patent holder who
has no rights of appeal under the PM(NOC) regulations. This is a major point of
contention for the patent-holding industry. Patent holders will often launch a full
infringement action while simultaneously defending themselves against the Section 8
damages following from a PM(NOC) decision (Tanner 2012). Additionally, those
PM(NOC) decisions are effectively binding on the patent owner for future generic
entrants. This is because re-litigating subsequent Notices of Allegation brought on the
same basis is considered an abuse of process and thus subject to a summary dismissal
application by the generic manufacturer under subsection 6(5) of the regulations
(McCurley and Lucas, 119). As such, a failed PM(NOC) defense to an NOA effectively
opens the market up to other generic applicants. Therefore, the stakes are quite high in
these proceedings.
It should be reiterated that the Patented Medicines Regulation and Patented
Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulation are distinct orders with different purposes.
The Federal Court of Appeal in ICN v. Canada (PMPRB) (1996) reinforced that “the
[respective] definitions of ‘medicine’ and the language referring to relevant patents are
more expansive in the case of the excessive pricing provisions” (Critchley 2002, 13).
This raises an interesting point of comparison that illustrates the self-constricting nature
of the IP policy environment in Canada. Figure 4.1 below compares select features of
each regulation with respect to jurisdictional issues and notional favourability to patent
owners. For patent linkage—regulations notionally favourable to IP owners—policy
scope is narrow and specific. High specificity requirements regarding eligibility for
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patent linkage protections were made even more specific in case law. This narrowed the
scope of the benefits to patentees. Narrow time constraints for application of the
regulations apply without any opportunities or remedies after an initial 45-day application
window. There are low costs and few barriers to generic manufacturers making a notice
of allegation and high penalties for patentee loss in a patent linkage proceeding. As
discussed, there are no appeal rights for patentees. Given this design, it is perhaps not
surprising that the generic industry has been successful in more than 70% of patent
linkage cases decided since 1993 according to generic industry association analysis.138
Conversely, PMPRB price regulation is notionally unfavourable to patent owners.
However, nearly every element of the PMPRB rules and jurisdiction provides it with
expansive power. This power has grown in case law. Low specificity requirements for
jurisdiction have been further entrenched by the courts. Time constraints regarding the
Board’s jurisdiction are retroactive to the patent pending period. Penalties associated with
losing a hearing are substantial and have escalated since the PMPRB’s inception.
The significance of these points and nuances as a matter of perspective should not
be overstated. However, the comparison is made here to illustrate that IP-expanding
policies (patent linkage) are implemented in the Canadian system with many constraints,
safeguards, and considerable capacity to roll them back in the future. Conversely, IPconstraining policies (the PMPRB) are applied liberally so that institutions are
significantly empowered and these powers could escalate over time. This may be entirely
appropriate from a domestic sovereignty perspective but is a nuance lost in the rancour of
the political debate on pharmaceutical IP in Canada.
138

As of February 2012. Canadian Generic Pharmaceutical Industry, Letter to Simon Kennedy,
Senior Associate Deputy Minister, Industry Canada, February 21, 2012, obtained under the Access to
Information Act.
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Figure 4.1: Comparison of Jurisdictional Issues Associated with Patented Medicines (Notice
of Compliance) Regulations (Patent linkage) and the PMPRB
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This analysis helps to illustrate how implementation can affect the notion of
winning or losing a negotiation. It is not always what was agreed to under the duress of
power asymmetry that matters. How an agreement is then shaped locally can have a
139

McCurley and Lucas note: “Recent Case law has found that the strict product specificity
requirements demanded by the minister and the courts for listing formulation and dosage form patents now
also are applicable to claims for a medicinal ingredient…a claim for a medicinal ingredient must match the
medicinal ingredient in the NOC specifically” (McCurley and Lucas 2014, 116-117).
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Ibid; Government of Canada, Health Canada (2015) “Guidance Document: Patented Medicines
(Notice of Compliance) Regulations,” 15-101151-734 accessed December 2, 2015, http://www.hcsc.gc.ca/dhp-mps/alt_formats/pdf/prodpharma/applic-demande/guide-ld/patmedbrev/pmreg3_mbreg3eng.pdf
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meaningful impact on the ultimate force and effect of standards. For the standard-taker,
winning is less about small negotiated concessions and more about retaining regulatory
autonomy.
In summary, under the PM(NOC) Regulation the marketing approval of a generic
was tied to the patent status of a brand drug. A generic manufacturer could simply allege
a patent to be invalid to commence a 30-month PM(NOC) dispute. These disputes are
usually followed by normal patent infringement or impeachment action that sometimes
considers the same legal and factual issues as the PM(NOC) dispute. The incentives for
generic companies to challenge patents are enormous. Generic companies apply for
marketing approval before patent expiry for many high-value products leading to
PM(NOC) proceedings at the Federal Court.141
This starts a lengthy and duplicative litigation process with clear financial
implications for both brand and generic companies. The original public policy objectives
of Bill C-91 and the patent linkage regulation reasonably sought to prevent patent
infringement during litigation and secure Canada’s access to the broader US market
under NAFTA. Patent linkage was also an explicit balance against Bill C-91’s “early
working” provision for generic drug development during the patent period. Canada’s
perplexing patent litigation regime is an artefact of balancing competing domestic and
international stakeholder interests in trade implementation. This has had a legacy effect
for future trade agreements. For example, as discussed below, “dual litigation” is one of
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In fact, according to an internal government analysis of the patent linkage process, generic
companies made “claims of non-infringement in 52% of cases between 2004 and 2010.”John Connell,
Industry Canada, “Advice to the Senior Associate Deputy Minister,” – Secret - CCM 227176, November
10 , 2011.
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the most contentious issues to be managed under the Canada-EU Comprehensive
Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA).

Implementation and Sequencing Matter: NAFTA Implementation Act 1993
This section details NAFTA implementation and the regulatory amendments that
followed it. It argues that timing was an important factor related to implementation. The
government saw advantages to acting quickly in advance of US implementation and a
pending general election in October of 1993.142 If the market power perspective offered a
comprehensive explanation, these sequencing subtleties should not have mattered.
However, NAFTA negotiator views suggest sequencing did matter. The section also
traces changes that the Patented Medicines Prices Review Board made to strengthen its
own guidelines in the NAFTA context.
On June 23, 1993 the North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act
S.C. 1993, c. 44, Bill C-115 was given Royal Assent. In excess of 200 pages, the
legislation contained many general provisions related to implementation including
ministerial designation, Canada’s section of a NAFTA secretariat, provisions for dispute
panels, committees and scientific review boards, and powers of the Governor in Council
regarding related regulations. The Implementation Act also amended parts of the Patent
Act to address residual issues related to compulsory licences not addressed in Bill C-91
just a few months earlier. These changes were contained in Part II “Related and
Consequential Amendments” the largest section of the legislation containing the Act-byAct amendments required to implement NAFTA. Given that Bill C-91 had already made
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Despite engaging in a regulatory amendment in 1994, the new government did not substantially
alter the regime immediately following the election.
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many changes, the Patent Act component amounted to just six pages of the
Implementation Act (2061 – 2066). It is not entirely clear why some changes were made
here and others in Bill C-91.
Principally, the Implementation Act empowered the Commissioner of Patents to
authorize the use of patents on request of the federal or a provincial government
(Implementation Act, s. 191.1 to repeal and replace s. 19 (1) of the Patent Act). It
empowered the Commissioner to set the terms of use in accordance with several
principles: a) an authorized use was to be limited in scope and duration; b) the use was to
be non-exclusive; and c) the use was predominantly to supply the domestic market. (Ibid,
at s. 19(2)). The patentee was afforded the right to be notified of the authorization (s.
19(3)); paid remuneration deemed adequate by the Commissioner taking into account the
economic value of the authorization (s. 19(4)); apply for its termination once
circumstances leading to the authorization ceased to exist (s. 19(5)); and, appeal any
Commissioner decision to the Federal Court (s. 19.2) (NAFTA Implementation Act 1993).
Due to NAFTA and TRIPS, Canada could no longer provide “exclusive use”
licences. These licences provided incentives for non-patent owners to make capital
investments to develop a technology that was not being utilized by the patentee.
Exclusive use was essentially the state transferring the monopoly incentive from the
patentee to another party. Instead, the Commissioner would have to “endeavour to secure
equality of advantage among the several licensees” and “reduce the royalties or other
payments accruing to the patentee under any licence previously granted” (Implementation
Act, s. 197(1-2) to repeal and replace s. 66(1b) and s. 66 (4c) of the Patent Act). The
Commissioner would be subject to certain conditions when granting a licence. For
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example, an applicant first had to make efforts to secure access to the patented subject
matter on reasonable commercial terms (Implementation Act, s. 191.1 to repeal and
replace s. 19.1(1) of the Patent Act). The Implementation Act also provided that “no
patent shall be granted for any mere scientific principle or abstract theorem”
(Implementation Act s. 192(3)). These were important parameters around how licensing
could proceed and help illustrate the greatly diminished nature of the regime. The era of
lucrative compulsory licensing so critical to the development and consolidation of the
generic drug sector was over.
For both political and content reasons, Canada was keen on passing the NAFTA
implementation bill and saw advantages to pre-empting US ratification. One advantage
was that Canada could implement the deal with less scrutiny from the US than would
have been the case if it waited for concurrent US ratification. According to John Weekes,
Canada’s

Chief

NAFTA

negotiator,

Canada

saw

first-mover

advantages

to

implementation:
It was interesting in the NAFTA, the Conservative government of Brian
Mulroney decided that we should do the NAFTA implementation, pass
the legislation implementing the NAFTA, before the US Congress did.
Now I think they partly had in mind they weren’t quite sure what
government would come after them… and what their approach might
be in terms of implementing NAFTA… It actually worked very well
because, basically, we did ours, we could have changed it, if we wanted
to, later… we were then able to sit back and see what the United States
did….the United States couldn’t say too much about what we were
putting through our Parliament, because they had nothing in front of
their Congress, so it was a little hard for them to be critical, which was
useful too (John Weekes, Public Statement, January 18, 2016, Ottawa).
This statement is interesting for a couple of reasons. First is the observation that
implementation needed to be completed in the dying days of the Progressive
Conservative government for fear that implementation outcome could differ based on the
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party in power. This speaks to an apparent flexibility that governments’ have in
implementing trade deals after negotiations are complete.

Implementation can be

political and is not simply a technocratic exercise where a negotiated outcome is easily
transplanted into domestic law: the details and politics of treaty implementation matter.
This insight may be more or less true depending on the nature of the treaty and the
constitutional approach governing treaties in relation to domestic law. With respect to
treaty implementation, Canada is a “dualist” system like the UK, Germany, and most of
the British Commonwealth (Halpérin 2014, 174). To greatly simplify, in dualist systems
treaties are not directly part of domestic law so must be enacted into domestic legislation
to have force and to be invoked (Jackson 1992, 315). This stands in contrast to “monist”
systems such as the Netherlands, France, and Spain where treaties are notionally “directly
applied” or “self-executing,” which entails that they can be invoked directly (Jackson
1992).143 However, implementation provisions are also sometimes used in these systems
and there are many national dynamics to consider when introducing complex new
regulatory measures. The US system “stands somewhere in between” where some treaties
are self-executing but have the status of a federal statue and thus can be overridden by
subsequent federal statute, sometimes leading the US to violate its international
obligations

(Ibid,

320).144

Comprehensive

analysis

of

various

international

implementation dynamics is beyond the scope of this study. However, the point is raised
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This dichotomy should not be overstated as there are many nuances regarding the hierarchy of
treaties in relation to domestic law, what it means to “invoke” (by whom), and policies and precedents
related to treaty “self-execution” or “direct application.” For example, monist systems sometimes struggle
to uphold direct application as exemplified by the case law on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) in the Europe and Japan (Jackson 1992, 333-4).
144
For a more detailed discussion, see Jackson (1992). See also the US approach to NAFTA
Implementation: North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act. Public Law No. 103-182,
107 Stat. 2057, December 8, 1993 https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-107/pdf/STATUTE-107Pg2057.pdf.
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here to highlight one of the many institutional issues that are a source of complexity and
national path dependence. Ultimately, this supports the need for detailed process tracing
specific to national laws. Further discussion on implications for future study is noted in
the conclusion (Chapter 7).
The second insight from the negotiator quote above is that within this politicized
environment, Canada pursued strategies related to relative timing of implementation that
may have had an impact on ultimate domestic legislation. By getting implementation
done first while the US dithered, Canada was able to somewhat depoliticize the
environment for itself. It implemented its policies under diminished public scrutiny from
the US. It is impossible to measure the impact of this timing strategy as even those
closest to negotiations would have no way of assessing the counterfactual. Nevertheless,
it is interesting that negotiators remember and extol the strategy and the importance of
sequencing some 22 years after the fact.
A good illustration of this accelerated timeframe factor is found in the Regulatory
Impact Analysis Statement attached to the PM(NOC) Regulations. The regulation appears
to have been published without stakeholder comment on the specific text:
Primary stakeholders have been consulted on the principle of these
Regulations prior to the passage of Bill C-91. However, given the
importance of quickly giving effect to the new statue, consultations
have not been undertaken on the text of the Regulations prior to their
coming into force. Early notice was not given in the Federal Regulatory
plan. As this is a new regulation the government will consult on its
implementation, and make appropriate refinements if needed
(PM(NOC) Regulation, Canada Gazette Part II Vol. 127, No. 6,
SOR/93-133).
The expedited timeline in implementing NAFTA and the PM(NOC) Regulations thus
removed one official opportunity for stakeholders to scrutinize the regulatory package in
advance of its coming into force. It is also interesting that both the negotiator and the
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regulator positions indicate future opportunities to amend or refine implementation
outcomes later, if desired or if needed. This speaks to an autonomy and self-confidence
on Canada’s part that stands in contrast to dominant narratives of TRIPS and IP
diplomacy as a hegemonic exercise of US imposition. Even those nations such as Canada
with an overwhelming trade reliance on the US felt confident that they could shape the
standards domestically on an ongoing basis. Being organized and acting quickly to
establish domestic regulations was a key success factor that complemented trade and
regulatory linkages within the bureaucracy.145 Importantly, the manner of implementation
provided future flexibility, even if that flexibility meant deferring important matters to the
judicial branch. Moving first also entailed implementation under diminished scrutiny.
Beyond implementation autonomy, trade negotiators would also seem to consider
time-related strategies associated with small powers catalyzing larger powers into action.
Leveraging his NAFTA experience, John Weekes went as far as to suggest—with TPP
Chief Negotiator Kirsten Hillman sitting beside him on a public panel—that Canada
should consider using a similar advance implementation strategy on the TPP agreement
in the context of US political delays and uncertainty:
I think you could make a strong argument that Canada has nothing to
lose by ratifying [TPP] ahead of the United States, and several things to
gain…potentially… If the TPP doesn’t go anywhere in terms of
ratification in the United States… and we should talk to the Japanese
about this…I think it would actually enhance the prospect of the TPP
getting through the US Congress…. The prospect that Canada might get
the jump on the United States in the Japanese market on a whole range
of agricultural commodities, for instance, would be something that
actually might spur the US Congress into action (John Weekes, Public
Statement, January 18, 2016, Ottawa).
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Discussed above in Chapter 3.
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In other words, in addition to domestic content factors associated with sequencing of
implementation, negotiators also consider foreign timing strategies. For example, they
may consider how to enhance internal demand for implementation within the polities of
their counterparty. In this speculative scenario market power still plays a role. Access to
the large Japanese market is essentially the ‘bait’ that the smaller nation (Canada) would
leverage to secure a ratification outcome by the larger party (the US). But missing from a
purely market power explanation is the underlying sequencing of access to that market:
the sequencing of an institutionalized trading relationship.

PMPRB Guidelines Amendment: New Price Maximum and CPI Restraints
In concert with 1993-1994 legislative amendments, the PMPRB built upon its own
Guidelines that reflected its interpretation and definitions of excessive prices for patented
products. As discussed, the initial Guidelines did not apply restrictive pricing tests to
existing products and instead opted to only apply consumer price index (CPI)-based caps
to future price increases. This decision entailed that some patented prices continued to be
higher in Canada than their respective international median price. To further constrain
prices, “after extensive consultations” in 1993, the pricing regulator
decided to revise the CPI-adjustment methodology and add the Highest
[international price comparison] rule to the Guidelines. The Highest
IPC rule states: the price of patented drug product will be assumed to be
excessive if it exceeds the prices of the same drug products in all
countries listed in the Regulations. It did not, however, decide to
constrain the price of a category 3 drug by changing the [maximum
non-excessive] test to be the lower of the [therapeutic class comparison]
and the [maximum international price] (PMPRB, Discussion Guide for
the Consultations on the Board’s Excessive Price Guidelines 2006, 18).
In other words, the pricing regulator further constrained potential prices of patented
products through new rules under its administrative Guidelines. It added a powerful new
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test regarding the highest allowable price. The institution evolved and built upon its rules
in concert with the new trade-related IP context. Because its initial powers over specific
pricing tests were fairly broad, the regulator had the power to further constrain patented
drug prices separately from legislative or regulatory amendments. However, it elected for
‘balance.’ It would not allow a price above the international maximum, but neither would
it force prices to an international minimum nor a “lower of” test. This has a considerable
impact on allowable pricing in Canada. While Guideline pricing rules impact different
products in different ways, generally, the selection of pricing tests and comparators can
greatly impact the pharmaceutical market.
In addition to the new pricing maximum, the PMPRB also reformed its CPI
methodology to further constrain price increases. The Board was particularly focused on
products that had not taken past allowable price increases. It was concerned that the
Guidelines did not prevent large one-time price increases for these products. To address
this, the amended Guidelines specified that a price would be deemed to be excessive if
the cumulative change in price over a three year period is in excess of
the cumulative change in CPI during the same period. In addition, any
one-year price increase in the current pricing period may not exceed 1.5
times the forecast change in the actual CPI. In other words, if a patentee
did not increase its price by the full allowable amount in the first or
second year, it would be allowed to take some of the unused increase in
the next year provided the annual increase was no more than 1.5 times
the growth in the CPI (PMPRB, Price Increases for Patented
Medicines: Discussion Paper 2005, 5).
This escalated the complexity of the PMPRB Guidelines somewhat and tightened the
regulation of price fluctuations. This was made in the context of public concern over
trade-related patent changes but was not connected to or negotiated in the trade context
(Interview with a Canadian Official, December 5, 2015). The PMPRB’s ongoing role and
importance had been affirmed. It amended its Guidelines to strike a balance between
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patent holders and consumers within the Board’s legislative mandate to prevent excessive
prices.
Canada held a general election on October 25, 1993 where the governing
Progressive Conservatives lost 154 seats (all but 2) and Prime Minister Jean Chrétien’s
Liberal government received a strong majority mandate. The election probably delayed
PMPRB regulatory amendments somewhat. Amendments to the Patented Medicines
Regulations were not adopted by Order in Council until November 1994, some 21
months after Bill C-91 Amending the Patent Act, 20 months after the Patented Medicines
(Notice of Compliance) Regulation and 17 months after the NAFTA Implementation Act.
However, following Bill C-91 and the PMPRB’s own Guidelines changes there was
apparently little need to substantially alter the Patented Medicines Regulation.146 This
was largely an administrative update that cleaned up the regulation without substantively
altering the business environment for intellectual property owners. By 1994,
pharmaceutical patentee R&D in Canada had spiked to 11.4% of sales, close to its peak
of 11.7% in 1995 (PMPRB 2005). The PMPRB’s Patented Medicines Price Index (PMPI)
reporting metric that tracks aggregate pricing was declining moderately. Canadian
patented drug prices had fallen below the international median of comparable prices for
the first time (Ibid). For the time being, the PMPRB appeared to be working well to
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The November 1994 amendments were highly consistent with the original 1988 regulation
(Patented Medicines Regulation, SOR/88-474, 1988 Canada Gazette Part II, 3921; Patented Medicines
Regulation SOR/94-688, 1994 Canada Gazette Part II, 3851). The main changes were to 1) remove some of
the transitional language contained in the original regulation and to make it more concise; 2) remove
somewhat unclear qualitative information requirements such as descriptions of the manufacturing process
and the extent to which medicines are “invented and developed” in Canada including phase III clinical
trials; 3) update numerical references to the Patent Act as amended by Bill C-91; and 4) remove all of the
specific forms to be submitted by a manufacturer from the actual regulation text. This left those details
under the purview of the PMPRB and its Guidelines.
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achieve its mandate. The new Liberal government did not see the need to alter its powers
beyond what the previous Progressive Conservative government had enacted.
In summary, sequencing was an important element of NAFTA’s implementation.
The government wanted to head off US implementation so as to operate under
diminished scrutiny from the hegemon. It also saw the value of legislating in advance of
the upcoming general election. The deal was finally implemented just four months in
advance of a sweeping change of government. This speaks to the fact that timing and the
details of trade treaty implementation matter. In the context of these reforms, the PMPRB
pricing regulator made its own changes to further constrain allowable patented drug
pricing. Following the election, the new government did not substantively alter the new
regime. It would have several years to study the impacts of the regime in advance of the
statutory review of Bill C-91.

Stakeholder Coalition Achieves Modifications to Patent Linkage
Bill C-91 included a statutory review provision after four years.147 This section examines
changes to the C-91 regime under that review. It shows that an entrenched stakeholder
coalition was successful in arguing for modifications to the patent linkage regime. The
linkage regime was modified in 1998 to limit the length of injunction.148 The section then
looks to how these policy issues have emerged in contemporary debates and recent trade
negotiations. This helps to illustrate the cumulative nature of trade and economic
regulation and the impact of preserving future flexibility as part of implementation. New
147

Section 14.(1) Review of certain sections provided a four-year review at committee House of
Commons and/or Senate: “The committee shall undertake a comprehensive review of the provisions of the
Patent Act enacted by this Act and shall, within one year after the review is undertaken…submit a report
thereon, including such recommendations as the committee may wish to make pertaining to those
provisions” (Bill C-91 1993, Canada Gazette III, Vol 16 (1), May 10, 1993, 32).
148
The patent linkage regime was also amended in 2006 to restrict injunctions to one per product.
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trade negotiations have picked up where previous deals left off. The implementation of
the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) addresses
issues that arise as a result of Canada’s NAFTA and TRIPS implementation. Under
CETA, a commitment was made to fully replace the patent linkage regime. This section
helps to illustrate the theory over a longer time horizon.149 Core domestic regulatory
issues and interests persist and are expressed over multiple agreements and
implementation processes.

Statutory Review of Bill C-91 1997-1998
The House of Common’s Industry Committee commenced a review of C-91 in February
1997 (Meeting No. 42), launched with joint statements by the Honourable David
Dingwall, Minister of Health and the Honourable John Manley, Minister of Industry.150
This testimony was followed in subsequent days by presentations from the PMPRB Chair
Robert Elgie and Executive Director Wayne Critchley; Health Canada officials; members
of the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' Association of Canada (patented industry),
including presidents of major Canadian subsidiaries;151 and the Canadian Drug
Manufacturers'

Association

(generic

industry),

including

CEO’s

Leslie

Dan

(Novopharm) Berry Sherman (Apotex) as well as then VP Research and International
Affairs James Keon. Keon was a former Canadian intellectual property policy official.
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This is important because the FTA and NAFTA were negotiated by the same government and
were very close in time to each other. It is helpful to show how policies are addressed over multiple
agreements, time, and different governments.
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House of Commons Standing Committee on Industry, “Minutes of Proceedings,” Fifth Report:
Section 14 of the Patent Act Amendment 1992 (C-91), accessed January 3, 2016,
http://www.parl.gc.ca/content/hoc/archives/committee/352/indu/minutes/indu_issue-04_3848/indu_04_min-e.html
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Nelson M. Sims (Eli Lilly Canada) André Marcheterre (Merck Frosst Canada) and Paul Lucas
(Glaxo Wellcome).
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Following passage of Bill C-91, he went on to lobby for the generic drug sector and
represented the sector’s efforts to abolish or modify patent linkage.152 Another
stakeholder voice was the Canadian Health Coalition comprised of critics of expanded
pharmaceutical IP protections including Professor Joel Lexchin, advocate Michael
McBane and other interested partners. Provincial governments were also consulted.
Provincial drug plan budgets are significantly impacted by the extent of IP protection.
The committee heard testimony from British Columbia, Manitoba, New Brunswick,
Ontario and Saskatchewan.153 With the exception of Ontario, which was concerned with
drug costs but otherwise “saw balance” the C-91 approach, these provinces all actively
supported Canadian Drug Manufacturers' Association (CDMA) positions.154
One key CDMA position was actually to repeal the PM(NOC) patent linkage
regulation all together. It threatened generic investment in Canada: “unless and until the
regulations are rescinded, Apotex and others are unable to make further investments in
the generic sector.”155 The government was somewhat more realistic about Canada’s
trade commitments as limiting its range of options: “I don't think Canada can walk away
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Keon had worked with Consumer and Corporate Affairs Canada from 1978-1994. He was a
senior analyst from 1987-88 during the FTA, was promoted to Director of Intellectual Property from 1988
– 1991, and was acting Director General in 1994. Keon has been the President of the Canadian Generic
Pharmaceutical Association (CGPA) (formerly Canadian Drug Manufacturers' Association) for more than
two decades. Office of the Commission of Lobbying of Canada (2016), “Public Offices held: James Keon,”
accessed January 21, 2016,
https://lobbycanada.gc.ca/app/secure/ocl/lrs/do/lpoh?cid=548&lid=510062&sMdKy=;
153
House of Commons, Standing Committee on Industry, “Witnesses,” Fifth Report: Section 14 of
the Patent Act Amendment 1992 (C-91) accessed January 3, 2016.
http://www.parl.gc.ca/content/hoc/archives/committee/352/indu/minutes/indu_issue-04_3848/indu_04_wit-e.html
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House of Commons, Standing Committee on Industry, “Summary of Testimony,” Fifth Report:
Section 14 of the Patent Act Amendment 1992 (C-91) accessed January 3, 2016.
http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/HOC/Archives/Committee/352/indu/reports/05_1997-04/chap3-e.html
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from the World Trade Organization. I don't think Canada can walk away from
NAFTA.”156 As part of the lobbying effort surrounding Parliamentary review, generic
industry stakeholder Leslie Dan delivered a speech in Toronto to the Economic Club of
Canada in January 1997 (Dan 1997). Dan, the founder of Novopharm, then the largest
generic producer in Canada by volume, critiqued Bill C-91 while extoling the virtues of
compulsory licensing. His speech drew on nationalistic rhetoric and stoked fears of high
drug costs and hospital closures:
[Parliamentary review of C-91] represents an important opportunity for
the government of Canada to take action in order to balance the
interests of Canadian consumers, the generic drug industry—which is
primarily Canadian-owned—and those of the foreign-owned
multinational companies which manufacture brand-name drugs…the
current legislation, Bill C-91, favours excessively the large brand-name
pharmaceutical manufacturers at the expense of Canadian consumers
and the generic industry…(Dan 1997).
This is typical of the rhetoric and hard lobbying battles fought out in public between
patented and generic industries on these issues. Dan made many good points but nowhere
in his speech did he mention Canada’s trade commitments under TRIPS. He raised
several issues related to implementation of C-91 that impacted Novopharm and the
generic industry and iterated several key policy prescriptions. These included: 1)
expedited review and repeal of section 55.2 of the Patent Act—this section empowered
the Governor in Council to enact the patented medicines linkage regulations which put
limits on Heath Canada issuing an NOC to a generic manufacturer where it would
infringe a patent;157 2) repeal s. 55.2 while maintaining “the right to do research prior to
156

Testimony of David Dingwall, Minister of Health: Ibid.
While not elaborated in Dan’s speech, Section 55.2 (4) states “The Governor in Council may
make such regulations as the Governor in Council considers necessary for preventing the infringement of a
patent by any person who makes, constructs, uses or sells a patented invention in accordance with
subsection (1), including, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, regulations: (a) respecting the
conditions that must be fulfilled before a notice, certificate, permit or other document concerning any
157

148
patent expiry;”158 3) no patent term extension;159 4) an export exemption incorporated
into the Patent Act; 5) allowing generic products to have similar size, shape and colour to
brand drugs; 6) “restore the retroactivity of licenses which were issued between
December, 1991 and February, 1993 and which were taken away;” and, 7) a general
preference that patent protection only offer five to ten years exclusive market monopoly
(Dan, The Empire Club of Canada Address, January 3, 1997). Regardless of any merits to
these points, some would put Canada offside of the TRIPS Agreement.
After hearing from 140 witnesses over a few months the Liberal-controlled
committee made recommendations in April 1997. The Committee “found this policy area
to be one of the most contentious and difficult ones facing the Canadian government.” 160
Given some of these concerns the committee recommended that government “re-visit the
regulatory regime associated with Bill C-91” among other recommendations including
improving the PMPRB’s statistical reporting.161
The group of stakeholders and provincial governments proved to be a powerful
interest coalition. In 1998, the period of automatic injunction in patent linkage was
product to which a patent may relate may be issued to a patentee or other person under any Act of
Parliament that regulates the manufacture, construction, use or sale of that product, in addition to any
conditions provided for by or under that Act; (b) respecting the earliest date on which a notice, certificate,
permit or other document referred to in paragraph (a) that is issued or to be issued to a person other than the
patentee may take effect and respecting the manner in which that date is to be determined;…(e) generally
governing the issue of a notice, certificate, permit or other document referred to in paragraph (a) in
circumstances where the issue of that notice, certificate, permit or other document might result directly or
indirectly in the infringement of a patent” (Patent Act 1985).
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reduced to 24 months (Regulations Amending the Patented Medicines (Notice of
Compliance) Regulations, Canada Gazette II, 132(7), 1998). Canada’s stockpiling
provision would be maintained. The lobbying effort was perhaps as successful as possible
while remaining NAFTA and TRIPS compliant, notwithstanding that stockpiling was
later ruled offside of TRIPS at the WTO. The change to patent linkage further
exemplifies the flexibility Canada had in implementing and subsequently modifying its
trade-related IP reforms. This was possible due to Canada’s legislative system where
many important details are enacted in regulation and elaborated in case law or
interpretive guidance following the implementing legislation.
The Minister of Industry John Manley recognized the reality of Canada’s
flexibility regarding linkage regulation in response to a question at committee. Mr. Brien,
MP from Témiscamingue, asked Manley: “To your mind, are the regulations part of the
international commitments? Is it your opinion that the regulations cannot be amended
without violation of international agreements?” In response, Manley noted:
The ability to manufacture pharmaceutical products before the expiry of
patents, which plays in favour of generic drug companies, and the
regulations, which favour international companies, are not provided for
in the international commitments. Therefore, it is possible to abolish
regulations. That is not an international commitment. 162
Patent linkage was, of course, not specifically required under TRIPS and NAFTA.
However, eliminating it would require other interlocutory measures during patent
litigation. The Liberal government decided to limit but not abolish the regime.
Nevertheless, the flexibility to alter or abolish the regulation independent of trade treaties
remains an important source of Canadian autonomy.
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Patent Term Restoration, Right of Appeal, and Dual Litigation in Contemporary
Debates
The legacy of the linkage regulation would leave an indelible mark on patent disputes in
Canada as well as future trade negotiations. The primary impact was the emergence of a
system the generic industry has termed “dual litigation.” Most lucrative products in
Canada are challenged through the PM(NOC) stream first and often litigated a second
time through a full patent infringement or patent impeachment action. This entails that
the same patents are often before the Federal Court on two separate occasions, sometimes
on much of the same factual basis. Ending “dual litigation” has been a central point of
generic industry advocacy, particularly through trade deals such as the Canada-EU
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA). Conversely, creating an
effective right of appeal under PM(NOC) was also a central point of patented industry
advocacy in these negotiations. Patentees also want Canada to enact equivalent measures
to the parts of the Hatch-Waxman Act that Canada did not pursue in the 1993-94
amendments, namely, a system of patent term restoration.
Patent term restoration (PTR) offers a period of protection “to compensate patent
holders for marketing time lost while developing the product and awaiting government
approval.”163 The US had introduced this in 1984 under the Hatch-Waxman Amendments
to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, which instituted up to maximum five years
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of supplemental protection. This protection was capped so that total patent life including
extension could not “exceed 14 years from the product’s approval date.”164 US patentees
could apply for PTR and eligibility would be determined by the Commissioner of Patents,
US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). The Commissioner determines the period of
extension based on the patent time expended during a “clinical testing phase” and a
regulatory “approval phase.” The latter is determined by the length of a product’s
regulatory review as measured by FDA and published in the Federal Register. Under 35
U.S. Code § 156(c) the patentee can receive one-half (50%) of the number of days under
clinical testing phase, which is the difference between the patent date and the
commencement of regulatory review by FDA. The patentee must act with “due
diligence” to efficiently bring the product to market and any unreasonable delays are
subtracted from the restoration period (35 U.S. Code § 156(c)(1)).
The USPTO maintains a list of supplemental PTR certificates granted.165 For the
purposes of patent linkage, the FDA maintains its “Orange Book” of relevant regulatory
approval dates and patent expiry dates. On application for regulatory approval
(Abbreviated New Drug Application, ANDA), a generic applicant in the US must declare
that the product will not infringe any patents on the Orange Book list.166 US marketing
approval will not be granted until related patents have expired. Based on an analysis of
the database maintained by the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), PTR is
typically much shorter than the maximum 5 years available, with an approximate simple
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average of 2.7 years for the more than 600 patents granted PTR as of July 2014.167 This
constitutes a major addition to US patent life. Canada only partially imported the HatchWaxman model by creating its own regulatory linkage mechanism with a 30-month
injunction period but no patent term restoration.
Another example of where Canadian amendments did not go as far as US rules
were the damages available to patentees when patents are infringed. The US provides
“enhanced damages” for “willful infringement.” This protects against abusive or
speculative activity of generic manufacturers by tripling the damages for willful patent
infringement.168 The Government of Canada highlighted this important difference in an
information package associated with the retrospective review of Bill C-91.169
Major EU-based pharmaceutical producers have a similar goal to the US in
pushing Canada to bolster its intellectual property protection regime. Given that NAFTA
negotiations produced patent linkage with no PTR, the EU in 2007-08 effectively picked
up where NAFTA left off through the CETA negotiations.170 Key EU objectives for the
CETA directly address patent measures implemented in the NAFTA era. These included
a patentee right of appeal in PM(NOC) patent linkage proceedings and a Hatch-Waxmanstyle patent term restoration (PTR) regime. Under CETA, Canada conceded to provide a
maximum of only two years of PTR or “sui generis” protection—less than the 5 years
provided by the US and EU. Canada has not yet released all details on how this will be
calculated but noted in its 2014 political summary of the agreement that the “reference
167
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points” will include the “filing of the application for the patent and the first authorization
to place the product on the Canadian market” (Government of Canada 2014, 19).
Canada made other CETA-related commitments to the generic industry that
directly address the legacy of TRIPS and NAFTA. One is “to ensure that litigants are
afforded effective rights of appeal, which gives scope for Canada to end the practice of
dual litigation” (Ibid). At the conclusion of CETA negotiations, details regarding how
this will be implemented were to be announced. The commitments were to “ensure all
litigants have equal appeal rights”; take “inefficiencies out of the system”; and guarantee
“an effective appeal for brands and more certainty for generics” (Ibid). It should be noted
that like NAFTA and TRIPS, no specific commitments on patent linkage were reflected
in the actual CETA text. The Canadian CETA implementation legislation, Bill C-30,
passed through Parliament in early 2017 with these changes to patent linkage still to be
determined in regulation.
The addition of dual litigation to the CETA package is a critical example of how
trade agreements can come with regulatory responses not part of the agreement, in this
case, concessions to benefit the generic drug sector. This is illustrated in an internal
government briefing note obtained under the Access to Information Act:
In March 2014, the members of Canada’s Research-Based Pharmaceutical
Companies (Rx&D) signed a letter to the Prime Minister requesting
consultations to ‘ensure that the dual litigation issue does not undermine
the positive steps forward’ in CETA. In their view, dual litigation was not
part of the negotiated outcome between Canada and the European Union,
emerging only after negotiations were concluded.171

171

Mitch Davies, Acting Assistant Deputy Minister Strategic Policy Sector, Industry Canada,
Advice to the Deputy Minister of Industry – Secret – CCM 270436 “Consultations on the Pharmaceutical
Provisions in the CETA” October 21, 2014.

154
This shows how the government has considerable scope to shape the impact of actual
trade commitments—an innovator right of appeal as a concession to the EU—with
related regulatory measures (ending dual litigation) that benefit domestic producers. It is
unclear if EU negotiators knew about this concession, which had been part of discussions
with the generic industry as early as February 2012.172 In fact, the generic industry
proposed specific treaty language that would prevent dual litigation to senior officials in
October of 2011.173 Either this language was not proposed by Canada to the EU, or if it
was, it did not make it into the final negotiated agreement. Either way, the brand industry
position that this was not part of the negotiated outcome would seem to be justified.
A different government is responsible for implementing the trade deal than the
one that made these regulatory commitments. As such, there are many possibilities for
how the NAFTA linkage regime will evolve under CETA implementation. Given the
history explored above, trade commitments are likely to be implemented with
considerable deference to institutionalized interests and build off the existing regulatory
regime.

Conclusion
Patent linkage was the most US-style provision implemented during the TRIPS/NAFTA
era. It directly replicated the 30-month stay for patent disputes and tied generic market
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approval to brand patent status. Patent linkage was a commitment that went beyond
TRIPS and was not codified in NAFTA. On the surface, Canada’s introduction of the
policy would seem to be most likely to support the alternative market power hypothesis.
However, Canadian officials actually secured an important win by keeping this
intellectual property policy out of trade treaties. This preserved domestic sovereignty and
Canada’s flexibility to reduce or otherwise modify IP protections in the future. Canada’s
patent linkage regime also substantively deviated from the US Hatch Waxman Act and
Canada provided no patent term restoration as part of its NAFTA-era reforms.
Canada reduced its IP protections following intensive stakeholder lobbying.
Under a four-year statutory review mechanism incorporated into Bill C-91, a powerful
stakeholder coalition was successful in arguing that Canada modify patent linkage to be
less protective. As discussed, this coalition was itself the product of past Canadian policy
choices, namely, the British-style system of compulsory licensing.174 Compulsory
licensing produced a powerful generic drug sector in Canada, which has left an indelible
mark on Canadian IP and innovation policy. Supported by consumer advocates,
academics and some provincial governments, the generic drug sector has resisted the
patent linkage policy. The generic industry continued to argue for its full repeal in the
CETA context. These efforts have been successful with significant reform of the patent
linkage regime pending. Learning from the TRIPS and NAFTA examples, we can predict
that the details of implementation will critically shape the regime going forward. These
insights should be tested further in various dualist and monist settings and for different
treaty types and levels of complexity.
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The sequencing of NAFTA implementation seems to have played a role in
allowing Canada to regulate under diminished scrutiny from the US. This strategy
accelerated the urgency of implementation. Regulators also deferred to the courts on
important policy issues such as the assessment of damages. Additionally, a comparison of
regulatory provisions shows Canada’s efforts to constrain IP protections and provide
regulators with expansive powers.
While advocates of weak IP protections may support the self-constraining nature
of Canadian policy environment, institutional layering may have more challenging
implications for other areas of international regulatory cooperation. It may not always
produce desirable outcomes. In almost every measurable way, Canada’s innovation and
IP polices have failed. Business R&D investment in Canada continues to lag. The
fragmented nature of the Canadian federal system of government has produced some of
the highest per capita expenditures on patented and generic prescription pharmaceuticals
in the OECD (PMPRB, Guidelines Modernization Discussion Paper 2016; see discussion
Chapter 7). The Canadian environment is overly litigious, fraught with duplication, and
lacks predictability. This is an unfortunate side effect of institutional layering. It
negatively impacts both brand and generic sides of the sector and they have argued for
reform (Government of Canada 2013). As will be explored in the next chapter, the clash
of domestic and international regulatory standards under NAFTA and TRIPS has
produced a system of patent litigation that faces many challenges. This was partially a
result of the patent linkage compromise.
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Chapter 5 - Institutional Feedback: The Legal Dimension

This chapter examines legal and case law developments following TRIPS and NAFTA
implementation in Canada. It shows how Canadian judicial institutions have narrowed the
definition and scope of patentable utility in the post-TRIPS era. This constraint on the
practical extent of market exclusivity provided by the intellectual property regime was a
product of Canadian institutional capacity and history. Market power is not well suited to
examining legal minutia within the black box of the state and its judicial institutions.
When idiosyncrasies in domestic adjudication processes arise, we would expect to see
bilateral pressure and prompt domestic resolution. However, US advocacy efforts to
pressure Canada to address this legal development are shown to be ineffective.
Furthermore, Canadian resistance in this policy area has subsequently shaped future
international trade and regulatory standards.
The chapter begins by comparing TRIPS and NAFTA language on patent utility
to Canada’s Patent Act as amended under those agreements. It provides a plain-language
overview of some fairly complex case law termed the “promise doctrine” or “promise
utility doctrine.” Under this doctrine, the court essentially interprets what the patent
language “promised” the technology would be useful for. In some cases, the court
reconstructs what utility could have been “soundly predicted” at the time of patent
application (Gold and Shortt 2014, 16; Siebrasse 2014, 21; Wilson 2014, 5, 11). Several
lucrative patents have been ruled invalid under this doctrine.175 It has become “almost

175
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invariably the standard for assessing utility of a pharmaceutical patent” in the Canadian
system (Siebrasse 2013, 1). The chapter identifies institutional and case law sources for
the promise doctrine’s development, and then traces subsequent case law and the political
fallout. The chapter explores political pressure for amendment from the United States
and its corporations and finds that judicial standards remain resilient.
The chapter concludes that to fully understand international regulatory standards,
scholars must consider the practical intersection of global standards and domestic
institutions. Implementation must be conducted with precision, as new international
standards tend to build on a prior institutional framework in a layering or cumulative
fashion. Furthermore, sequencing and historical precedent can be important to final
policy outcomes. The policy evolution illustrates the utility of historical institutionalism
in comparison to alternative theoretical approaches.

Patent Invalidation Under the Promise Utility Doctrine
This section argues that Canadian judicial institutions have mitigated the full impact of
TRIPS and NAFTA by leveraging historical practice and case law to set more onerous
standards for patentability in Canada. This was possible because Canada did not directly
replicate some TRIPS and NAFTA language when implementing those treaties into
domestic law via amendments to the Patent Act. Canadian judicial institutions retained
and asserted considerable authority over the scope of patentability.
International IP regimes help to harmonize standards. This harmonization does
not always lead to consistent outcomes. TRIPS enshrined in treaty 20 years of patent
before the Federal Court. PM(NOC) proceedings are a primary source of promise doctrine case law.
Henceforth, the term invalidation is used to refer to successfully challenged patents in both PM(NOC) and
full patent infringement streams of litigation.
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protection applied to all Canadian patents. This standard was actually implemented as
part of the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement package (the FTA). Canada’s
membership in the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT), effective January 1990,176 provided
patentees with the option of one common submission point for international patent
applications. PCT membership facilitated simultaneous filing in 148 treaty member
countries.177 This allowed Canadian patent reviewers to rely heavily on common
international search report information (Wilson 2014, 4).178 In other words, patent
examiners in Canada often rely on international standards and existing international
approvals when granting a Canadian patent (Ibid). Despite international process and
standards harmonization under TRIPS and the PCT, international treaty language did not
bind parties to a unified definition of what would constitute a useful invention or “patent
utility.”179
Under TRIPS Section 5 (Patents) Article 27, the definition of patentable subject
matter is broad and linked to industrial application: “patents shall be available for any
inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they
are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application.”180 These
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terms are defined in TRIPS with some latitude to the patent-granting member country:
“‘inventive step’ and ‘capable of industrial application’ may be deemed by a Member to
be synonymous with the terms ‘non-obvious’ and ‘useful’ respectively.”181 This broad
TRIPS language left considerable scope for domestic review and interpretation with
respect to the determination of obviousness and utility.182
In a similarly broad fashion, Canada’s Patent Act defines invention as “any new
and useful art, process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement in any art, process, machine, manufacture or composition of
matter.”183 Importantly, the specific definition found in TRIPS was never replicated in
Canadian law. Per the domestic flexibility entailed by the language “may be deemed by a
member,” the term “useful” was not made synonymous with ‘capable of industrial
application.’ Canadian courts have capitalized on this broad scope by reaching back into
case law precedent to impart a Canada-specific notion of what constitutes a valid patent.
Patent challenges and invalidation are constantly in a state of flux and patents are
routinely invalidated in many countries. However, for the international IP regime to be
efficacious, there should be considerable convergence of actor expectations around
common international patent applications and general consistency across jurisdictions.
For example, on balance one would expect the same ‘good’ patents to be upheld and
frivolous patents not granted or invalidated. To the contrary, several lucrative patents
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have been invalidated in Canada under “promise doctrine” case law.184 This has not been
seen under the equally litigious US system or elsewhere in Europe.
The promise doctrine technically impacts all patented technology but has had
practical implications primarily for the pharmaceutical sector. This was facilitated by a
strong Canadian generic export sector with the resources to endure lengthy and costly
litigation and routinely challenge the patents of US and EU multinationals. The
invalidations often impact a subset of pharmaceutical patents called “selection patents”
where a broad “genus” or class of compounds is first patented, and then as useful
applications are developed, selections from that genus are subsequently patented (Gold
and Shortt 2015, 40). This is a common but contentious practice that is sometimes framed
as double patenting or “evergreening” by the generic industry.185 Alternatively, patentees
argue this is an essential component of the patent system providing incentives to advance
research and conduct clinical trials. The Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) has upheld this
view and the general importance of selection patents. The court dismissed the notion that
selection patents ipso facto constitute double patenting or evergreening. It has affirmed
the importance of the doctrine of selection patents on the basis of recognizing
improvements made: “selection patents encourage improvements over the subject matter
of the original genus patent because that selection does something better than or different
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from what was claimed in the genus patent.”
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However, the courts have set onerous

standards for when such selections can take place through heightened evidence
requirements. These evidence requirements apply at the time of the patent application.
While TRIPS language focuses on commercial application, Canadian courts have
adopted a much narrower definition of utility based on its interpretation of the promise of
the patent. Selection patents are particularly impacted because patentees must specify
how selections are distinct from the genus:
Patent applications may contain promises for a variety of reasons.
Sometimes, a particular degree of usefulness is at the core of the
invention…. Another case, that of “selection patents”, arises where a
patent has already been granted for a broad class of compounds (or
“genus”)… A party may seek a second patent for a sub-species of that
genus on the basis that it has discovered that the sub-species (or
“selection”) has a surprising and non-obvious advantage over other
members of the genus. Otherwise, the patentee of an original “genus”
patent would be able to “evergreen” its original patent monopoly,
through subsidiary patents for sub-classes of that very same
invention.187
The Canadian case law emerges from this selection patent problem but impacts the
entirety of what is patentable and what evidence is required at the time of the patent
application. Because TRIPS/NAFTA implementation did not alter domestic laws with
respect to the specific technical definitions of utility, judicial institutions were positioned
to define this going forward. The courts creatively applied historical precedent to exclude
certain patents, and thus shape the standard to reflect local practices and norms.
A normative factor potentially impacting the evolution of the promise doctrine is
the sentiment in Canada against “evergreening.” There is a notion that only one period of
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exclusivity per drug is just, regardless of any research effort that may have gone into
selection of a particular subset of the genus. Evergreening is possible in many
international jurisdictions and some argue that it has considerable associated costs
(Vernaz et al. 2013). As noted by Jonathan Darrow, while critics see only “minor
variations” these patenting strategies do not actually extend the patent life of the original
product:
suggesting that [variations] extend the effective patent term of the
original product involves a bit of analytical [sic] sleight of hand…..The
old drug, which is no longer subject to patent protection, is in the public
domain. Although drug companies have obtained a new patent, the
patent on the original drug product hasn’t been extended at all (Darrow
2010, 6).
Even when the new variation is patentable, that does not mean that governments want to
grant multiple patent linkage injunctions on the same molecule. While only one of several
potential evergreening scenarios, multiple injunction periods under US and Canadian
patent linkage provisions was seen as a problem (see chapter 4) and caused both countries
to amend them in 2003 and 2006 respectively. Beyond regulatory patent linkage,
Canadian courts still had to grapple with how to manage the patentability of new uses and
secondary selections from an already patented genus.

Foundations in Case Law
In addition to treaty implementation, previous case law was an important source of the
promise doctrine’s development. This section explores theses sources. It defers to legal
experts and the extant legal literature on the promise doctrine to inform its temporal
analytical parameters. The common law roots of the promise doctrine can be traced to
Consolboard Inc. v. MacMillan Bloedel Limited (1981) regarding some elements of the
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utility definition (Siebrasse 2014, 4). It may reach back even further to the British House
of Lords in Hatmaker v. Joseph Nathan & Co (1919) regarding reference to a specific
“promise” of a patent (Gold and Shortt 2015, 39). Building on Consolboard (1981), the
first major case to codify the test for the promise doctrine was the Supreme Court of
Canada (SCC) ruling in Apotex Inc. v. Wellcome Foundation Ltd., (2002). Legal scholars
and patent office practitioners have identified a series of cases beginning in 2005 that are
importantly shaped by the Supreme Court Wellcome (2002) ruling and precipitated
changes in Canada’s official manual for patent examiners (Siebrasse 2013; 2014; Wilson
2014, 6). As such, this analysis starts process tracing on the Wellcome (2002) case as a
reasonable “critical juncture” or “point at which an institution or practice was contingent
or open to alternative paths, and actors or exogenous events determined which path it
would take” (Bennett and Checkel 2015a, 26).
This case started in 1998 around the same time as the generic industry was
fighting for amendments to the PM(NOC) patent linkage regulation. At that time, generic
drug giant Apotex made the decision to take on a high profile patent dispute regarding
one of the first available drugs to have some success in treating human
immunodeficiency virus infection and acquired immune deficiency syndrome
(HIV/AIDS). At issue in Wellcome (2002) was an existing drug zidovudine commonly
referred to as AZT. In the 1960s, AZT had been investigated unsuccessfully as a potential
chemotherapy agent. During the height of the AIDS crisis, the Wellcome Foundation and
its partner company Glaxo/Wellcome, which were not the compound’s original inventors,
identified a new use for AZT in the treatment and prophylaxis of AIDS. Glaxo/Wellcome
called the drug Retrovir and was granted a patent. Apotex wanted to market a generic
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version of AZT so challenged the patent in both the Federal Court and the Federal Court
of Appeal. Both upheld the patent. Apotex appealed to the Supreme Court on the basis
“that the necessary utility had not been established as of the priority date of the patent,
that the [patent] claims covered more than the invention (prophylactic properties as well
as treatment properties).”188 The SCC ultimately disagreed and also upheld the patent.
However, the SCC did feel the need at that time to conclusively spell out acceptable
parameters for “new use for old compounds” and rule on the statutory requirements for
invention and patent utility.
Wellcome (2002) spelled out the test that would set the legal standard and would
come to have implications for Canada’s international relations:
Utility is an essential part of the statutory definition of an “invention”
[189]. The inventor must be in a position to establish utility as of the
date the patent is applied for, on the basis of either demonstration or
sound prediction based on the information and expertise then
available. Where the subject matter of the patent is a new use for an old
chemical compound, it is not enough that the invention is reduced to a
definite and practical shape by the formulation of a written or oral
description. Nor is it enough for a patent owner to be able to buttress
speculation with post-patent proof. If a patent sought to be supported
on the basis of sound prediction is subsequently challenged, the
challenge will succeed if the prediction at the date of application was
not sound, or, irrespective of the soundness of the prediction, there is
evidence of lack of utility in respect of some of the area covered…
The doctrine of sound prediction has three components. Firstly, there
must be a factual basis for the prediction. Secondly, the inventor must
have at the date of the patent application an articulable and “sound” line
of reasoning from which the desired result can be inferred from the
factual basis. Thirdly, there must be proper disclosure. The soundness
(or otherwise) of the prediction is a question of fact. The doctrine of
sound prediction, in its nature, presupposes that further work remains to
be done. Care must be taken, however, that the doctrine is not abused,
188

Apotex Inc. v. Wellcome Foundation Ltd. [2002], SCC S.C.R 4 docket 28287, at 154, accessed
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and that sound prediction is not diluted to include a lucky guess or mere
speculation.190
Under this test, an inventor must have proof of utility at the date of the patent application
or be able to ‘soundly predict” it.

By defining the utility test as it has, the SCC

effectively heightened the disclosure and evidence requirements to establish that an
inventor’s prediction about utility was sound. The ruling does acknowledge that “further
work” or studies on an invention can be completed at a future date. However, the
disclosure requirements can still be highly challenging in the context of the normal drug
development process. For obvious practical and competitive reasons, clinical trials are
almost exclusively conducted after the patent application.
Here we see the Supreme Court adopt a Canada-specific standard for evidence to
establish utility. The passage also explicitly excludes post-patent filing evidence for
sound prediction cases (Siebrasse 2014, 16). Often, the court does allow post-filing
evidence, for example, to establish non-obviousness and lack of utility (Ibid). For sound
prediction cases, it is not enough to simply show evidence of clinical development or
commercial success after the patent application. Had the SCC allowed post-filing
evidence, the entire promise doctrine issue may not have developed post-2002.
There is some scholarly disagreement on the general ‘newness’ of this doctrine.
Those who disagree with Siebrasse’s (2014) characterization of the promise utility
doctrine as something fundamentally new may also disagree with the characterization of
Wellcome (2002) as a “critical juncture.” Some argue that non-pharmaceutical cases as
early as 1947 also dealt with the “promise of the patent” (Gold and Shortt, 2014, 56).
Notably, Gold and Shortt argue that Siebrasse incorrectly dismisses the “promissory
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aspects” of the judgment in New Process Screw Corp v. PL Robertson Manufacturing Co
(1961) and that he instead privileges the court’s application of a “scintilla” (of utility)
standard (Gold and Shortt 2014, 56).191 Siebrasse counters that Gold and Shortt obfuscate
the issue by conflating the specific promise doctrine with other doctrines associated with
invalidation including obviousness, sufficiency and overbreadth (Siebrasse 2014b, 2).
New Process Screw (1961) is not part of the promise doctrine because “the promise is
made in the claims, not in the disclosure” (Ibid, 53).192 This is clearly a point of
disagreement between legal experts who appear on opposing sides of the patent utility
issue and the present analysis does not aim to settle the dispute. This important
disagreement, however, does support the methodological point that the decision when to
start and stop process tracing can be somewhat subjective.
Despite this potential subjectivity, there seems more than enough evidence of a
compelling juncture on Wellcome (2002). This was an actual pharmaceutical IP case
where Canada’s highest court had a clear choice to accept or reject utility-specific
admissibility of evidence. And the decision had substantial implications for Canada’s
treatment of evidence going forward. This case is, in fact, the basis for Gold and Shortt’s
own comparison between the Canadian system and the US system regarding incentives
for utility-based litigation. They argue that incentives for litigation are much higher in
191

The mere “scintilla of utility” is a key term against which patent value is measured where no
specific promise is made in the patent: “Where the [patent] specification does not promise a specific result, no
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Canada due to a lack of admissibility for post-patent proof in “sound-prediction” cases
(Gold and Shortt 2014, 65).
Perhaps more importantly, Gold and Shortt’s assessment of TRIPS is consistent
with the central component of this thesis related to the residual power of domestic
institutions vis-à-vis international standards. They argue that “international agreements
do not specify substantive patent content” and “TRIPS did not intend to legislate a global
standard for patentable utility” (Gold and Shortt 2014, 58, 59). This is obviously part of
an argument in support of dismissing a specific case,193 but it also highlights an important
limit to the international regime. International agreements only reach into domestic law to
a certain extent. Many important details are determined domestically. By contrast, local
entrenched judicial institutions have much closer proximity to the law and retain power
over definitional interpretation.

Process Tracing the Historical Institutionalist Hypothesis
This section traces the relevant case law and illustrates how the path dependence of
precedent supports the historical institutionalist (HI) hypothesis. The HI hypothesis for a
narrowing of the broad TRIPS/NAFTA language is that historically rooted institutions
and temporal sequencing have shaped this feedback response. For the HI hypothesis to be
valid, we should see evidence of judicial capacity and that promise doctrine patent
invalidations are explicitly linked to institutionalized standards.194 Previous case law is
instructive in this regard. We would also expect to see evidence of US pressure
193
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specifically addressing the promise doctrine and evidence of Canadian institutions
resisting this pressure.195 Indeed, no amount of US pressure to date has been able to
challenge this entrenched institutional source of domestic power.
Citation of Consolboard Inc. v. MacMillan Bloedel (Saskatchewan) Ltd. (1981) is
a good starting point as the definition of inutility in that case clearly conflicts with what
was later articulated under TRIPS regarding commercial application. Consolboard (1981)
cites Halsbury's Laws of England, (3rd ed.), vol. 29 where ‘not useful’ “means that the
invention will not work, either in the sense that it will not operate at all or, more broadly,
that it will not do what the specification promises that it will do... the practical usefulness
of the invention does not matter, nor does its commercial utility, unless the specification
promises commercial utility.”196 This is at odds with the TRIPS definition of utility above
that directly specifies commercial application. By adopting the Consolboard (1981)
definition,197 the court continues an institutionalized practice regarding utility that reaches
back to English common law. It is not so much that the conception of utility is
completely “new,” but the Wellcome (2002) SCC judgment codified the approach in a
specific legal standard for future use.
According to the Canadian Legal Information Institute (CANLII) database, 64
rulings jointly cite Consolboard (total 156) and Wellcome (total 131) as of March 2015.198
Many rulings explicitly invoke the language in Wellcome (2002) and Consolboard (1981)
to invalidate patents. However, qualitative analysis is needed as not all are invalidations
or have led to a substantial material outcome. Some have been invalidated for multiple
195
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reasons including lack of “sound prediction” or have been overturned on appeal.
In 2005, the Federal Court dismissed an appeal regarding evidence disclosure in
Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Apotex, (2005) FC nefazodone. This case was not an invalidation
but considered a clinically problematic pharmaceutical product that had just prior been
removed from both the Canadian and the US market. This ruling, while relating to the
disclosure of evidence, was among the first to jointly rely on Consolboard and Wellcome
together to reassert the court’s interpretation of utility.
Also citing Consolboard and Wellcome was the 2005 PM(NOC) case Pfizer
Canada Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Health) (2005) which did not uphold the patent for
the product quinapril.199 The judge agreed with the patent owner that “sound prediction”
had been satisfied

200

and that “double-patenting” was not at play.201 However, under a

reverse onus, the Federal Court found the patent holder had not proven that the patent did
not make overly broad claims.202 Specifically, the court held that the “claims of the ‘330
patent were broader than the invention disclosed.”203 The Federal Court of Appeal later
reversed this decision in Pfizer Canada Inc. v. Canada (Health), (2007) FCA 209 –
quinapril. Thus it should be noted that the standards and tests outlined in Consolboard
and Wellcome do not always lead to invalidation, provided that ‘sound prediction’ is
satisfied, and the court deems claims made about the patent’s use are not overly broad nor
obvious.
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Two important cases that also cite Wellcome and Consolboard involve the US
corporation Eli Lilly and Company.204 These cases are central to the promise utility
doctrine debate and were the basis of a NAFTA Chapter 11 Investor State Dispute
Settlement (ISDS) case brought against Canada by the company. On the basis of the
promise doctrine, Canadian courts ruled that Lilly’s patents on the key products
olanzapine and atomoxetine were not valid. After lengthy domestic litigation processes
that were ultimately unsuccessful and a refusal by the Supreme Court to hear Lilly’s case,
the company launched an ISDS challenge in late 2012.
Lilly argued the promise doctrine imposes more onerous standards of proof in
Canada that a patent will lead to a useful invention, even where there is a successful and
clinically efficacious product on the market. Lilly claimed that this series of judicial
rulings following Wellcome (2002) has put Canada offside of its NAFTA commitments
and effectively expropriated its investments. It sought a government rectification or
compensation of $500 million. According to Lilly’s second Notice of Intent filing:
By construing the “promise of the patent” as the standard against which
utility is assessed, the Canadian Federal Courts are in effect requiring
proof of the effectiveness of the compound in treating a disease or
disorder at the date of filing of the patent application, which imposes a
significantly higher onus on the patentee than the standard of credible
or plausible utility that is mandated by the TRIPS Agreement and
NAFTA...The measures in issue have had the effect of destroying the
value associated with Lilly’s investments, namely, the exclusive rights
to prevent third parties from making, using or selling the patented
product during the patent term and to enforce those rights.205
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This statement formed the basis for Lilly’s claim that Canadian judicial rulings impose
higher standards for patentability than found in TRIPS. In support of the notation that
patent invalidations constitute an “expropriation” of the company’s investments, Lilly
also argued that the standards were “radically new, arbitrary and discriminatory against
pharmaceutical companies.”206
Prominent legal practitioners noted a “widely” held view that the doctrine is
inconsistent with NAFTA obligations.207 In the view of others, the claim lacked basic
credibility in that it used NAFTA’s investment Chapter 11 for an intellectual property
matter. One interesting feature of the claim arises from the structure of ISDS. It holds the
executive branch of government to account for judicial interpretations. The Government
of Canada argued “in all but rare circumstances, a determination by a domestic court
concerning the existence of a property right, including an intellectual property right,
cannot amount to an ‘expropriation’ at international law.”208 Lilly noted that the rulings
have been incorporated into the official Canadian Intellectual Property Office Practice
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Manual.209 An implicit point is that, as signatory to NAFTA, Canada has not taken
legislative action to override the promise doctrine.

Past Decisions “Binding” Future Outcomes
This section briefly examines the long litigation history of the two key Eli Lilly cases.
The text of the ruling in these PM(NOC) patent linkage proceedings show how past
Supreme Court Decisions were “binding” on these outcomes. Eli Lilly Canada Inc. v.
Novopharm Limited, (2007) FC 596 olanzapine was a PM(NOC) proceeding that first
allowed a generic competitor on market. This case was preceded by a nearly identical
testing of the same patent by Apotex which claimed the patent invalid on the basis of
“anticipation,” “obviousness,” “double-patenting” and an “inferred” intention to mislead
contrary to Section 53 of the Patent Act.210 All of these allegations were dismissed and the
court granted Lilly an order of prohibition against Apotex marketing a competitor.
Following the Apotex ruling, a second case on the same product Eli Lilly Canada Inc. v.
Novopharm included essentially an identical witness list and identical evidence as
assessed by Justice Hughes J.211
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Despite a clear consistency of evidence, this second round of litigation on the
same molecule used the sound prediction test to invalidate the patent while leveraging the
“disclosure as the public bargain” language from Wellcome (2002). The second ruling
upheld the earlier dismissal on the points of anticipation, obviousness, intention to
mislead, and “double-patenting” (at 184, 185). However, the second decision also
reflected the court’s aversion in principle to two periods of monopoly for selection
patents, where those selections do not fulfill the institutionalized public bargain. As noted
by the judge in that case, “Given that Lilly has already enjoyed a patent monopoly for a
group of compounds that included olanzapine all said to be useful in treating [central
nervous system] disorders, it simply has not paid the price, by way of a clear and explicit
disclosure as to what the invention is” [emphasis added].212 Despite near identical
evidence and near identical ruling on all other elements of validity, on the second goaround the patent was not held to be valid based on a lack of utility.
This approach by the generic sector to throw every potential argument for
invalidity against the wall and “see what sticks” is common. The Wellcome (2002) utility
test provides a powerful tool in this effort. The introduction of clear evidence of
substantial commercial success explicitly had no bearing on the ruling.213
Ironically, the judgment is significantly informed by English common law per
Halsbury’s Laws of England, (3rd ed.), vol. 29, as cited in Consolboard (1981). The
English Court of Appeal itself upheld the validity of the exact same patent in Dr. Reddy's

212
213

Eli Lilly Canada Inc. v. Novopharm Limited [2007] supra, at 164.
Ibid at 187.

175
Laboratories (UK) Limited v. Eli Lilly and Company Ltd., (2009).214 It appears that the
Canadians are more faithful to the path laid out by English Law than are the English
themselves.
Despite the objective of TRIPS and the PCT to harmonize patent standards
internationally and create predictability for patent owners, patent utility is one area that
has clearly not been harmonized in Canada’s case. This creates international divergence
on the same patents despite the same general issues and evidence. The Canadian Court
was careful to safeguard autonomy from other international rulings in this regard.215 In
contrast, the English court in its conclusion of validity did “draw comfort” from a similar
ruling affirming utility on this patent by the German Oberlandsgericht and on appeal by
the Bundespatentgericht.216
Every modern patent system is, of course, subject to judicial review and
invalidation is always a possibility. However, the highly specific testing criteria on which
this review is based in Canada is fairly new—more recent than many of the patent
applications it impacts—and is wholly Canada-specific:
Canadian patents, especially in the pharmaceutical field, normally claim
priority from a prior filing in the US or Europe, neither of which has a
similar doctrine. Even Canadian patent drafters would not have been
alert to this doctrine until recently. This means the patents that are being
214
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invalidated in litigation today on the basis of the promise of the patent
doctrine were drafted without regard to its requirements (Siebrasse
2013, 3).
This practice impacts predictability for patent owners and complicates the regime goal
regarding international convergence of expectations. In summary, Canada is an outlier
among common legal systems.
The second case Novopharm Limited v. Eli Lilly (2010) FC 915 atomoxetine again
highlights that commercial utility has little force in Canadian patent adjudication. Perhaps
learning from its experience in the olanzapine case, Lilly’s counsel conceded the point on
commercial application: “[Counsel] is correct when he argues that utility does not mean
commercial usefulness.”217 Interestingly, for the same product Lilly pursues a very different
line of argument in its NAFTA investor state dispute settlement (ISDS) complaint where it
takes great pains to stress the commercial utility and success of its product. This was part of
Lilly’s expropriation claim and the supporting argument that Canada had broken with
historical practice, where previously, no commercially successful products were found to
lack utility.218
One key argument made by Lilly is that the heightened standard of utility is not
reflected anywhere in the Patent Act. At the time of its patent application in 1996 the tests
set out in Wellcome (2002) could not have been foreseen. In a crucial passage, the trial judge
defers on this point citing the Canadian institutional standard he must work within:
Lilly argues that the validity of the ’735 Patent is now being assessed
against the backdrop of a more rigorous disclosure obligation than may
have been apparent at the time of its filing in 1996. Lilly also questions
217
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what public policy or statutory purpose is served by imposing a
heightened disclosure obligation in cases of a sound prediction of utility –
provided, of course, that what is disclosed is sufficient to understand and
to work the invention. The disclosure issue, however, has been
determined by earlier decisions that are binding upon me and to the
extent that it may be amenable to reconsideration, it must be examined
elsewhere [citation omitted, emphasis added].219
It is hard to imagine a smoking-gun statement that more aptly supports the historical
institutional hypothesis. The judge clearly does not see an option other than striking down
the patent on the basis of inutility as identified by the sound prediction test in Wellcome
(2002).
Some of the normative language from Wellcome identified above is reproduced in
Novopharm Limited v. Eli Lilly (2010) atomoxetine.220 This is reflected in somewhat more
of a utilitarian style: “sound prediction is to some extent the quid pro quo the applicant
offers in exchange for the patent monopoly.”221 The idea of a quid pro quo between
inventor and “the Crown, representing the public” regarding description of the invention
has an institutionalized history and is also cited in Consolboard (1981).222 This standard
and the invocation of the public bargain regarding disclosure also seems to suggest that
norms and judicial identities as defenders of that bargain also play some role. In this case,
we do not need to go down the winding road of mutual constitution of agents and
structures to see some validity in a constructivist-informed hypothesis. While the HI
smoking-gun test is satisfied, it is not a double-decisive test, and there is room to consider
equifinality by viewing this judicial development through a pluralist lens. In this case,
both norms and institutions contribute to explaining the outcome. Historical sequencing is
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also relevant as previous decisions create institutionalized practices that clearly bind
future outcomes.

Scope and Impact
There are several other cases that leverage and contribute to this case law. This section
continues to process trace the promise doctrine’s scope and impact. While the full impact
is inherently difficult to assess, there can be no doubt that the case law provides a
significant constraint on patentability in Canada.
Lilly’s Notice of Intent points to a substantial increase in generic company
attempts to invalidate patents sector-wide following “promise doctrine” case law that
began around 2005. According to Lilly, in the 25 years prior (1980-2005) there were
only 33 patent-utility challenges in Canada, two of which led to successful patent
invalidations. In just 7 years following 2005, (2005-2012) Canadian courts apparently
heard 58 utility challenges and 19 invalidations, all of which were related to
pharmaceutical patents.223 These figures were not individually specified by Lilly but were
identified by both Lilly’s and Canada’s expert witnesses during the ISDS arbitration.
A chronology of key cases and appeals is included in ANNEX C, listed by date of
first proceeding. This list was extracted from the expert witness report of Dr. Bruce
Levin, a Columbia University biostatistician and Lilly witness in the ISDS arbitration.
The analysis has been updated to reflect some critiques and refinements made by
Canada’s expert witnesses. A few more recent cases have also been added. The list
rightly includes PM(NOC) cases which are summary judgments and not technically
patent ‘invalidations.’ As discussed herein, these cases have real-world impact and
223
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importance and cannot be excluded.224
Another case that deserves particular mention is the long saga of litigation on
blockbuster drug Plavix. Litigation on the molecule was granted leave to the Supreme
Court twice before it was settled out of court on the eve of its second Supreme Court
hearing.225

Initial claims of “anticipation, obviousness and double patenting” were

dismissed in the first round of litigation. The patent returned to the SCC the second time
on basis of the promise doctrine. In its 2014 factum, the drug’s manufacturer Sanofi
argued that Canada’s subsequent interpretation of Consolboard (1981) has taken the
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promise doctrine well beyond its UK origins and well beyond the Canadian Patent Act.226
Sanofi noted that Consolboard (1981) cites pre-1977 UK law. At this time there was a
UK statutory measure for invalidity based on a “false promise” on fact (i.e. not on sound
prediction of utility as of the patent filing date per Canada).227 Since 1977 the UK has
moved via legislation to an ‘industrial application’ of utility. A similar approach was
subsequently adopted in TRIPS:
Since 1977, the UK Patents Act has not contained this statutory ground
of invalidity. Thus, patents can no longer be held invalid on the basis of
a false promise or suggestion. UK patents however still must have some
utility, which is measured on whether it is ‘plausible’ that the invention
is capable of industrial application, a very low threshold.228
This further demonstrates the salience of historical institutionalism. The UK moved to an
industrial application threshold in law. It made a clean break with history in advance of
TRIPS. Yet the legacy of its past standards significantly impacted the evolution of
Canadian case law. The promise doctrine would not have become such an important
international issue had Canada implemented TRIPS differently and modified its Patent
Act to more closely reflect the language of industrial application.
Estimates for the financial magnitude of the promise utility doctrine are still
nascent, often shrouded in secrecy due to legal strategy, and none have been validated by
academic peer-review. Eli Lilly claims $500 million for Canadian patent invalidations of
two of its major products noted above. An opt-ed penned by a former United States Trade
Representative (USTR) staff has claimed $1.1 billion and 23 patents “revoked” without
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citation or sourcing of this estimate.229 US pharmaceutical industry associations in their
representations to the USTR have only provided specific estimates for US-owned patents
and have claimed a conservative minimum of $750 million in direct damages for around
20 patents invalidated by Canadian courts under the promise utility doctrine (BIO 2015,
20; CPUC 2015, 7). These estimates used IMS Health sales data but are non-transparently
disclosed with confidential data redacted. The associations’ claim is that sales losses are
more accurately in the billions when the full range of impacts is accounted for. These
include “additional damages paid to competitors as a result of Canadian decisions
applying the promise doctrine,” patent application denials by the Canadian Intellectual
Property Office (CIPO), pending trials, and “forfeiture of intellectual property rights
granted in similarly-situated economies around the world” (CPUC 2015, 7).
The impacts on the Canadian market are not unsubstantial. Even a conservatively
assumed $1.3 billion impact estimate would constitute approximately 10% of the annual
$13.6 billion output of the entire patented pharmaceutical industry in Canada (PMPRB
2014, 15).230 Perhaps a greater concern for patent owners is the perceived threat to similar
invalidations in other international markets. The US does not want to see other major
markets experiment with more onerous tests for utility and undermine its TRIPS
accomplishments. One indicator of the concern is that US industry has supplemented its
traditional association advocacy via The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of
America (PhRMA), Biotechnology Innovation Organization (BIO), and the US Chamber
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of Commerce Global Intellectual Property Center (GIPC) by setting up an issue-specific
association, the “Canadian Patent Utility Coalition” (CPUC).
There are many barriers to constructing a reliable financial impact assessment of
the promise utility doctrine. Companies do not want any company-specific data disclosed
due to shareholder concerns and the risk of spreading an international “contagion”231 of
invalidations for their patents. Furthermore, there is no way to quantify the impact for
cases that are settled for undisclosed sums. This was the case for what was to be a
landmark Supreme Court ruling on the promise doctrine that was settled out of court the
day before its hearing.232 The issue of non-transparent settlements between brand and
generic companies has raised eyebrows from competition regulators in both Canada and
the US, particularly those settlements that might lead to an anticompetitive “pay-fordelay,”233 where “brand drug companies [pay] generics to drop patent challenges and
delay entering the market” (Competition Bureau 2014, 2). Another point of uncertainty is
the counterfactual for the products that did not apply or were not granted a patent under
the heightened standard.
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Despite the challenges, precision on the specific financial impact is not required
for the purposes here. US research suggests that one year following generic competition,
brand market share typically erodes to only 16% of sales (by unit) (Grabowski, Long, and
Mortimer 2013, 1). For large products, defined by US sales in excess of $250 million
USD, the erosion is even greater to just 11% of the former market (Ibid). Given the
incentive structure for generic pharmaceutical companies to pursue cases, it is perhaps
not surprising that these invalidated patents relate to some of the most lucrative (or
potentially lucrative) products on the market. There can be no doubt that the invalidation
of these high revenue products constitutes a meaningful constraint on the TRIPS
standards both at the individual product level and at the national system level. More
fundamental than the direct financial impacts felt by industry is the political outcome and
policy implication of an assertive federal judiciary.
Ultimately, the arbitration panel sided with Canada’s view, dismissed Lilly’s
claim and awarded legal costs to Canada.234 This outcome is fully consistent with the
present theory and supports the fact Canada maintained considerable domestic
sovereignty under NAFTA. The power of domestic courts to interpret patent utility
remains fully intact. As it turns out, reports of the death of Canadian sovereignty were
greatly exaggerated. The tribunal noted that under the circumstances of a rational and
non-arbitrary policy approach “it is not the role of a NAFTA Chapter Eleven tribunal to
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question the policy choices of a NAFTA Party.”235 The tribunal rejected the notion that
the promise doctrine constituted “a dramatic change in law” noting that it reflected a
“more incremental and evolutionary” change. This is an important distinction when
considering whether Canada ‘expropriated’ investments or simply applied the law
according to the constraints of past precedent.236
This is not the end of the promise doctrine saga. The Supreme Court of Canada
will rule on an additional case in 2017 that could provide further clarity on this issue.
There are also potential international implications. According to Gold, the tribunal
decision “[sends] a signal that countries can phrase their patent laws in a way that suits
their national needs.”237 Alternatively, PhRMA notes:
the tribunal did not need to consider the inconsistency of Canada’s patent
utility doctrine with its international obligations… [the] Canadian
Government has a choice. Through a quick legislative fix, Canadian courts
would be required to live up to global standards of patentability, which
purposely set a low bar for demonstrating utility. This is the same standard
implemented in the United States, Europe and Japan.238
US promise doctrine advocacy will clearly continue. It is a likely US target for the 2017
NAFTA renegotiation.
In summary, Canadian courts have articulated a national standard for patentable
utility that is wholly Canada-specific and there is ongoing disagreement on its
compliance with international regime standards. A NAFTA Chapter 11 dispute settlement
process designed to hear investment expropriation claims and not intellectual property
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matters was an unconventional vehicle to address concerns regarding the appropriateness
of Canada’s patent utility regime. Through this process, path dependent judicial standards
have remained resilient. Canada’s narrow and path dependent implementation of NAFTA
and TRIPS239—which did not replace existing Canadian standards with an “industrial
application” standard—has survived for the time being. Regardless of this outcome, there
can be no doubt that this case has helped to undermine the public legitimacy of ISDS.
This is a tricky for Canada because dispute settlement is a key institutional protection in
managing power asymmetry with the US and was a central NAFTA accomplishment (see
ANNEX B).

US Pressure and the Canadian Response
This section turns to the second part of the historical institutionalism test identified
above. For historical institutionalism to provide an alternative to market power we should
see clear evidence of US pressure and Canadian officials relying on institutions to push
back. This section helps to show that despite considerable pressure from the US,
Canadian institutions are resilient. Furthermore, this section shows that the causal
mechanisms previously identified in the HI literature could be strengthened via research
design to better support the approach (Sell 2010). “Naming and shaming” of Canada by
the US Trade Representative has not been effective in this case. Naming and shaming is
only one of several mechanisms of policy diffusion.
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herein, Canadian resistance to naming and shaming from its most important and most
powerful trading partner does support an HI hypothesis by illustrating how domestic
institutions counteract international power.
While it may seem to be an arcane point of patent law, the issue of technological
utility is an important bilateral issue. It is seen by the US as undermining the Canadian
patent system and US claims to control of technology. It is important for the US because
Canada is a sizable market for technological goods and also because of its symbolic value
in other markets. The USTR’s Special 301 list is an annual publication reporting on the
“adequacy and effectiveness of US trading partners’ protection and enforcement of
intellectual property rights and market access for persons that rely on [IP] protection”241 It
is a primary advocacy tool and source of moral suasion for pressuring countries on IP.
On its own, the 301 report is simply an IP score-card and only triggers the US to seek
remedies for what the USTR sees as the most egregious challenges to US corporate
interests. The list is determined by the USTR in consultation with impacted stakeholders,
foreign governments, Congress, and is influenced by other interested parties. Notably, the
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) submit positions
annually based on its member company interests. Many of these positions are directly
reflected in the USTR’s final report.
The Special 301 report divides countries into three designations: 1) “watch list”,
2) “priority watch list”, and 3) “priority foreign country” with only the latter potentially
subject to an investigation under the Section 301 provisions of the US Trade Act of 1974.
This designation is reserved for only the most aggressive violations of IP and designation
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is rare—one country in the seven years prior to 2013. For most designations, the list does
not have practical legal implications beyond its utility as a naming and shaming242 tool to
pressure governments to make IP reforms, improve enforcement, and as a reminder of
commitments made under international trade and investment agreements.
The USTR has kept Canada, its close ally and neighbor, on the 301 List for over
a decade. PhRMA makes a detailed submission to the USTR every year in advance of the
301 report and requested Canada keep its “priority watch list” designation in 2013-2015
due to what it sees as: 1) weak enforcement of patents; 2) utility requirements
inconsistent with the Canadian Patent Act, TRIPS and NAFTA commitments and
“international norms;” 3) limitations on regulatory data protection; and 4) a lack of patent
term restoration when regulatory approval or other delays diminish effective patent life
(PhRMA 2013; 2014). In May 2013, despite PhRMA’s advocacy Canada received a
minor upgrade from the Priority Watch List (held since 2009) to the Watch List “in
recognition of significant progress on copyright issues.” This upgrade reflects nonpharmaceutical-related IP enhancements following Canada’s passage of the Copyright
Modernization Act in 2012.
The issue of promise utility doctrine invalidations kept Canada on the 2013 USTR
Special 301 List, which is highly critical of the Canadian regime.243 Similarly, the issue
of “heightened utility requirements” surfaces in the 2014 USTR report although with
considerably more specificity on the issue:
242
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The United States also has serious concerns about the lack of clarity
and the impact of the heightened utility requirements for patents that
Canadian courts have applied recently. Under this amorphous and
evolving standard, courts can invalidate a patent on utility grounds by
construing the "promise of a patent" years after the patent has been
granted, leading to uncertainty for patent holders and applicants and
undermining incentives for investment in the pharmaceutical sector. In
applying this standard, courts have invalidated a number of patents held
by U.S. pharmaceutical companies, finding now that those products
lack utility (i.e., not capable of industrial application), even though such
products have been in the market and benefiting patients for years. The
United States will closely monitor developments on these issues and
looks forward to continuing to work with Canada to address these and
other IPR issues, including through the TPP negotiations (USTR 2014,
49).
This statement is perhaps unsurprisingly symmetrical to PhRMA’s 2014 301 submission
to the USTR (PhRMA 2014, 75-81). PhRMA’s 2015 submission contains essentially the
same positioning, but with more support in the form of cases cited, many of which are
also considered herein (PhRMA 2015, 82). PhRMA has declined to date to provide a cost
estimate (Ibid, 88).
The USTR statement is most interesting for its parenthetical use of “industrial
application,” a direct utilization of the broad TRIPS language on patentable utility (see
TRIPS definition above, this chapter). The use of parentheses confuses the issue
somewhat given that no product has been invalidated in Canada for not being
commercially viable, but rather for lack of sound prediction, obviousness, or a number of
other evidentiary reasons cited above. In fact, it is the lack of consideration of evidence
of commercial success that creates the problem for US patent owners (Ibid). This is a
regime design and implementation issue reflecting TRIPS’ failure to modify
institutionalized practice to replicate key language in Canada’s Patent Act.
PhRMA maintains that the judicial action and the promise doctrine are actually
inconsistent with the Patent Act, however, this is not likely supportable. It is not the case
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that the court does not recognize that these products have industrial application, but rather
the court feels that it cannot take this into account because of past decisions and the
doctrine of precedent. The promise utility doctrine is in some ways the court’s alternative
to the industrial application standard under TRIPS. As of 2017, this approach was
winning the day due to the court’s authority and proximity to the practical application of
Canadian law. It is also an assertion of the court’s authority and independence from US
approaches and decisions.244 This type of nuance would not be possible to capture under
a market power approach which cannot be truly sensitive to within-state dynamics.
Internal government of Canada ministerial memos and lines for media
engagement obtained under the Access to Information Act suggest that Canada easily
dismisses US concerns:
In the 2016 [Special 301] Report, U.S. industry stakeholders continue to
raise concerns with Canada’s requirements for patent utility, citing
industry allegations concerning the invalidation of patents on this basis
by the Canadian courts…Canada considers the Special 301 process and
the Report to be invalid and analytically flawed because the process
relies primarily on U.S. industry allegations rather than empirical
evidence and objective analysis…Canada does not recognize the validity
of the Special 301 [report]245
Canada’s dismissal and blasé outlook on USTR naming and shaming would seem to be
partially linked to a lack of uptake by Canadian media: “As usual, the Report has not
garnered significant attention in Canadian media.”246
In addition to USTR pressure, the US pursues bilateral advocacy on IP and patent
utility through traditional bilateral channels. In late 2013, the US Senate considered
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Bruce Heyman as President Obama’s nominee for Ambassador to Canada. The questions
posed by the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Democrat from New Jersey
Robert Menedez, reveal interesting insights on foreign policy priorities related to Canada.
This question and its response from eventual plenipotentiary Heyman reflect the priorities
of the administration. The passage also reflects the priorities Menedez’ major corporate
constituents, the New Jersey pharmaceutical industry, where many multinationals’ head
offices are located.
Chairman Menedez:
We have pushed for strong IP protections in the TPP agreement,
Canada has not, and to date, has not been supportive of pro-innovation
efforts in those negotiations or in its own domestic practices. An
example can be found in the heightened standard for patentable utility
that Canada now uses which is contrary to the global best practices and
its international commitments. That innovators should face significant
intellectual property challenges with one of the largest trading partners
with the United States is a serious concern, so if you are confirmed
what steps would you take to address Canada’s access barriers…with
respect to IP protections through the TPP, and otherwise?247
In response, Bruce Heyman:
…Intellectual property rights are the core of what American institutions
depend on to compete globally. American ingenuity is our special
sauce, and we work so hard doing research and development at the
corporate level and depend upon patent rights and protections when we
sell products overseas. I am aware of the issues that have been brought
up with respect to intellectual property rights…if considered to be
Ambassador by this esteemed committee, I will take this issue to the
Canadian government, and I will make this issue an important issue…
my number one mission [will be] expanding our economic footprint,
but unless we have the intellectual property protections for our
companies, it will make it incredibly difficult to expand those
relationships… so I will make that a priority.248
The passage is important because it highlights the failure of TRIPS/NAFTA—cited as
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Canada’s “international commitments”—to sufficiently shape domestic institutional
processes and the determination of patent utility. It is interesting that US lawmakers
express concern over Canadian domestic IP practices in the context of the size of the
Canada-US trade relationship. The passage also shows how domestic reforms are then
linked to future trade agreements like the Trans-Pacific Partnership.
From the US perspective, the issue of patent utility and judicial patent invalidation
establishes an important international precedent. This poses a threat to all of the IPrelated economic statecraft the US has engaged in over the past several decades. If the
US cannot protect its IP-related commercial interest with its closest neighbor, major
trading partner, security dependent, and cultural companion with highly similar judicial
institutions, then what hope does it have elsewhere? Given all of the other important
Canada-US issues at play,249 the fact that IP and the promise doctrine play such a
significant role in bilateral relations is a telling indicator of its priority.
Beyond parochial corporate interests, the broader US business model relies heavily
on building institutional protections for its knowledge and service-sector assets. Trade
deals are important to diffusing governance norms and securing IP commitments.
However, these commitments mean little if they are undermined by subnational
administrative processes. While the invalidation of a handful of Canadian patents and a
couple billion in lost revenue is not a major issue for the US from a structural
perspective, the threat of superficial or easily revoked IP commitments clearly is.
In its legal defense of the Eli Lilly case, Canada explicitly defended judicial
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practices with respect to patent invalidation and the two-step patent office and judicial
review process. Canadian government lawyers’ Statement of Defense downplays the
inherent value of Canadian patents that have not yet been subject to judicial review,
positioning them as simply “administrative”:
Unlike the initial administrative reviews by the Patent Office, which
rely on the patent specification as filed and assumptions in favour of the
applicant, the Federal Court will review a patent's validity in light of
extensive expert and fact evidence, presented in an adversarial court
process between private parties…
Claimant was well aware that initial patent grants…were only
presumptively valid…It was also aware that for its patents to remain
valid they would need to withstand not only the Patent Office's
administrative review, but rigorous court scrutiny, in an adversarial
process.250
This legal positioning illustrates how the administrative bifurcation between a relatively
weak federal patent office whose “decisions” are routinely overruled by a relatively
strong Federal Court system can have a meaningful impact on outcomes. This is similar
in many other national patent systems. The multisite diffusion of authority at the national
level helps to produce cross-national variation in patent interpretation.
In general, when considering intellectual property Canadian officials seem to
recognize their autonomy regardless of pressure from trading partners. For example,
internal Canadian government briefing materials obtained under the Access to
Information Act suggest IP modernization in the CETA context was focused on meeting
basic international commitments while accommodating domestic realities:
Internationally, Canada has faced pressure to align its IP framework
with international standards…[Despite] meeting international treaty
obligations, there remain calls for further improvements, mainly
stemming from perceived divergences from policies adopted by the
United States and the European Union… Stakeholders are often
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polarized, especially in copyright and pharmaceuticals… Key drivers
affecting Canada’s IP include: International pressure – the US and EU
have criticized Canada for lagging behind on IP policies. Trade
agreements and IP treaties including TPP and CETA have been very
important accelerators of IP reforms for Canada in recent years…
Despite economic pressure, Canada’s IP laws need to align with the
domestic context.251
While it is not entirely clear from this heavily redacted memo to what specific domestic
context the official is referring, it must either be the domestic legal context or the
domestic political context. Either supports a hypothesis that existing domestic institutions
matter (in addition to power factors as reflected in the statements on US and EU
pressure).
In summary, this section has argued that Canadian judicial institutions have
proved to be powerful and resilient. At the international level, Canada operates under
tremendous power asymmetry with the US. There has been substantial pressure to amend
the promise utility doctrine via bilateral diplomacy, ‘naming and shaming’ via the USTR
Special 301 watch list, and under a NAFTA Chapter 11 Investor State Dispute Settlement
(ISDS) case brought by the US manufacturer Eli Lilly. To date, however, Canada has
resisted this pressure relying on the argument that TRIPS/NAFTA in no way constituted
an abdication of domestic courts to determine patent validity.252 Canada has deferred to
the authority of the judicial branch on this matter and not taken any legislative action to
override the promise doctrine under pressure from the US. The strategy is effective
because Canada-US power asymmetry is far less relevant at the institutional level than in
a trade context. This type of within-state nuance cannot be captured in dominant market
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power accounts in IPE. Institutional power clearly matters even when it may be at odds
with regulatory objectives underwritten by US market power.

Taking Equifinality Seriously
It is useful to consider some alternative hypotheses.253 This section considers Canadian
standards under the lens of neorealism, neoliberalism, and constructivism. It argues that
realist and neoliberal alternative hypotheses are not instructive but constructivism cannot
be dismissed. As such, a pluralist approach that considers historical institutionalism in
combination with other approaches is most productive.
In the case of the promise doctrine, the neorealist or “market power” alternative
hypotheses for the outcome is clearly not determinative. If market power explained the
outcome of a narrowing definition of patentable subject matter, then the US should have
favored this outcome. As discussed in the preceding section, this is clearly not the case.
The US has been quite active in opposing this evolving Canadian standard and US
multinationals have expended countless legal resources in this effort. Furthermore, a
neorealist approach is not generally aligned with opening the black box of the state.
The neoliberal hypothesis in this case relates to cooperation and utility
maximization. For example, one could argue that in order to facilitate cooperation and
secure agreement on TRIPS/NAFTA its language had to be weak in defining utility. In
this scenario, the US effectively bears the costs of cooperation through standards that are
vulnerable to local challenge leading to only partial enforcement of its patents, and thus
253
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the most utility-maximizing solution to facilitate agreement. In order for this hypothesis
to be valid, there should be evidence that negotiators realized this compromise as part of
negotiations. However, even if negotiators did consciously reach a compromise on this
point, it never might have been made explicit and this would be tough to confirm.
Documentation regarding trade negotiations is often scarce. In cases of scarce evidence,
hoop tests can sometimes provide highly probable insights despite limited data.
A relevant hoop test for the neoliberal hypothesis—what categorically must be
true if neoliberalism explains the narrowing of patent scope—would be evidence that the
TRIPS/NAFTA language permitting the promise doctrine was an intended concession to
Canada as the regime-taker. To better contextualize Gold and Short’s assertion that
TRIPS never intended “to legislate a global standard for patentable utility,” the US very
much did intend that US multinationals’ patents would be upheld based on TRIPS’
extremely broad and encompassing definition of utility.254 In theory, it could be
interpreted to essentially exclude no commercially marketed product. The key point is
that TRIPS language on utility (“may be deemed by a member”) provided sufficient
scope for domestic interpretation. Canadian courts have clearly not adopted the very
broad international definition of utility as “capable of industrial application” but rather
have narrowed it through heighted disclosure requirements. The courts have done so
partially through Wellcome (2002) by excluding from admissibility the core type of
evidence that can conclusively establish capability for industrial application: evidence
obtained following the patent date including evidence of commercial success.
The classic example of a hoop test provided in the process tracing literature is
summarized as follows: “It could not have been the case that the person x murdered
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person y, because person x was not in the same country at the time of the murder”: thus
the hoop test is failed and the explanation, “person x murdered person y,” is falsified (see
Bennett and Checkel 2015, 17). Similarly, and using the same argument structure, it
could not have been the case that the US made concessions in the form of intentional
weakness in the definition of utility if evidence suggests that Canada did not at the time
know it was receiving a concession. In other words, if we can show conclusively that
Canada was not extracting a concession on this point then we know that the neoliberal
hypothesis is false. It cannot pass this essential hoop test: “did Canada think it was
receiving a concession on IP rather than making a concession?” In actuality, there is no
evidence to suggest that either party could have foreseen this course of events with
respect to patent invalidations.
If we look at one of the more comprehensive accounts of the NAFTA negotiation
on record it seems that Canada’s experience with the earlier Canada US Free Trade
Agreement informed its positions on intellectual property (Cameron and Tomlin 2000).
Canada had resisted many intellectual property reforms as part of the FTA and was
clearly the party making the concessions on IP in NAFTA, including but not limited to
the effective prohibition on compulsory licenses (Ibid, 47). Canada did secure
concessions from the US in the form of IP exemptions for its cultural industries, but the
IP concessions ended there.
Negotiator accounts are also instructive. Upon examination of a preTRIPS/NAFTA 1989 "wish list" of benefits which US intellectual property owners
sought, Canada’s lead negotiator on intellectual property, John Gero, noted the extent of
the US win on IP: “A quick glance at the minimum substantive requirements of the
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TRIPS Agreement and NAFTA indicates that virtually all of these goals have been
accomplished and surpassed” (Gero and Lannen 1995, 93-4). This alone is sufficient
basis to reject the neoliberal hypothesis of cooperation accommodation: Canada thought
it was making a concession on IP not getting one in the form of lax definitions on IP.
Gero has no incentive or reason to exaggerate the extent of the US win on IP. And if
Canada did not know it was receiving a concession how could there be one? Clearly the
hoop tests on neorealism and neoliberalism fail. The US was not bearing the costs of, or
facilitating, cooperation. There was no robustly efficient or functional harmonization of
standards, but only imprecise language on utility that seemed sufficiently broad from the
US perspective to protect all patents capable of industrial application. Nevertheless, this
allowed considerable room for domestic judicial interpretation and thus we see crossnational divergence of patentability outcomes.
There are probably several constructivist hypotheses that could be argued for the
limiting of patent scope discussed above. The most central to the discussion in Chapter
Two is that Canadian norms and identities were powerful enough to trump the material
concerns (potential trade retaliation) related to TRIPS/NAFTA non-compliance. A
relevant hoop test for a constructivist hypothesis is thus: for norms and identities to be
determinative of a narrowing of patent scope then they should at least be cited or
apparent in the key rulings.255 Looking first to the judgment and formative legal test set
out in Wellcome (2002) we see that the Supreme Court was actually finding in favor of
the patent owning brand pharmaceutical manufacturer. In setting out the test for sound
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prediction, the ruling takes pains to outline its balanced nature and that it is designed to
uphold the “public interest”:
The doctrine of “sound prediction” balances the public interest in early
disclosure of new and useful inventions, even before their utility has
been fully verified by tests, and the public interest in avoiding cluttering
the public domain with useless patents and granting monopoly rights in
exchange for speculation or misinformation…The disclosure made in
the patent was and is of real use and benefit and Glaxo/Wellcome, by
making the disclosure, fulfilled its side of the bargain with the public.
It was therefore entitled to legal protection for what it disclosed… 256
Irrespective of what Wellcome (2002) has been used to justify and its many normative
elements, this ruling was not an ideological or normative assertion against a predatory
patent owner. The prohibition on post-patent evidence does not appear to be an
intentional reaction to an obvious or flagrant legal transgression, but rather a guideline to
discourage speculative patenting in the future. Importantly, the ruling aimed to uphold the
institution of intellectual property rights as a social bargain with the public. But at the
same time, it does meaningfully impact TRIPS/NAFTA in so far as it limits what
evidence can be used to establish utility. Sound prediction of utility is explicitly framed
as a provision in the public interest. It also asserts the power of the judicial branch to
determine and reconstruct the promise of the patent retrospectively.
This assertion of authority by the court speaks to its self-identity as the preservers
of that “public interest.” It establishes a legal test that considerably narrows the very
broad definition of utility under TRIPS/NAFTA and is not reflected anywhere in any
iteration of Canada’s Patent Act. It reframes the rules to reflect the court’s interpretation
of how patentable value ought to be defined and the evidence that should be available at
the time of patent filing. The patent owner’s IP is valid in the court’s view precisely
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because disclosures in the patent fulfilled its public bargain, not because it was capable of
industrial application.
The normative language in the decision regarding “public interest,” preventing
“useless” or “speculative” patents, and striking a public “bargain,” clearly cannot be used
to dismiss the constructivist hypothesis. There is enough evidence in this key passage to
satisfy the constructivist hoop test. The judicial positioning would seem to suggest that
these social norms informed the decision and outcome at the critical juncture of
Wellcome.

However, unlike a failed hoop test, passing one cannot form the basis of a

positive inference (Van Evera 1997, 32). Reference to norms and exhibition of identities
is a necessary but not a sufficient condition to affirm the constructivist hypothesis.
In summary, it is highly probable that normative principles and identities
impacted the original ruling that set the marker for subsequent promise utility doctrine
patent invalidations. However, this ruling did not actually have a limiting effect on
market exclusivity because it was positive for the patent owner. It did provide the
historical basis for future material outcomes as subsequent rulings cited and were linked
to Wellcome (2002). Neorealist and neoliberal alternative hypotheses are not instructive
but constructivist norms and identities cannot be dismissed.

Policy Feedbacks Shaping the Evolution of IP Standards
This section explores the issue of how the local policy evolution identified in previous
sections feeds back onto the international stage. One substantive impact of the Eli Lilly
NAFTA challenge was a feedback effect on Canada’s trade diplomacy. Principally, this
feedback was embodied in Canada’s trade and investment agreement with the European
Union. The Lilly investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) case impacted the explicit text
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of the agreement’s investment chapter in a late addition following an eleventh hour round
of highly political negotiations. The text of the final negotiated outcome—pre-legal
scrubbing—included the following “declaration” regarding an apparent exemption from
investor state dispute settlement for intellectual property matters:
Declaration to Investment Chapter Article X.11 Paragraph 6
Mindful that investor state dispute settlement tribunals are meant to
enforce the obligations referred to in Article X.17(1): Scope of a Claim
to Arbitration of Chapter x (yyy), and are not an appeal mechanism for
the decisions of domestic courts, the Parties recall that the domestic
courts of each Party are responsible for the determination of the existence
and validity of intellectual property rights. The Parties further recognize
that each Party shall be free to determine the appropriate method of
implementing the provisions of this Agreement regarding intellectual
property within their own legal system and practice. The Parties agree to
review the relation between intellectual property rights and investment
disciplines within 3 years after entry into force of the agreement or at the
request of a Party. Further to this review and to the extent required, the
Parties may issue binding interpretations to ensure the proper
interpretation of the scope of investment protection under this Agreement
in accordance with the provisions of Article X.27: Applicable Law and
Rules of Interpretation of Chapter x (Investment). 257
This is in direct response to Eli Lilly’s challenge to Canada. It specifically refers to the
primacy of the court in the determination of patent validity. It also attempts to preserve
room for parties to implement IP provisions according to domestic legal system and
practice. The exclusion of this declaration from the body of the text calls its future impact
into some question. It would seem to provide a quotable argument for respondent states
to argue IP’s exclusion before ISDS tribunals; however, the full practical implications of
this language will only be apparent with time.
This statement did not appear in earlier leaked iterations of the CETA text. It
contains consistent language with Canada’s Statement of Defense in the Lilly case
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regarding the existence and validity of IP. ISDS is not an “appeal mechanism” for IP
decisions of domestic courts. The notion of a national review mechanism and binding
interpretations of the scope of investment protections is also an interesting mitigation of
unbridled investor protection. However, it is not entirely clear how this additional
mechanism will work in practice. It is also unclear why this is included as a declarative
appendix to Expropriation (Article X.11) and its paragraph dealing with IP (paragraph 6).
This was a point of political discussion and would seem to represent a win for the EU and
US IP-producing sectors. Paragraph 6 under Expropriation X.11 reads:
For greater certainty, the revocation, limitation or creation of
intellectual property rights to the extent that these measures are
consistent with TRIPS and Chapter X (Intellectual Property) of this
Agreement, do not constitute expropriation. Moreover, a determination
that these actions are inconsistent with the TRIPS Agreement or
Chapter X (Intellectual Property) of this Agreement does not establish
that there has been an expropriation.258
Paragraph 6 in the final CETA expropriation text was originally proposed by the EU to
mirror the NAFTA text. This was added to the investment chapter somewhere between a
November 21, 2013 leak259 and an April 7, 2014 leak.260 The explicit connection to TRIPS
standards here is important because it does not rule out ISDS arbitration for national
action on IP that might be inconsistent with TRIPS. Exactly who decides this is
presumably an arbitration panel, which entails an ISDS hearing, and ultimately, that IP
will indeed be an issue to be mediated in that venue. Including the declaration directly in
the section on Expropriation X.11 would have enhanced clarity here. Alternatively, it
could have been included in a similar manner as Annex X.43.1 - Exclusions from Dispute
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Settlement, which protects decisions under the Investment Canada Act from ISDS.
However, this lack of clarity is also a result of CETA’s direct adoption of NAFTA
language structure.
CETA Chapter X, paragraph 6 is an artefact and legacy of similar provisions in
NAFTA that exempted compulsory licenses and the revocation of IP from the definition
of expropriation (NAFTA Chapter Eleven: Investment; Article 1110 (7)), provided it was
compliant with NAFTA’s intellectual property Chapter 17: “This Article does not apply
…to the revocation, limitation or creation of intellectual property rights, to the extent that
such issuance, revocation, limitation or creation is consistent with Chapter Seventeen
(Intellectual Property).”261 In other words, CETA adopted NAFTA with respect to the
definition of expropriation and the link to TRIPS compliance. This demonstrates why,
from an historical perspective, these agreements and language need to be considered
together. NAFTA Chapter 17, which was based on a late draft of TRIPS, also performs
the same function as the “consistency with” qualifier to the statement that would
otherwise limit IP’s consideration under ISDS. This is why one of Canada’s arguments in
the Lilly case—that the arbitration panel has no jurisdiction—is up for debate. The open
question is whether a NAFTA Chapter 11 dispute settlement tribunal has jurisdiction to
hear an IP-related expropriation case on its own assessment of whether an IP revocation
is inconsistent with NAFTA Chapter 17; or, must it first defer to the mechanism for
dispute settlement in Chapter 17 (intellectual property) which is outlined in NAFTA
Chapter 20, Institutional Arrangements and Dispute Settlement Procedures. Canada’s
lawyers advance a compelling argument for the latter. But similarly to CETA, there
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seems to be no specific guidance under NAFTA for “who decides” exceptions to the
stated IP limits on expropriation. A Chapter 11 tribunal could very well interpret this to
be within its purview.
In CETA’s case, the same question of jurisdiction regarding the determination of
consistency with the IP chapter could arise. This is not spelled out in the agreement text.
It is interesting that Canada was not the party proposing that CETA mirror NAFTA on
this issue. As illuminated in leaked trade documents, it was actually the Europeans who
wanted this language to mirror NAFTA. Canada proposed the language of the exemption
to expropriation read “except where the decision amounts to a denial of justice or an
abuse of right.”262 The EU alternative that was ultimately adopted mirrors NAFTA263 in
tying expropriation exemptions for IP to CETA’s own IP chapter. In other words, under
both NAFTA and CETA, IP-related policies are normally exempt from the definition of
expropriation but may not be if a government action is inconsistent with the IP chapter.
CETA adds TRIPS as another essential point of national conformity.

Figure 5.1

illustrates the various versions of the CETA agreement and where each of the relevant
paragraphs was added in the negotiation process.
The final Declaration to Investment Chapter Article X.11 Paragraph 6 cited
above was not included until the final leaked version dated August 1, 2014. The EU in a
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“[CAN: For greater certainty, this Article does not apply to a decision by a court, administrative
tribunal, or other governmental intellectual property authority, limiting or creating an intellectual property
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version dated September 26, 2014 subsequently released this.264 Prior to that release,
negotiation over expropriation was discussed in offensive and defensive positioning in
text at paragraphs 5 and 6. Canada did propose tying the definition of expropriation to
TRIPS in an investment Chapter leak with national mark-ups dated November 21, 2013
in relation to compulsory licenses and the revocation, limitation or creation of
intellectual property rights. But by April 4, 2014, that TRIPS reference was limited to
compulsory licenses. Canada’s position on the revocation, limitation or creation of
intellectual property rights was now tied to the nebulous “denial of justice” language
cited above. The EU, however, appears to have insisted that both paragraph 5
(compulsory licenses) and paragraph 6 (revocation, limitation or creation of intellectual
property) refer to TRIPS. Furthermore, the EU insisted that paragraph 6 also refer to the
CETA IP chapter, per the model laid out in NAFTA. Canada would have been hard
pressed to argue against its own model as laid out in NAFTA. Path dependence would
seem to have considerable salience here.
Figure 5.1: Evolution of Key Passages in CETA Versions, Releases and Leaks265
CETA
Version/Release

Declaration on IP re:
expropriation

Expropriation para 5
(compulsory licenses)

Leaked Memo –
from European
Commission (EC)
to Trade Policy
Committee
November 6,
2012
Leaked
Investment

Not yet an issue –
negotiators still focused
on Canada Investment
Act, financial services
exemptions, and scope of
ISDS

Not discussed, only main
positions on IP

Not yet included

CA proposes266 language
linked to NAFTA/TRIPS

264

Expropriation para 6
(revocation, limitation
or creation of IP
rights)
Not discussed

Not yet included

Consolidated CETA Text, Published by the European Commission, September 26, 2014, at page
185, Accessed February 20, 2015, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/september/tradoc_152806.pdf
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In addition to the leaks and releases in this table there were other important leaks of the CETA IP
Chapter, as well as the consolidated section on investor state dispute settlement February 4, 2014 and April
3, 2014.
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CETA
Version/Release

Declaration on IP re:
expropriation

Chapter with
national mark-ups
November 21,
2013

Expropriation para 5
(compulsory licenses)

Expropriation para 6
(revocation, limitation
or creation of IP
rights)

EU proposes similar with
addition of WTO267

Leaked
Investment
Chapter with
national mark-ups
April 4, 2014

Not yet included as a
separate declaration:
Proposed by EU as
“separate annex or joint
understanding;” Similar
text to declaration
proposed by Canada to
be in text268

Yes – confirmed per the EU
proposed text

Leaked CETA
Text (EU
Member) marked
“Final” August 1,
2014
Published CETA
Text by European
Commission
September 26,
2014
Final CETA text
following legal
scrub 2016

Yes – Detailed
declaration to
Expropriate para 6 as
quoted above

Yes

Yes

Yes

Canada proposes vague
langue re: “denial of
justice or an abuse of
right.” EU proposes as
“separate annex or joint
understanding;” per the
NAFTA model: “to the
extent that these
measures are consistent
with TRIPS and the
IPR Chapter of CETA”
Yes- Per EU language,
but in main treaty text
as section 6 rather than
separate annex;269 Tied
to CETA IP chapter.
Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes
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“[CAN: For greater certainty, this Article does not apply to a decision by a court, administrative
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One of the most interesting leaks on the CETA IP and investment negotiation was
an earlier memo from the European Commission to the EU Trade Committee. The memo
clearly outlines that the scope of investor-state dispute settlement was a key controversy
as early as November 2012. Regarding pharmaceutical patents, the memo suggests the
highly politicized nature of the discussion. There was a clear issue linkage or tradeoff
between Canada’s offensive agricultural-related positions:
These [European intellectual property rights] requests are strongly
supported by Canada’s own research-based pharmaceutical industry,
but strenuously opposed by generic drugs producers, who are
attempting to frame the debate in Canada in terms of higher costs for
the public health services. Given the high degree of political sensitivity,
both at the Federal and Provincial level, Canada has not made any move
on this issue in the negotiations and clearly any decision on the EU
[intellectual property rights] requests will be taken at the highest
political level at the end of the negotiations. ... Any Canadian move will
be linked to the negotiation result on the offensive agricultural market
access issues of Canada, and will condition our ability to deliver on all
three [intellectual property rights] issues.270
The linking of the IP and agricultural items under the CETA negotiation is indicative of
the high-politics associated with these knowledge-economy discussions. IP is
controversial in many sectors, however, it is particularly so for pharmaceuticals. This is
due to the fiscal exposure that provincial governments have to IP regarding drug costs
and Canada’s large and influential generic pharmaceutical industry.
As identified in earlier chapters, the generic sector has a long political history in
Canada and has benefitted greatly from previous policy decisions regarding compulsory
licenses. It has also benefitted from Canada’s comparatively less protective IP regime
270
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(compared to those found in the US and EU). The fact that the CETA IP decision went
to “the highest levels” politically is no coincidence. It is reflective of the power of an
institutionalized interest coalition and strong generic drug sector that has resulted from
many previous industrial policy decisions. The fact that Canada has historically paid
some of the highest prices internationally for generic medicines is also interesting (Law
2013; Law and Kratzer 2012). This provides the generic sector with a substantial base of
power both to challenge essentially every valuable patent as well as to lobby the
government for favorable treatment. The lobbying effort made on CETA and key
concessions to the generic industry reflect the historical power and institutionalization of
that sector in Canada. Canada resisted EU proposals for up to five years of patent term
restoration271 and this was ultimately limited at (up to) two years. It also rejected the
proposal of extending data protection to new uses for already approved drugs.
Concessions notably included exceptions to IP violations for generic exports and ending
so-called “dual-litigation.”272 This will involve substantial reform and potential
abolishment of the patent linkage regulation. As in the past, the government walks a fine
line to balance interests on these reforms. Many of the most important details will be
worked out in regulations following the agreement.
Canada clearly wants ongoing ISDS protection for Canadian investments but the
experience with NAFTA ISDS has complicated its pursuit of that objective. In 2014
Canada’s International Trade Committee undertook a study and published the following
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recommendation on ISDS: “That the Government of Canada continue to negotiate strong
investor-state dispute settlement and investment protection measures into trade
agreements to provide predictability and stability for Canadian investors.” In practice
under a majority government such committee reports have little policy influence and
often simply reflect the government’s positions and intent. On October 15, 2014 the
government published a response to the committee’s CETA report. This included explicit
support for the committee’s recommendation and some positioning regarding the attempt
to “balance” interests:
The Government of Canada supports this recommendation….In all of
its investment-related negotiations, the Government of Canada pursues
a high standard of protection for its investors and seeks to include a
robust investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism. Doing so
establishes a stable and predictable rules-based investment climate and
provides access to an independent, impartial and timely process for the
resolution of disputes… The Government also negotiates exceptions
and reservations to its investment agreements and free trade agreement
investment chapters that preserve existing and future policy flexibility
in sensitive areas, particularly in the areas of health, the environment,
culture and social services.273
Even if not a meaningful exercise from a substantive policy perspective, this back and
forth pageantry between government and parliamentary committees is useful as a venue
to articulate and legitimize government positions on highly political issues. The lack of
clarity on the practical impacts of the negotiated “exceptions and reservation” to ISDS
and intellectual property protection reflect the challenges and politics of providing
balance in the knowledge economy.
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Conclusion
In summary, it is productive to think of the ratification of NAFTA and TRIPS not as a
discrete outcome, but rather as the first step in a long process of implementation.
International standards interact and sometimes clash with domestic institutions on an
ongoing basis. Canadian legal institutions are resilient in the face of international
regulatory standards and bilateral pressure. The evolution of IP case law and the political
fallout show how standards evolve to reflect local institutions as much or even more than
the international standard. TRIPS implementation required many modifications to
Canada’s Patent Act but did not alter the definition of utility nor diminish the power of
judicial institutions to further constrain the breadth of patentable utility. Long-standing
practices were subsequently institutionalized in the form of a specific legal doctrine. This
implied rules for case-by-case interpretation that contrasted with the broader TRIPS
standard regarding ‘industrial application.’ Rules of evidence excluding post-patent proof
in ‘sound prediction’ cases made evidence of commercial success moot.
Process tracing various logical tests shows the utility of historical institutionalism
(HI). Canada’s response to US and EU pressure demonstrates how local power can
manifest despite considerable pressure from powerful international actors. These issues
were pursued in an international investment dispute forum with implications for trade
diplomacy and CETA. CETA is widely regarded as the model for next-generation trade
deals. The fallout from NAFTA litigation has impacted the very future and legitimacy of
ISDS going forward.
Regulatory standards build on past regulations and trade agreements build on past
trade agreements. Trade treaties are an important political outcome but their
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implementation is equally important as this process sets the parameters for the
intersection of global and domestic standards. As one standard morphs into another, we
see clear policy feedback and path dependence as would be expected under an HI
hypothesis. Domestic institutions can retain considerable influence as part of this process.
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Chapter 6

Institutional Feedback: The Procurement Dimension

This chapter examines procurement policy feedbacks related to the expansion of traderelated intellectual property (IP) rights in Canada. The new international IP regime and a
proliferation of new, patented technologies would have clear financial impacts for
Canadian health insurers. The chapter makes three arguments. First, in response to
budgetary challenges, Canadian decision-makers converted nascent civil society and
academic institutions and elevated them to become important institutions of the state.
Second, this layering of institutions had a significant constraining impact on the public
market for pharmaceuticals. The success of these public institutions has attracted the
attention of Canada’s private drug insurers who do not yet have similar capacity and have
increasingly tried to leverage the power of public institutions.
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Third, Canada has

played a leadership role in an international diffusion of similar ideas and institutions that
were adopted in different ways in accordance with existing national circumstances. This
diffusion can be attributed to epistemic cooperation and the functionality of the ideas
themselves, not due to market power.
Market power theory would predict that small market powers are not likely to
significantly mitigate trade commitments that are contrary to the interests of larger
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market powers. For market power to hold, we would expect global standards advanced by
the hegemon to essentially alter or replace domestic rules without strong compensatory
domestic institutional layering or conversion. Institutional repellence and resistance
through these feedbacks should not be powerful. Furthermore, regulatory initiatives
should not generally be successful internationally unless they are advanced by a major
market power. Policy diffusion should be a function of power. We would certainly not
expect to see domestic mitigating institutions of smaller powers diffuse internationally.
Evidence of either would be a smoking gun that other important factors beyond market
power are needed to explain international regulatory diffusion.
Conversely, historical institutionalism suggests that past policy decisions create
policy feedbacks that impact politics: actors adopt strategies that reinforce the logic of the
system (Thelen 1999, 2003; Pierson 1993). For historical institutionalism to have validity
as an alternative to market power or as part of a pluralist framework, we would expect to
see strong domestic institutional feedbacks (domestic reinforcement) that are successful
in resisting or repelling the impact of international standards. Evidence of this would
strongly suggest that historical institutionalism is not “bunk.”275
For this to be most convincing from a research design perspective, domestic
actors should have capacity to respond to powerful exogenous pressures. HI would
suggest that actors adapt to new challenges by converting nascent institutions or layering
new institutions on top of existing ones. Indeed, the emergence and evolution of
Canadian procurement assistance institutions is a useful empirical case to evaluate
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As identified in Chapter 1, the question “Is Historical Institutionalism Bunk?” was raised by
Drezner (2010). Furthermore, evidence that local policy feedbacks within a smaller power actually help to
create global political outcomes in an international diffusion process where standards are adopted in pathdependent ways would tend to support an historical institutionalism hypothesis.
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whether institutional layering and conversion have significant domestic and international
impacts. This is because these institutions had very modest beginnings, low financial
resources, and initially lacked a direct connection to core state decision-making
processes. They were not developed by great powers who control major markets as would
be required under a market power theory (Drezner 2007, 5).276
The chapter starts process tracing in 1989 around the emergence of Canadian
“health technology assessment” (HTA) institutions. HTA is defined as “systematic
evaluation of a medical or health technology for evidence of its safety, efficacy,
effectiveness, cost, cost-effectiveness, and ethical and legal implications, both in absolute
terms and in comparison with other competing technologies” (Stephens et al. 2012,
29).277 HTA in Canada and in other countries was derived from the “evidence based
medicine” (EBM) movement.278 EBM was a Canadian academic medical innovation and
is defined as the “conscientious, explicit and judicious use of current best evidence in
making decisions about the care of individual patients… integrating individual clinical
expertise with the best available external clinical evidence from systematic research”
(Sackett 1997). The chapter then shows how EBM and pharmaceutical HTA institutions
narrowed the number of available technologies and the conditions under which they
would be available for a significant portion of the patented health products market.
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See discussion below.
This definition is favorable to the World Health Organization (WHO) definition: “the systematic
evaluation of properties, effects, and/or impacts of health technology [and] is a multidisciplinary process to
evaluate the social, economic, organizational and ethical issues of a health intervention or health
technology in a systematic, transparent, unbiased and robust manner” (World Health Organization 2015, 8).
The WHO definition lacks sufficient specificity and omits that comparative cost-effectiveness analysis has
become an essential component of HTA as practiced in Canada and Europe.
278
EBM and evidence-based policy making were the principles behind the rapid emergence and
institutional adoption of “health technology assessment” (HTA) institutions.
277
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The chapter then conducts a within-case comparison of these institutions vis-à-vis
Canada’s private drug insurance market, which has not been able to similarly mitigate its
exposure to the IP regime. It argues the power and institutional capacity of public
institutions by showing how private market actors have increasingly attempted to
leverage them. Per an HI approach, public market sequencing of capacity development
has had a significant impact on regime impacts within the same system. Finally, the
chapter traces the international diffusion of Canadian ideas and cost-effectiveness
methodologies. Canada’s leadership helped many other countries adopt similar
institutions to mitigate the full effect of international IP standards and the related costs of
patented pharmaceuticals. Policy diffusion was not completed via a formal regime
underwritten by market power, but through international epistemic cooperation.
In comparison to earlier chapters, the chapter traces policy processes more
removed from actual trade deals regarding time and sphere-of-governance. However,
process tracing methodology encourages a diversity of evidence gathering to help
uncover causal mechanisms that may be somewhat hidden or non-obvious (Bennett and
Checkel 2015). Also, process tracing must not be limited to “micromechanisms within
processes” and should thus avoid “temporally restricted accounts” (Pierson 2004, 101).
While removed from trade negotiations, the chapter argues that the state’s adoption of
HTA is a critical policy feedback to trade-related IP protections.

How HTA Institutions Narrow the Effect of Patent Protection
This section argues a point that is highly logical but is not made explicit by the health
technology assessment (HTA) community and its literature. HTA institutions,
particularly those that assess pharmaceuticals, have been adopted as an inherent state
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response to the proliferation of patented products under increasing IP protections.279 It is
useful to illustrate how HTA fits into the broader system and other institutions cited in
earlier chapters. Figure 6.1 depicts core pharmaceutical system institutions in Canada at a
high level and details how each contributes to narrowing the IP regime.280 The section
traces the origins and practical impact of these institutions. They increasingly provided
valuable procurement assistance to public health insurers to determine what patented
technologies would be purchased or reimbursed by publicly funded government health
plans. The institutions had considerable success in narrowing the scope of public
insurance plan exposure to expanded IP protections. It then argues that this policy
evolution exemplifies layering and conversion, which are the key dynamics of change
under historical institutionalism (Thelen 2003).
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This does not mean that HTA does not also accomplish its more explicit aims related to
evidence-based medicine, enhancing the quality of patient care, or supporting rational pharmaceutical
decision-making. It should be noted that pharmaceutical costs are closely related to intellectual property
rights and the costs associated with research and regulatory approval. The cost of raw chemical materials is
most often negligible. In absence of IP rights, cost-based HTA would have little if any role in policy
decision-making. Evidence might still be used to inform clinical decisions, but HTA as it is known in
Canada and Europe would not likely exist.
280
Where price regulation and other institutions examined in earlier chapters impact both the public
and private market, additional institutional layers have been subsequently added in the public market to
further address the assessment and procurement of patented medicines (see Figure 6.7).
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Figure 6.1: How Canadian Institutions Constrain International Regime Standards
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Origins of Health Technology Assessment Institutions in Canada
This section explores the emergence and sources of HTA in Canada. It shows that HTA’s
early proponents were careful to grow the institution incrementally and allow it to
demonstrate its utility and reach a critical mass. EBM and HTA were then repurposed to
take on the more complex and political task of evaluating pharmaceuticals. While HTA in
Canada was originally envisioned for medical devices and procedures, its adoption and
role in Canada has been most apparent for patented pharmaceuticals.
In December 1989, Canadian federal, provincial and territorial (F/P/T) Ministers
of Health agreed to establish and jointly fund the Canadian Coordinating Office for
Health Technology Assessment (CCOHTA). The new institution would be led by a
leading proponent of HTA in Canada Dr. Devidas Menon with a mandate to “provide
Canadian health care policy decision makers with evidence-based information on
emerging and existing medical devices” (CADTH 2009). CCOHTA was originally set up
as a three-year pilot with a modest budget of $500,000 shared between federal and
provincial governments with contributions determined on a population basis (Battista et
al. 1995a, 77; Battista et al. 1995, 102).281 Under Canadian federalism, authority for
health is fragmented among provinces. As such, CCOHTA was to play a coordination
role between parallel provincial bodies that had emerged in Québec in 1988 (Québec
Counseil d’Evaluation des Technologies de la Sante (CETS)) and were emerging in
British Columbia, Alberta, and Saskatchewan (Battista and Hodge 1995, 289). The
“preferred target audience” for this work was “clearly… policy makers” who had system-
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CCOHTA’s mandate was to “provide Canadian health care policy decision-makers with
evidence-based information on emerging and existing medical devices.” CADTH website, accessed
September 5, 2016, http://scientificadvice.cadth.ca/en/cadth/history.
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level authority (Battista, public remarks, 2015). Governments and HTA agencies jointly
prioritized topics for review (Ibid).
CCOHTA’s early focus on devices, as opposed to pharmaceuticals, appears to
have been a matter of both strategy and practicality given the modest allocations from
government:
Generally at the beginning... I remember the conversations that we were
having here when CCOHTA was created and as well when the Québec
Council282 was created, there was some fear that the domain of
pharmaceuticals, being so vast, would very quickly overwhelm, the
capacity to evaluate, from these nascent organizations…At the
beginning of these organizations the scientific capacity is minimal, the
resources are modest…looking at what CADTH has become today, you
realize that this was certainly the right thing to do, this was the wise
thing to do, because it has grown so much in this country, and around
the world, in fact (Battista, public remarks, 2015).
In other words, there was a conscious effort among early proponents to keep the scope of
Canadian HTA manageable without taking on the more onerous and complex task of
evaluating pharmaceuticals. This allowed CCOHTA to develop its institutional capacity,
reputation, and utility to policy makers (Battista et al. 1995; Battista, public remarks,
2015). Battista seems to attribute CCOHTA’s success to this sequencing of institutional
development (Battista, public remarks, 2015).
HTA and evidence-based health policy making in general was derived from the
EBM movement.283 The movement was principally aimed at strengthening “standards of
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Québec Counseil d’Evaluation des Technologies de la Sante (CETS).
This movement was pioneered by David Sackett, his student Gordon Guyatt who coined the term
and many other collaborators including, but not limited to, Andrew Oxman, Brian Haynes, Deborah Cook,
Mitchell Levine, Iain Chalmers, Anthony Culyer, and others within the “Evidence-Based Medicine
Working Group” (for a full list of participants as of November 1993 see: Oxman, Sackett and Guyatt 1993).
While EBM and HTA are closely linked, other important pioneers including Devidas Menon (Canada),
Renaldo Battista (Canada-Quebec), David Banta (US), Egon Jonsson (Sweden, later Canada), are perhaps
more associated with HTA institutions than strictly EBM. Other important thinkers such as Archie
Cochrane (UK) also helped to inform the EBM movement.
283
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clinical practice” and to “bring more certainty to clinical decision making” around the
“best available evidence” (Sur and Dahm 2011). An epistemic community centered on
the ‘Evidence-Based Medicine Working Group’ advanced much of the early work on
EBM. 284 This group was supported by grants to EBM pioneer Dr. David Sackett in the
late 1980s and early 1990s (Oxman, Sackett, and Guyatt 1993).285 As is typical of
government research grants to academics in Canada, the government did not actively
direct, but rather encouraged this emergent area of practical scholarship to develop at
arms-length. Under the leadership of Sackett, Guyatt, and others, the EBM community
grew organically and developed tools and methodologies that would later be adopted
directly by governments when purchasing patented technologies. Sackett also helped to
diffuse EBM to Europe.286
It is important to note that the original purpose of EBM was not necessarily
related to government cost-containment, but rather enhancing standards and quality of
care. In fact, there was some concern within the EBM community that its principles and
methods would be repurposed for such objectives:
284

This epistemic community of clinicians and academics (clinical epidemiologists) grew around
McMaster University and published extensively in the 1980s and early 1990s (Ibid). Their publications
notably included a series of ‘how to’ articles in the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA)
stylized as “Users’ Guides to the Medical Literature.” These were aimed at busy clinicians who wanted to
improve patient outcomes by incorporating evidence into their day-to-day medical practice (EvidenceBased Medicine Working Group 1992; Oxman, Sackett and Guyatt 1993). For a full bibliography of the
JAMA ‘Users’ Guides to the Medical Literature’ see University of Toronto Evidence-Based Medicine
research guide, “Evidence Based Medicine” accessed August 29, 2016,
http://guides.library.utoronto.ca/c.php?g=250646&p=1671396.
285
Grants included the Ontario Government’s Trillium Clinical Scientist Award. Sackett founded
Canada’s first department of clinical epidemiology at McMaster University in 1967. Canadian Medical
Hall of Fame, accessed August 28, 2016, http://cdnmedhall.org/inductees/dr-david-sackett. Sackett had also
received $500,000 from Ontario to establish a General Internal Medicine (GIM) program for the McMaster
Region that would be designed around EBM principles (Sackett 2015). Critical details on the history of the
evidence-based medicine movement were articulated in a written self-interview by Sackett in the final
months of his life (Sackett 2015).
286
In 1994, he left McMaster to take up a position at Oxford University and helped to entrench
EBM approaches despite considerable resistance from parts of the British medical establishment (Sackett
2015, 44-54).
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Some fear that evidence based medicine will be hijacked by purchasers
and managers to cut the costs of health care. This would not only be a
misuse of evidence based medicine but suggests a fundamental
misunderstanding of its financial consequences. Doctors practicing
evidence based medicine will identify and apply the most efficacious
interventions to maximize the quality and quantity of life for individual
patients; this may raise rather than lower the cost of their care (Sackett
et al. 1996).
In other words, there are many instances where EBM, properly practiced, will actually
increase costs within a health system. For example, this could be the case for the
introduction of effective new health technologies or medical processes that require
incremental health care practitioner hours and resources. However, there are also clear
cases where EBM can be used to limit inappropriate or wasteful health care spending, or
even be ‘hijacked’ to ration access to patented technologies. This requires the adoption of
a policy at some level of governance regarding appropriate or inappropriate practice.

Evolution of HTA and its Incorporation Into Public Policy Processes
This section illustrates how Canada’s early HTA institutions gradually started to occupy
space in high-level public policy planning processes. The timing of HTA’s expansion
coincided with trade related intellectual property reforms under Bill C-91 (NAFTArelated amendments to the Patent Act) and pressing provincial concerns over future drug
costs. The same committee of senior officials287 tasked with considering the provincial
response to Bill C-91 also considered CCOHTA’s future role (O’Reilly 2001, 126).
While not explicitly linked to trade and IP, Deputy Ministers of Health made CCOHTA a
permanent institution and increased its budget. The institution also began to adopt a
coordination role for pharmaceutical reviews. These reviews were part of provincial
287

This group included Provincial and Territorial Deputy Ministers of Health and reported directly
to the F/P/T Conference of Deputy Ministers of Health.
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pharmaceutical economic evaluation mechanisms that at the time were unique to Canada
and Australia (Drummond, Jönsson, and Rutten 1997). The economic evaluation
approach was noted in 1997 as a model for development in “free pricing” systems (UK,
US), administered systems (France), and reference pricing systems (Germany,
Netherlands, Sweden) (Ibid).
As described by Dr. Menon, HTA was explicitly “a field developed to support
purchasing or coverage decisions” (Menon and Stafinski 2009). HTA was in some ways
the systematization of EBM: “McMaster University in Hamilton, Ont., led the earliest
developments in evidence-based medicine. Health technology assessment was…a natural
extension of the production and use of evidence in system-level decision-making”
(Menon 2015). Evidence-based policy is now almost taken for granted as obvious and
desirable, but this was not always the case. For example, policy instituted by a
government or health authority may be viewed as limiting the possibility for practitioners
to exercise clinical judgment.288 However, new more expensive pharmaceutical products
continued to enter the market following trade-related intellectual property reform.
Concerns about demographic challenges posed by Canada’s aging population were also
growing. In fairly short order, the utility of EBM and specifically HTA for patented
pharmaceuticals became clear to government and most of the medical community.
Clinical considerations regarding practitioner choice are still a concern, but seem to have
lost priority to the concerns of curbing patented drug costs, countering aggressive
pharmaceutical marketing practices, and managing the proliferation of new patented
treatments.
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This is the source of the concern over administrative ‘hijacking’ identified by Sackett above.
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In parallel with the expansion of intellectual property protection under NAFTA
and the draft TRIPS, Canadian policy makers in 1993 expanded CCOHTA’s coordination
mandate to pharmaceutical reviews. F/P/T Deputy Ministers of Health agreed to triple the
institution’s budget (CADTH 2009). CCOHTA was also entrenched as a “permanent”
institution in 1993 (Sanders 2002). At that time, Canada’s existing intergovernmental
system of F/P/T cooperation was in the midst of considerable organizational shift to
manage what were seen as the pressing health challenges of the day. Following the
publication of the somewhat ominously titled “Blueprint to Ensure the Future of Health
in Canada” in June 1992, F/P/T Deputy Ministers of Health established several different
interprovincial advisory committees (O’Reilly 2001, 111). One of these focused on
‘health service delivery’ and explicitly aimed to link health care costs to health care
quality (Ibid). This group of senior officials assessed the future and expanded mandate of
the CCOHTA in light of what provinces were increasingly anxious over: “pharmaceutical
utilization and cost” (Ibid, 123). In addition to considering CCOHTA’s future role, this
same Health Services committee of senior officials including Deputy Ministers of Health
was also tasked with determining how provinces would manage expanded pharmaceutical
patent protections under Bill C-91 (Ibid, 126). The abolition of compulsory licensing
under a 20-year patent term was obviously a major concern289 for Deputy Ministers given
the immense fiscal benefits Canadian provinces derived from them in the past (Eastman
1985; see discussion Chapter 2).
The expanded CCOHTA mandate into pharmaceuticals was not yet a formalized
review process for all products entering the Canadian market. This would come later in
289

For example see House of Commons, Standing Committee on Industry, “Summary of
Testimony,” Fifth Report: Section 14 of the Patent Act Amendment 1992 (C-91) accessed January 3, 2016.
http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/HOC/Archives/Committee/352/indu/reports/05_1997-04/chap3-e.html
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2002-2003 when CCOHTA was given the mandate to establish the “Common Drug
Review” (CDR) and did so on a permanent basis in 2004.290 For the time being,
CCOHTA continued to play more of a coordinating role to track and share the various
studies being conducted locally by EBM academics, provincial cost-effectiveness review
bodies, and similar international activities.
The early self-reflective literature of the HTA community identifies the following
primary drivers of its adoption: heath care costs, related information needs of policy
makers, and a critical mass of epistemic expertise in the “evaluative sciences” including
epidemiology and economics (Battista and Hodge 1995, 293-4). While these factors are
not prioritized in the literature, it is interesting to note that HTA for pharmaceuticals has
not developed to the same extent in the US where health care cost escalation was most
acute in the early 1990s (Ibid). However, it did develop where an epistemic and
institutional critical mass was also present, such as in Canada. Volunteerism, goodwill,
and policy “champions” within that epistemic group were also critical to its development
in Canada (Battista, public remarks, 2015).291

Based on their early assessment of

progress in HTA, Battista and Hodge (1995) note, “the science of technology assessment
will

benefit

from

institutions

and

mechanisms

that

foster

interdisciplinary

communications and collaboration” (294). Taken together, this suggests that structural
cost factors are perhaps a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the emergence of
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CDR would assess all new drugs and make recommendations to participating F/P/T governments
regarding public coverage decisions (excluding the province of Québec which established its own parallel
review mechanism). This decision-making process is commonly referred to as ‘formulary listing’ given that
the process does not reflect direct ‘procurement’ per se, but rather a review for inclusion on a provincial
formulary list of eligible drugs for reimbursement under public drug insurance plans.
291
“With respect to emergence… with respect to the why?...clearly the notion of champions was
absolutely key. You need people to really believe in the power of evidence in the decision making
process… therefore a receptive policy environment and a maturation period where the champion will try to
convince [was needed]” (Battista, public remarks, 2015).
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HTA. However, as argued below, cost concerns were certainly behind the repurposing
and institutional adoption of EBM principles and HTA to help manage patented
pharmaceutical procurement.

How HTA Methodologies Constrain the Impact of Patented Pharmaceuticals
This section elaborates on the specific methodology of Health Technology Assessment
(HTA) and how it is used to mediate demand for patented technologies. HTA bodies such
as the Canadian Coordinating Office for Health Technology Assessment (CCOHTA) help
guide government funding decisions and justify funding some technologies and not
others. CCOHTA’s role evolved within the Canadian health system to 1) increasingly
consider pharmaceuticals, 2) increasingly play an evaluation and advisory role to
government as opposed to a strict coordination role, and 3) become an important
institution of the state to help manage costs. To reflect these new roles, CCOHTA was
later renamed the Canadian Agency for Drugs and Technologies in Health (CADTH).292
A critical component of Canada’s evaluation system was to link comparative
clinical effectiveness research with cost metrics to produce comparative costeffectiveness research. This contrasts with the US and Swedish systems that had earlier
roots in general ‘technology assessment.’ However, cost-based clinical effectiveness
research is expressly prohibited in US Medicare decision-making and Sweden explicitly
did not aim to contain costs (Garber and Sox 2010; Jonsson and Banta 1995).
HTA is arguably an approach to ration access to publicly funded health
technologies. However, the term “rationing” has political implications and therefore HTA
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This name change took effect in 2006 after the establishment of the Common Drug Review
process. CADTH website, accessed September 5, 2016, http://scientificadvice.cadth.ca/en/cadth/history
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is more frequently positioned as “evidence-based decision-making” or “evidence-based
formulary review.” From a political perspective, it is much easier to grow or sustain
spending than to push back against demand for health technologies or make painful
expenditure reductions. Health spending cuts are particularly contentious due to the
human element and the reality that the “baby-boom” demographic most associated with
health care cost concerns is politically powerful and assertive within the electoral
process. As a result, public health system managers in Canada have found it useful to
have solid clinical and particularly economic evidence to justify specific health system
decision-making and austerity measures. They appealed to expert processes to secure
this.
In some ways, HTA reflects very sensible and prudent management, but it also
reflects an attempt to de-politicize important spending decisions through expert analysis.
Pharmaceutical HTA typically rewards those companies and patented technologies that
produce technological and therapeutic advancements that can demonstrate they are costeffective. The key metrics and methodologies used in HTA to establish cost-effectiveness
are “quality-adjusted life years” (QALY) and comparative “incremental costeffectiveness ratios” (ICERs). When considering the value of a treatment, QALY is a
measurement that approximates the effectiveness of a therapy to extend life, adjusted for
quality of life improvements. Where QALY is a unit of measurement, a QALY threshold
is a policy statement about value and what should be regarded as cost-effective. As
discussed by Menon and Stafinski, there are known general parameters or suggested

226
guidelines for QALY policy thresholds, but no hard data293 on their role in government
decision-making processes:
A cost/QALY threshold was first suggested in 1992 in Canada. The
proposed figure was $20,000 per QALY (1992 dollars) for the
threshold below which a new technology ought to be adopted, and
$100,000 per QALY for the threshold above which a new technology
should not be adopted. A threshold figure that is cited now is US
$50,000 per QALY. However, there is no formal evidence that any of
these boundaries has ever been accepted or implemented by any
Canadian decision-making body. In fact, Laupacis has since stated that
the traditional $50K/QALY ‘would be considered relatively
unattractive’ (Menon and Stafinski 2009, S14-19).
The key data that goes into calculating QALY is an expert clinical assessment of a drug
or device’s therapeutic benefit. This assessment requires considerable medical and
economic expertise.
HTA bodies are usually funded by governments but comprised of academics,
health economists, and clinicians who make funding recommendations based on a
product’s comparative therapeutic benefits and costs. An expert committee is responsible
for this assessment.294 CCOHTA295 established an expert advisory body called the
Canadian Drug Expert Committee (CDEC).296 CADTH also maintains a specific review
process for oncology drugs called the pan-Canadian Oncology Drug Review (pCODR)
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This contrasts with the system that has subsequently developed in the UK where ‘appropriate’
QALY thresholds are discussed much more openly. For example, the Drug “Appraisal Committee” of the
UK National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) has discussed in public the relative
appropriateness of cost per QALY between £20,000 and £30,000. Appraisal Committee Chairs have
published on “special circumstances” that have warranted incremental cost-effectiveness above £30 000 per
quality adjusted life year. The six factors include: condition severity; end-of-life considerations (since
2009); stakeholder persuasion; significant innovation; disadvantaged populations; and, clinical use for
children (Rawlins, Barnett, and Stevens 2010).
294
This is similar to the Human Drug Advisory Panel (HDAP), the committee used by the Patented
Medicines Prices Review Board referenced earlier (see Chapter 3).
295
Now called CADTH.
296
This body was originally called the Canadian Expert Drug Advisory Committee (CEDAC) but in
2011 was renamed the Canadian Drug Expert Committee (CDEC).
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that has its own expert committee, the pCODR Expert Review Committee (pERC).297
CDEC and pERC expert committees review clinical and cost data submitted by
manufacturers to assess a drug’s therapeutic benefits and cost-effectiveness. These data
are first compiled and analyzed by CADTH staff reviewers. The expert committees then
make recommendations regarding coverage directly to government payers. A simple flow
chart illustrating these institutions and expert committees is found in Annex D.
Cost is determined by the price of a therapy and the duration or course of
treatment required. Pharmaceutical prices are, of course, centrally determined by the
existence of a patent and thus subject to the pricing ceilings regulated by the Patented
Medicines Prices Review Board (PMPRB). While the PMPRB assesses comparative
therapeutic benefits to establish those pricing ceilings, HTA considers cost-per-QALY as
a metric to help decision makers determine affordability and the state’s “willingness to
pay.” Sometimes willingness to pay is influenced by the existence of multiple treatment
options, both patented and non-patented. This requires a comparative analysis of costeffectiveness. The incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER) is the core comparison
methodology used in HTA and reflects “the difference in cost between two treatment
interventions over the difference in their effect” (Briggs et al. 1997).
There is a vast technical pharmacoeconomic literature on the methodology of
QALYs and ICERs and the concepts do not require further elaboration for the present
purpose. The key detail to note is they are methodological tools used in health
“procurement” decision-making. They are particularly useful when assessing the degree
297

pCODR and its expert committee pERC were originally established independent of CADTH in
2010 by provincial and territorial ministries of health. pCODR was preceded by an Interim Joint Oncology
Drug Review (iJODR) established in 2007. CADTH assumed responsibility for pCODR in April of 2014.
CADTH Website, “Frequently Asked Questions About pCODR” accessed November 3, 2016
https://www.cadth.ca/pcodr/faqs
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of clinical improvement and the cost associated with that improvement. The methods are
useful for examining expensive and competing health technologies. Pharmaceutical
technologies are expensive ipso facto that they are subject to trade-related patent
protections granted by the state. The removal of compulsory licenses that Canadian
payers had relied on heavily between 1969 and 1993 for cost containment purposes also
created a policy tool vacuum that HTA began to fill in the 1990s and 2000s. The role of
emergent cost-effectiveness institutions as an explicit counterweight to patent reforms
under Bills C-22 and C-91 was in fact considered in the health policy literature; however,
its prospects for success in this effort were initially mixed and controversial (Lexchin
1997, 75).

Institutional Conversion and Impact
This section discusses how Canada’s HTA institutions were repurposed to increasingly
mitigate the financial impact of patented pharmaceuticals. This can be viewed as an
example of institutional conversion that is a key method of institutional change identified
in the historical institutionalism literature (Thelen 2003). The empirical work shows how
institutions are converted to more centrally address costs created by patented
technologies.
CCOHTA successfully performed its coordination and review mandate for several
years and increasingly specialized in how to assess the costs of pharmaceuticals. In 1996
it produced a Guidance Document for the Costing Process, and in 1997 produced its
Guidelines for Economic Evaluation of Pharmaceuticals: Canada (CCOHTA 2001). In
1999, Deputy Ministers of Health again reasserted CCOHTA’s role in the health system
increasing its annual budget from $1.7 million to $4.32 million (CCOHTA 2000). A good
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proportion of this increase was directed to CCOHTA’s $500,000 “horizon scanning”
program, which “alerts health care managers to issues on emerging technologies” (Ibid).
This early warning function bolstered health system managers’ planning capacity for
future expenditure challenges posed by new technologies.
In March 2002, CCOHTA was selected by Deputy Ministers of Health to house
an interim Common Drug Review (CDR) process (CCOHTA 2002). CDR was devised as
“a single process for assessing new drugs for potential coverage by publicly funded
federal, provincial and territorial drug benefit plans” (CCOHTA 2003). This included a
mandate to reduce duplication and “maximize the use of limited resources and expertise”
(CCOHTA 2002a). CDR would “critique manufacturer-submitted pharmacoeconomic
studies” and employ its new expert committee298 to make formulary listing
recommendations to participating drug plans (CCOHTA 2003). It also established
common submission requirements for manufacturers to comply with.
In September 2002, Canadian Health Ministers announced CCOHTA would
house a permanent CDR process (CCOHTA 2003). Importantly, CCOHTA President Jill
M. Sanders tapped Barb Shea to be CDR’s first Director. Shea was a provincial drug plan
manager with 10-years of experience and responsibility for managing her home
province’s pharmaceutical budget (CCOHTA 2002a). This is a clear indication of CDR’s
alignment and orientation in provincial expenditure management. CCOHTA also
received a cash injection from the federal government of $45 million in new funds over
five years (CCOHTA 2003).
HTA was becoming a more mainstream part of political discussions. HTA
pioneer Renaldo Battista identifies a period of HTA “expansion” where the lexicon of
298

CEDAC referenced above.
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HTA intersects with politics: “HTA really becomes part of the official political
discourse…politicians will speak of the importance of generating evidence to make better
decisions…and at that point there will be increasing demand for a diversity of products”
(Battista, public remarks, 2015). Policy makers were demanding more decision-making
tools, particularly in the area of pharmaceuticals. Policy maker strategies increasingly
reflected their desire to reinforce and bolster HTA institutions.
Reaction to the Common Drug Review was mixed. According to an early
independent assessment of the program, manufacturers and patients had immediate
concerns about process, transparency, administrative burden, and a lack of patient
involvement (EKOS 2005). In response, CCOHTA noted it was exploring options to
engage with the public (CCOHTA 2005). A full patient input process was eventually
incorporated into the process.299 However, early evaluations of the CDR process
suggested a lack of clarity about how patient information was actually used in the
decision-making process (SECOR 2013, 18).
CDR and pCODR maintain a recommendation framework that helps to guide the
advice of each process’ expert committee. Recommendation options are 1) reimburse, 2)
do not reimburse or 3) reimburse with clinical criteria and/or conditions.300 Past
frameworks have been similarly structured, but used the terminology of “list,” “do not
list,” “list with conditions,” etc. These conditions are very flexible and usually involve
clinical parameters, cost improvement criteria, or both clinical and cost criteria. A very
common recommendation is for expert committees to recommend a drug for funding but
299

This was incorporated in May 2010.
CADTH, “Recommendation Framework for CADTH Common Drug Review and pan-Canadian
Oncology Drug Review Programs: Guidance for CADTH’s Drug Expert Committees” accessed September
20, 2016, https://www.cadth.ca/media/cdr/templates/pre-subphase/pCODR_CDR_recommendations_framework.pdf
300
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only at a lower price or with improved cost-effectiveness.

301

This invites negotiation

between drug plans and manufacturers. Outright recommendation for funding is fairly
uncommon. Generally, a “do not reimburse” (or “do not list” as it has been called in the
past) makes it very difficult for a product to be included on a formulary.302
Drug plan managers are often pharmacists by training but do not have the
capacity or expertise (therapeutic, health economics, epidemiology etc.) to evaluate all of
the relevant evidence. As such, HTA review is a critical decision-making tool. However,
expert analysis is not binding on payers in Canada.303 They always retain autonomy over
listing. Figure 6.2 provides an analysis of CDR recommendations from 2004 to 2011. It
stops at 2011 when a new negotiation institution, the pan-Canadian Pharmaceutical
Alliance (pCPA), was established.304 This is important to draw a distinction and show
that HTA did in fact have a qualitative impact, independent of pCPA negotiations under
the new model.305
Figure 6.2: Canadian Drug Expert Committee Recommendations 2004-2011
CDEC Recommendation
List
Do not list
List with criteria (i.e. list only as second line
treatment; list with improved cost-effectiveness)
List consistent with therapeutic class (i.e. similar
price; same restrictions)
Total products/indications reviewed
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Incidence
6 (3.6%)
77 (45.6%)
62 (36.7 %)
24 (14.2%)
169 (100%)

Data provided below.
For many years following the introduction of CDR, a CDR or pCODR “do not list/reimburse”
did not necessarily disqualify a drug from provincial funding. Funding could be provided on a province-byprovince and product-by-product basis. More recently, since 2011 when provinces entered into joint price
negotiations through the pan-Canadian Pharmaceutical Alliance (pCPA), a “do not list” or “do not
reimburse” review essentially now disqualifies a drug for coverage under public drug plans. It prevents a
drug from even entering the pCPA negotiation process. This is discussed further below.
303
This is different from other systems that have developed internationally where HTA review
decisions are binding on payers. This is discussed further below.
304
The first drug negotiated under the pCPA in 2010 (Solaris™) is not included in the analysis.
305
pCPA’s role is discussed below.
302
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In the pre-PCPA period, around 45% of technologies reviewed by CDR were not
recommended for funding.306 For reference, the rate of outright “no” at CDR declined
somewhat in the post-pCPA era (Bosnic et al. 2015).307 It is interesting that full
recommendations are granted in around 4% of cases. In other words, despite the fact that
prices are regulated in Canada by the Patented Medicines Prices Review Board
(PMPRB), expert review has determined that only 4% of technologies should be priced at
the full price ceiling offered under that regulation. Clinical and economic review
mechanisms in Canada yield that around 96% of drugs should either be less expensive
than federally regulated pricing levels, or that provincial payers should restrict their use
in some way.308 By definition, CDR reviews and net pricing following confidential
negotiated rebate payments to government are more restrictive than federal regulatory
price controls. Non-excessive pricing (PMPRB legislative mandate) is not the same as
affordable for public health plans (provincial mandate). Federal regulations are still
important in promoting price stability and setting maximum ceilings. However, provinces
have further constrained net pricing in the public market through HTA-informed
negotiations (Morgan, Friesen, Thomson, and Daw 2013b).
While very important in the early years, the PMPRB has evolved to be somewhat
less important in the public market, but remains highly important in the private drug
market. Much of this decline in relevance to the public market started in 2004 with the

306

Only the most recent CDEC recommendation for each indication was used to arrive at a sample
of 169. Several of these initially received a ‘do not list’ that was upgraded upon resubmission. As such,
45.6% is actually a slight underestimate.
307
This rate of “do not list” by CDR declined from 45.6% (2004 - July 2011) to 37% (July 2011 –
end of 2014) implying an approximate overall rejection rate of 42% (author calculation). Bosnic et al.
(2015) report that 63% (64 of 102) of drugs received a positive or conditional recommendation from July
2011 – end of 2014.
308
For example, more restrictive than the clinical indication as reflected on a Health Canadaapproved product monograph.
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introduction of the CDR and in 2006 when the province of Ontario introduced
confidential negotiated product listing agreements (PLAs) deals. These agreements
involved manufacturers negotiating net prices with the province and signing a contract to
provide direct rebates to government. Many other provinces followed Ontario with this
approach, and eventually it was formalized for all public markets on a national basis
through the pCPA (Morgan, Friesen, Thomson, and Daw 2013a).
To show HTA’s impact, we must compare the recommendations in Figure 6.2 to
actual procurement decisions. Individual procurement decisions appear to be largely
consistent with the advice of expert bodies and thus significantly impacted by HTA costeffectiveness analysis. This has been shown, to some extent, in previous studies of overall
percent agreement and percent discordance between Common Drug Review (CDR)
recommendations and subsequent provincial listing decisions.309 However, qualitative
details about this adoption are required to better understand the mechanics and influence
of HTA. This chapter updates analysis in the literature to be current to the introduction of
pCPA in 2011, and builds on earlier conclusions with qualitative data.310
The conclusion of high consistency is supported by an analysis of individual
purchasing decisions where n=1521 (169 CDR reviewed products x 9 provinces
excluding Québec, given its lack of CDR participation).311 There is a high consistency of
expert review decisions and procurement outcomes. With very few exceptions, negative

309

Gamble et al. (2011) note that “proportion of drugs listed decreased significantly after the
introduction of the Common Drug Review for all participating drug plans”
310
Rather than using Kappa scores, this analysis looks at the same phenomenon using simple sets as
well as qualitative perspectives of decision makers.
311
These listing decisions are available publicly but are also compiled by IMS Health’s FAME™
database and reported in the periodical publication the Provincial Reimbursement Advisor (PRA). This
IMS tabulation is highly reliable and has been used for convenience and consistency with studies from the
medical and health policy literature. IMS-Brogan, Provincial Reimbursement Advisor, Volume 15, Issue
04, 2012.
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expert review is a sufficient condition to rule out a full listing. Expert review is a
mechanism to rule-out (but not necessarily rule-in) public funding for some technologies.
Of the 169 recommendations 77 were “Do not List.” Four smaller provinces (NS,
MB, PE, NL) did not fully list any of these 77 products. Aggregating the data for 9 CDRparticipating provinces, produces 693 total purchasing decisions for provinces to make on
those 77 “do not list” (DNL) recommendations (77 DNL drugs x 9 provinces). Removing
necessary exceptions from the analysis312 yields only 4 full listings out of 679 listing
decisions (0.6%). Figure 6.3 suggests an explicit connection and substantial role for
expert review in justifying no or limited listings.
Figure 6.3: Venn Diagram of CDR-Negative Drugs not Fully Listed in 9 Provinces

Not fully listed
Fully listed

675

4

Explicit connection:
negative expert advice
helps to rule out
listings. Only 0.6%
CDR-Negative
received a full listing
within 700 days

Expert advice =
do not list
n=679 (685 less 6 listed
under a special program)

Similarly, CDR-positive advice was a sufficient condition to secure public
funding. Of the 5 drugs recommended for funding,313 all five were covered in 7 of 9

312

Note: 18/693 (only 2.6%) of those decisions resulted in “full” listings. However, 8 of those
listing were delayed by more that 700 days, and thus can hardly count as “full listings.” Removing these
from analysis completely yields 10/685 (or 1.5%). Furthermore, 6 of these listings decisions are for only
two drugs that were made available on an exceptional basis in many provinces under politically driven
special priority health programs. These drugs were exceptions from normal listing process and thus should
be removed from analysis. They are diabetes drug Levemir and mental health drug Invega.
313
Advicor™ received a list recommendation from CDEC but is not actively marketed after a
company acquisition and thus has been removed from the data. This reflects the difference between the 6
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provinces suggesting a near perfect sufficiency condition for those provinces. This
relationship is displayed in Figure 6.4. However, the number of cases is small: 5 CDRpositive recommendations times 9 provinces only totals 45 coverage decisions. Based on
the circumstance of listing (see footnotes to Figure 6.4), a rough estimate of 43.5 of 45
drugs received listing (96.7%). This suggests a high probability that a CDR “list”
recommendation is a sufficient condition for provincial listing (and indeed 100% in 7 of 9
provinces). Only for Manitoba was a CDR positive recommendation not a sufficient
condition to gain provincial listing.

Figure 6.4: Venn Diagram of CDR-Positive Drugs Funded in 9 Provinces314
Full consistency in 7 of 9 provinces
(5 out of 5 drugs were funded in 7
provinces)

Fully listed
Not fully listed
43.50

1.50
Expert advice =
“List”; n=45

However, the picture is more ambiguous in cases where expert review yields less
decisive advice, for example, conditional or otherwise modified listing recommendations.
In these cases, there is a less clear relationship than for “list” or “do-not-list” cases. For
example, of the 86 products that received a CDR-conditional recommendation

CDR-positive recommendations reported in Figure 6.2 and the listing analysis in Figure 6.4 which
examines listings for the five CDR-positive drugs (times 9 provinces to total 45).
314
Near perfect subset relationship in most provinces for provincial uptake of full list
recommendation include: BC: 4.75 out of 5 (Twynsta™ requires special authorization); AB: 5 out of 5;
ON: 5 out of 5; NS: 5 out of 5; SK: 5 out of 5; MB 3.75 out of 5 (Twynsta™ not listed; Manitoba has listed
one form of Altace, but not its combination product Altace HCT a listing of 0.75 has been used to
approximate this situation. http://web2.gov.mb.ca/laws/regs/pdf/p060-083.13.pdf; NB 5 out of 5; PE 5 out
of 5, however, Yasmin was listed in 2013 so it should be noted this listing was delayed. See:
http://www.gov.pe.ca/photos/original/macmemosept13.pdf; NL 5 out of 5; Total for all provinces
aggregated: 43.5 out of 45 or (96.7%).

236
(multiplied by 9 participating provinces for a total of 774 subsequent purchasing
decisions) fully 24.5% were not listed; 12% were full listings, and 2% were full listings
but significantly delayed (>700 days), perhaps due to protracted price negotiations.
Provinces followed-up conditional CDR recommendations with conditional listings in
61.5% of those cases.315

As such, further qualitative insights are required to fully

describe the impact of HTA.
There is also a qualitative impact of conditional recommendations. The role of
HTA for these cases is primarily to inform criteria or conditions and inform negotiations.
Canadian drug plan managers use clinical conditions and criteria to restrict drug access to
a sub-set of the total patient population. Ostensibly, this restricts access to only those
patients who will most benefit from the therapy as informed by the clinical evidence. For
those technologies that are screened-in for government funding, an important function of
HTA is to help restrict criteria or conditions to manage how many patients will have
access to them, and under what specific conditions. For example, sometimes HTA
recommends that an expensive new drug316 be used only if a cheaper alternative is tried
first.317

315

However, the percent of conditional CDR recommendations resulting in “conditional listings”
could potentially be as high as 75.5%. This would depend on the extent to which provinces required price
concessions via confidential PLAs in exchange for those 14% of cases with “full” listings (61.5% + 14% =
75.5%).
316
New drugs are almost always patented and are ‘expensive’ because they are protected by stategranted patent protections.
317
Consider the substantially restrictive criteria that go along with the conditional recommendation
for drug x: “The Canadian Expert Drug Advisory Committee (CEDAC) had previously recommended that
[drug x] not be listed. A new randomized controlled trial (RCT) was the basis for the [drug x]
resubmission. The committee maintains its prior conclusion that [drug x] has not been proven to be costeffective in any group of patients but, recognizing the need for treatment alternatives in patients with severe
pulmonary hypertension, recommends the following restrictive formulary listing criteria. It is
recommended that [drug x] be listed for patients…[who] have both 1. failed to respond to non-prostanoid
therapies and; 2. who are not candidates for epoprostenol therapy…” CADTH Website, accessed
September 20, 2016,
https://www.cadth.ca/media/cdr/complete/cdr_complete_Remodulin_July20_2006.pdf. Note in this
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Both cost criteria and clinical criteria are related to expenditure management or
‘affordability.’ The Executive Officer of Canada’s largest provincial drug plan has
described the utility of conditional recommendations in expenditure management:
Really helpful information for all of us, and I know a real growing area,
is “list with clinical criteria or conditions.” It is providing guidance to
the public drug plans, determining who will benefit most from these
new therapies, and under which conditions should they be reimbursed
for maximum affordability and for positive outcomes for patients.
Sometimes it’s very clear; sometimes it’s not (McGurn 2016).318
In other words, HTA does not always provide binary yes/no insights, but often allows
drug plan managers to narrow and shape coverage criteria to minimize costs and ensure
appropriate use.319
HTA

also

informs

pricing

negotiations

between

plan

managers

and

manufacturers. A key component of CADTH’s institutional conversion was when
provinces made CDR and pCODR reviews mandatory for all new drugs applying for
public funding. This was implied as a general norm when establishing CDR in 2004. It
was later formally entrenched in 2011 when the Council of the Federation’s Health Care
Innovation Working Group established pCPA as the common point of negotiation for all

passage the considerable criteria used to limit access to this particular treatment. One of CDEC’s prime
considerations was the cost of the drug which ranged from $18,000 to more than $70,000 per year
depending on the dosing regimen. This new therapy did, however, provide considerable benefits over
existing therapies in that it could be administered subcutaneously rather than through a continuous IV
infusion through a permanent catheter of the central venous. It would appear that expert review considered
this to be a substantial innovation, but not one substantial enough to reward the manufacturer with a full
listing at the patented drug’s full price. Most provinces leveraged this expert advice. The drug was only
made available as part of a few special access or exceptional drug programs (i.e. not fully listed) and was
not reimbursed at all in several major jurisdictions including Ontario, Alberta, Nova Scotia, or Manitoba.
318
Suzanne McGurn speaking in her role as Assistant Deputy Minister and Executive Officer,
Ontario Public Drug Programs
319
This insight is verified by an increase in conditional listing since 2011 (subsequent to the data
reflected in Figure 6.2). See Bosnic et al. (2015).
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provincial drug plans.320 This common negotiation mechanism was first referred to a
“pan-Canadian purchasing alliance,” was formally named the pan-Canadian Pricing
Alliance, and was later formally renamed the pan-Canadian Pharmaceutical Alliance
(pCPA). This name change appears to have been an attempt to deemphasize the fact that
pCPA’s fundamental role is to negotiate prices and confidential rebates to government.
However, this remains an ongoing reality. One study suggests that 80% - 95% of PLAs in
Canada remain financial-based rather than health-outcomes-based (Thompson et al.,
2016). Politicians who seem to like the procurement metaphor of “bulk-discounts” often
inaccurately refer to pCPA as ‘bulk-purchasing’. The process more accurately reflects
joint price negotiations.
CADTH review is an essential precursor to public funding in Canada. Technically
and legally, there is nothing stopping provincial plans from listing a drug without HTA
review or independently of the pCPA. However, provinces have opted to mandate this to
maintain integrity of the process. It is mandatory for manufacturers, but provinces can
opt-in or opt-out on a product-specific basis.321 As a ‘procurement’ assistance
mechanism, HTA review really informs the starting parameters for these pricing
negotiations. With a few exceptions including re-negotiations, HTA review and pCPA

320

Council of the Federation, “Premiers Protecting Canada’s Health Care Systems” August 6, 2010
press release, accessed September 14, 2016, http://www.conseildelafederation.ca/en/latest-news/172010/153-premiers-protecting-canada-s-health-care-systems
321
“In general, all new drugs approved for use by Health Canada are then submitted by the drug
manufacturer for review under the national Common Drug Review (CDR) process for non-oncology drugs
and under Pan-Canadian Oncology Drug Review (pCODR) for oncology drugs…Once CDR or pCODR
releases its final recommendation, the Pan-Canadian Pricing Alliance (pCPA) decides whether joint panCanadian negotiations will occur for the drug product. If the decision is to move forward with negotiations
through the pCPA, one jurisdiction will assume the lead and confirm with the manufacturer which
jurisdictions are participating… [it is] up to each participating jurisdiction to make their final decision on
funding the drug product through their own public drug plan and enter into a jurisdiction-specific product
listing agreement with the manufacturer.” Pan-Canadian Pharmaceutical Alliance Website, accessed
September 5, 2016,
http://www.canadaspremiers.ca/phocadownload/pcpa/scope_of_pcpa_process_sept_2014.pdf
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apply to all new patented drugs seeking funding. pCPA has become the most important
venue for the negotiation of pricing and has helped to further entrench the important role
of CADTH as a mandatory review prior to pCPA negotiations.322 pCPA also maintains a
separate price-setting process for generics that does not involve an HTA review and tiers
pricing by product (ranging from 75% to 18% of originator brand product) according to
the number of generic competitors on the market.323
HTA is most routinely applied at product launch. As such, drug plan managers
see a clear future role for HTA to evaluate drugs currently on the market. These drugs
may not have received the same cost-effectiveness scrutiny at launch or may not have
performed as effectively in real-world use as anticipated by the initial clinical
assessments (McGurn 2015).324 As HTA evolved in Canada, its role and importance to
decision making has only grown. It continues to adapt to decision-maker needs for
‘ongoing’ assessments, not just at product launch, but also to facilitate decommissioning
or ‘disinvestment’ in technologies. The term Health Technology Management—as
opposed to Health Technology Assessment—has been used to describe its future role.325
CADTH already does some of this type of work through its Therapeutic Review program
that comparatively evaluates full classes of drugs already on the market for “optimal use”
322

While tremendously important for pricing, it should be noted that the introduction of pCPA itself
has not had a significant impact on the overall proportion of new drugs listed across provincial jurisdictions
(Milliken et al. 2015).
323
The lower 18% of the originator brand price threshold is applied for at least 18 high-volume
generic drugs; Pan-Canadian Generics: Pan-Canadian Tiered Pricing Framework – Government of
Saskatchewan website, accessed September 5, 2016,
http://formulary.drugplan.health.gov.sk.ca/PanCanadian.aspx
324
Speaking in her role as Assistant Deputy Minister and Executive Officer, Ontario Public Drug
Programs, Suzanne McGurn made the following comments: “How do we build on the success and
learnings that we’ve had in this era of evidence-driven decision-making that CADTH has been such a
significant contributor to, how do we actually start evolving that work to support decisions that aren’t just
at the front end…” (McGurn 2016).
325
Brian O’Rourke, “Health Technology Management,” 88-90, CADTH website accessed
November 28, 2016, https://www.cadth.ca/sites/default/files/events/PM%20Session%20%20Drug%20Portfolio%20Info%20Sess%20-%20Oct%2026%202016%20-%20FINAL.pdf

240
in practice (see Figure 6.7). Where Health Technology Management (HTM) seems to be
most promising, however, is in a new initiative announced in 2017 called the “Cancer
Drug Sustainability Initiative”. This effort is being led by the Canadian Association of
Provincial Cancer Agencies (CAPCA) and involves coordination of various system
players including CADTH and the pCPA. Health Technology Management efforts
including the CAPCA drug sustainability initiative can be considered a unique and
emerging institutional “re-assessment” layer.
In addition to these formal institutional constraints on the pricing and availability
of patented product there is also a de facto constraint on overall effective patent life from
a time perspective. This varies depending on HTA and negotiation agency workload.
CDR review time target is 180 calendar days. 326 This is one component of overall “time
to provincial listings” for which estimates range but has been assessed by IMS-Health
and the brand industry association at 449 calendar days.327 The extent of time to listing
and “effective patent life” are contested between brand and generic industry associations,
but there can be no doubt that the layering of HTA and negotiation institutions adds
significant time to the product review process and thus constrain effective patent life. The
magnitude of this constraint will vary by product, provincial jurisdiction, and has
fluctuated over time.

326

“From the time that an application is accepted for review to the date of issuing an embargoed
Canadian Drug Expert Committee (CDEC) recommendation." CDR Process in Brief, accessed April 12,
2017, https://www.cadth.ca/about-cadth/what-we-do/products-services/cdr/common-drug-reviewsubmissions/process-in-brief
327
“Across provinces comprising 80% of the eligible national public drug plan population.” Brad
Millson, Sherri Thiele, Yvonne Zhang, Wendy Dobson-Belaire, and Brett Skinner, “Access to New
Medicines in Public Drug Plans,” 2016 Annual Report, Innovative Medicines Canada, accessed April 12,
2017, http://innovativemedicines.ca/wpcontent/uploads/2016/05/20160524_Access_to_Medicines_Report_EN_Web.pdf. It should be noted that
delays can be caused by many factors and measurement of time-to-listing is impacted by methodology (e.g.
80% population coverage versus other potential metrics).
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Canadian policy makers adopted the principles of evidence-based medicine and
actively supported the development of HTA. They repurposed an existing institution to
help manage cost concerns related to patented pharmaceuticals. Provincial policy makers
have since confirmed the important role, and potential future expansion of HTA, in
managing the pipeline of new pharmaceuticals coming to Canada from international
firms (Bell 2016).328
The US drug industry takes an alternative perspective and views Canadian
institutions as rationing bodies. US companies have taken aim at these practices, and
general pricing levels in countries that employ HTA-informed negotiations in comparison
to the US, where prices are much higher:
Most of these countries, if you look at Canada, if you look at Australia, if
you look at New Zealand, all highly developed countries, all freeriding
on inventions in the United States. If you look at access for their
population– I don't have exact numbers here, but I think if you say there
were 100 new products authorized in the United States, Australia and
New Zealand, their population only has access to 30% of them. The UK,
they have access to 47% of them, normally, two to three years later than
the US. Their citizens are not getting quality healthcare…Canada is
cheaper because of rations. And Canada is cheaper because it can,
because it freerides off American innovation. In our industry, let me be
very clear here, we have sunk all the money up front… What you're
paying for is all of that clinical trial, all of that knowledge, all of that
experimentation, which tells you [the] pill will do what it will do…And
so, once you've done all that work, you're very subject to commercial
blackmail [by governments]…You cannot negotiate with governments.329
328

Ontario Deputy Minister of Health, Dr. Bob Bell commented publicly on this in 2016: “Where
could CADTH play its maximum role? And I’m speaking now from the Deputy Ministers’ table, what help
do we need?... There’s no question that for many provinces, expanded effort in health technology
assessment is essential. But I guess what I would say is that we in Canada look off on our shores and we
see these multiple pipelines coming into the country… is it possible that we can look at CADTH for health
technology, along with partners in various other provinces that have experience in HTA, especially in
pharmaceuticals, where I think the entire country accepts that [CADTH] has primacy in both oncology and
non-oncology drug value assessment…Could we say that the first stop shop, for anybody who wants to
bring any new product, especially any new pharmaceutical to Canada, would be an evidence review by
CADTH?..” (Bell 2016).
329
Ian Read, Pfizer CEO, Statement at the US National Press Club, March 23, 2017, accessed April
5, 2017 http://www.press.org/sites/default/files/20170323_read.pdf
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This statement is somewhat overstated as there are sources of leverage on both sides of a
negotiation. At least in Canada, institutions do attempt to base decisions on the best
available evidence. These statements are closely aligned with similar statements from
President Trump who has criticized US drug prices, but intends to simultaneously address
the pricing and investment imbalances: “Foreign countries must pay a fair share for drug
development costs…We're going to end global freeloading."330
The point is that Canadian HTA and negotiation institutions are carefully
watched, scrutinized, engaged, and sometimes challenged by US industry. In the early
years (1997-1998), CCOHTA faced an injunction lawsuit from an American company
regarding one of its drug reviews for being "negligently misleading" and containing
“negligent misstatements” (Skolnick 1998, 283-4). The court denied the injunction and
affirmed that CCOHTA had taken steps to ensure scientific accuracy, noting that an
injunction would “virtually render the defendant [CCOHTA] useless” within the
Canadian system (Ibid). While successful, the legal defence alone cost CCOHTA 13% of
its annual budget (Ibid).
US government opposition to HTA and negotiation institutions is perhaps less
blatant than USTR activity on IP and the promise doctrine (Chapter 5). Part of the reason
is that HTA has gained broad legitimacy as an evidence-based approach to decision
making, and companies implicitly acknowledge the reality that HTA in many countries is

330

Roberta Rampton and Deena Beasley, “Trump pushes drug makers for lower prices, more U.S.
production” Reuters January 31, 2017, accessed April 5, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usatrump-pharmaceuticals-novartis-idUSKBN15F13K. While the diagnosis of “freeloading” is consistent
between these two perspectives, the prognosis would seem somewhat different. The CEO perspective
seems to suggest that that government institutions will continue to have considerable leverage. It is unclear
what specific measures President Trump has in mind.

243
here to stay. However, direct opposition from large US corporations is clearly present.331
US government-level debates have focused on the potential use of Canadian and UKstyle HTA and negotiation approaches in US market. The polarization of this debate was
most prominent in the 2010 Affordable Care Act discussions (see below). The potential
use of cost-effectiveness research remains a point of ongoing debate among various US
stakeholders (Concannon et al. 2015, 16).
Though these mechanisms have not yet been widely adopted in the US, reviews in
small countries like Canada can have reach beyond borders and are closely watched by
US corporations. US company regulatory filings with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) have noted the risk posed by negative HTA reviews:
HTA organizations, such as NICE in the UK and the Canadian Agency
for Drugs and Technologies in Health, make reimbursement
recommendations to payers in their jurisdictions based on the clinical
effectiveness, cost-effectiveness and service impact of new, emerging
and existing medicines and treatments. Any recommendations or
guidelines that result in decreased use, dosage or reimbursement of our
products could materially and adversely affect our product sales, business
and operating results. In addition, the perception by the investment
community or stockholders that such recommendations or guidelines will
result in decreased use and dosage of our products could adversely affect
the market price for our common stock.332
Despite having considerable size and ability to gain support within the US political
system, the power of the US pharmaceutical industry to drive favourable outcomes for
patented products internationally is often exaggerated. Comparatively minuscule state
HTA institutions with paltry budgets can significantly impact US companies with billions
in resources. Market power cannot fully explain these dynamics and the institutional
331

This opposition is not universal and many companies work collaboratively with HTA
organizations.
332
Amgen Inc. 2012 Form 10-K “Annual Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934,” accessed April 20, 2017,
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/318154/000144530513000364/amgn-12312012x10k.htm
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sources of power that shape the broader environment for patented products. Market
power may be a useful incentive to secure adoption of an international standard, but has
limited broader utility in explaining the design and real-world role of regulatory
standards.
In summary, while HTA institutions were established separately from Canada’s
trade diplomacy, the evolution of HTA was a key policy feedback. It was an additional
institution layered on top of the regulatory price control institution implemented and
enhanced under Canada’s trade deals. This institutional layering and conversion
constitutes a meaningful mitigation to the trade-related IP regime and calls into question
the analytical utility of a strict market power account.

How Private Drug Insurers Attempt to Leverage Public Institutions
This section provides a concise within-case comparison to show the significance of
public institutions. Canada’s private drug market has not yet developed a comparable
institutional capacity. It shows that the private market has actively attempted to leverage
public institutions to contain its own cost exposure.333 Private payers look to the future
with particular concern over cost growth. They have: advocated for a more activist
Patented Medicines Prices Review Board to drive down prices and a role in the
institution’s governance; adopted CADTH’s HTA reviews in some cases; and have
sought access to negotiated prices through participation in public plan negotiation
mechanisms.
333

There were several years of pharmaceutical expenditure expansion in Canada following TRIPS.
More recently, public sector cost-containment and a “patent cliff” of patent expiries for several
“blockbuster” products has provided several years of modest pharmaceutical growth at or below 2%
annually. CIHI, National Health Expenditure Trends, 1975 to 2015, data tables, accessed September 22,
2016, https://www.cihi.ca/sites/default/files/document/nhex_2015_datatables_en.zip
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Prescription drug spending in Canada is around $29.2 billion (around 13.3% of
total Health Spending in Canada) and is split between public, private and out-of-pocket
sources.334

Public drug programs typically cover elderly adults and those on social

assistance. Provinces also provide catastrophic drug programs that range somewhat but
provide coverage when patients’ drug expenditures exceed a certain percentage of
household income, usually in the range of 2-5% (Phillips 2016).335 Public spending on
prescription drugs in Canada is approximately $12.6 billion (2015) and constitutes around
43% of prescription drug spending.336
Private employer-based drug insurance plans are usually offered by one of 4 or 5
major insurers. Prescription drugs reimbursed by private plans were $10.2 billion in 2015
and constitute around 35% of prescription drug spending. Direct out-of-pocket spending
by patients on prescription drugs in Canada was about $6.4 billion in 2015 and
constitutes approximately 22% of total prescription drug spending.337 Of the $29.2 billion
in total prescription drug sales reported by CIHI, only 52% or $15.2 billion are for
patented drug costs at the factory gate (ex-factory sales).338
Figure 6.5 shows a comparative distribution of Canadian prescription drug
spending for 1992 pre-NAFTA/TRIPS as compared to 2015. It shows a substantial
334

For an analysis related to patented drugs, it is important to differentiate prescription drug
spending from total drug spending which includes over-the-counter and personal health supplies. Data
source: CIHI, National Health Expenditure Trends, 1975 to 2015, data tables, accessed September 22,
2016, https://www.cihi.ca/sites/default/files/document/nhex_2015_datatables_en.zip
335
Some provinces provide universal coverage (e.g. Québec and New Brunswick) and others
provide a range of catastrophic drug policies. For a good overview of the fragmented Canadian market for
pharmaceuticals and the range of provincial coverage frameworks, see Canada’s Library of Parliament
publication: Phillips (2016).
336
At time of writing these were the most recent data available from the Canadian Institute for
Health Information (CIHI), Canada’s official statistician for the health sector. Per CIHI publication
practice, all figures for 2015 herein are forecast. Calculation of percentage share are the author’s. CIHI,
National Health Expenditure Trends, 1975 to 2015, data tables, accessed September 22, 2016,
https://www.cihi.ca/sites/default/files/document/nhex_2015_datatables_en.zip
337
Ibid.
338
PMPRB Annual Report 2015.
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decrease in the percent share of the public prescription market (48% to 43%), and a
commensurate increase in the total share of the private sector. Public and private plan
dynamics are somewhat different and there may be multiple causes for these trends.
However, active plan management in the public market is undoubtedly a major factor.

Figure 6.5: Public, Private, and Out-of-Pocket Share of Total Prescription Drug Spending
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Figure 6.6: Cumulative Increase in Annual Prescription Drug Spending
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Figure 6.6 shows actual expenditure growth since the introduction of the Common Drug
Review (CDR) in 2004. Each category has predictably increased considerably with the
expansion of patent protections, drug volume, and proliferation of available technologies.
However, the public institutions seem to have managed this growth better than the private
sector.
Perhaps most pressing for the private sector is not its past capacity to constrain
spending but what it sees as future challenges as new “specialty medicines”339 come to

339

Specialty drugs are “medications used to treat chronic, complex conditions such as rheumatoid
arthritis, multiple sclerosis and cancer. Specialty drugs are usually costly, require special storage and
handling, need intensive clinical monitoring and require frequent dosing adjustment.” It was noted in 2015
that there were 7000 potential drugs under development, most of which were specialty drugs, and that by
2020 42% of private market drug spending will be in area. Express Scripts Canada, Drug Trend Report
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market. Insurance models are apparently unprepared to weather future shocks. By the
private insurance sector’s own admission, it has faced considerable challenges managing
exposure to high-cost drugs and looks to the future with considerable concern:
Rising drug costs, particularly related to the increasing incidence of rare
but very high cost drugs, undermines the ability of employers to
continue to offer drug coverage benefits to employees… Any long-term
solution to these challenges will require both public and private payers
to make adjustments to their programs and to work more
collaboratively going forward (CLHIA 2012).
Here the private sector is clearly aiming to align itself with the public institutions. This
concern over future costs is disputed. The brand pharmaceutical industry association
Rx&D340 noted in an analytical response to the Canadian Life and Health Insurance
Association (CLHIA) that private costs “will remain sustainable into the foreseeable
future” (Rx&D 2013).341 However, there can be no doubt that the private market has not
contained costs and future exposure to the same extent that public institutions have. The
public sector has institutional tools in place that can evolve to better deal with future
expenditure challenges in an evidence-based manner.
To address this perceived policy gap, the private insurance sector has attempted to
leverage public institutional capacity in three central ways. First, it has lobbied Canadian
policy makers to make more aggressive use of PMPRB’s price control powers (CLHIA
2016; CLHIA 2012). In particular, it requested that the PMPRB be tasked “to achieve the
lowest possible prices” as opposed to its legislated mandate to ensure that patented prices
are not “excessive.” The insurance industry has proposed that the PMPRB’s basket of

2015, accessed December 2, 2016, http://www.express-scripts.ca/sites/default/files/2015-Drug-TrendReport.pdf
340
This association is now called Innovative Medicines Canada.
341
It should be noted that this analysis only projected 2012- 2017 which is a reasonable time period
for a market that can change quickly with the introduction of new technologies.
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international reference countries should be amended to include lower cost OECD
jurisdictions for regulatory price comparison purposes. Also, it is suggested that the
frequency of product review be increased, to every 5 years, or when there are “material
changes in volume” of use for a particular drug. In perhaps the most direct signal of the
private insurers’ desire to harness the PMPRB’s power, it has recommended that the fivemember board “be required to include private insurer representation” (CLHIA 2012).
This would present a clear conflict of interest, but it is a very interesting indication of the
private sector’s desire to leverage public institutions.
Secondly, individual insurers have actively leveraged CADTH’s HTA review
processes. In 2011, former Ontario drug plan manager Helen Stevenson established the
‘Reformulary Group,’ a company that essentially tried to apply elements of public drug
plan management and HTA methodology to private plans through an “evidence-based
formulary.”342 Stevenson established her own expert committee similar to CADTH’s and
attracted a few insurer clients including Sun Life Financial. This appears to be the first
foray of Canada’s private market into public-style reimbursement mechanisms. However,
after 5 years in operation Reformulary had only attracted insurance plans totaling
110,000 lives as of September 2016.343
Other insurers have directly adopted CADTH reviews, making them a formal part
of some private plan reimbursement processes. In 2015, Canada’s largest private drug
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Reformulary Website, accessed September 22, 2016,
http://www.reformulary.com/index_en.php?page=our_team; Sun Life Financial, 2011, “Sun Life and
Reformulary Group announce strategic alliance to help lower drug costs for employers” Press release
December 15, 2011, accessed September 22, 2016, http://www.newswire.ca/fr/news-releases/sun-life-andreformulary-group-announce-strategic-alliance-to-help-lower-drug-costs-for-employers-509271751.html
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Reformulary Website, accessed September 22, 2016, http://www.reformulary.com/index_en.php
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insurer Manulife instituted the “Manulife Drug Watch” program. According to its
promotional material directed to plan sponsors (employers):
Drugs expected to impose a considerable financial cost on…drug
plan[s] will be placed On Watch and subjected to further review before
they can be considered for addition to [the] plan…Manulife will base
its evaluations on the publicly available information from the Canadian
Agency for Drugs and Technologies in Health (CADTH).344
Like the public system, this leverages negotiations with manufacturers based on
Manulife’s review of CADTH assessments.345 There is no available data on exactly how
CADTH information is used in this review process and it remains to be seen how closely
Manulife drug plans will harmonize with public plans. Harmonizing coverage standards
with public plans seems to be a long-term goal of the private sector and it has called for
public and private systems to jointly establish a common national minimum formulary
(CLHIA 2012, 28).
Third, the private sector has sought access to and participation in confidential
pan-Canadian Pharmaceutical Alliance (pCPA) product listing agreement negotiations
that make considerable use of CADTH’s HTA assessments. The private insurance sector
is opposed to the public insurance sector’s use of confidential PLAs that do not benefit
private plans and thus ultimately entail differential net pricing in Canada:
through the Council of the Federation's pan-Canadian bulk buying
alliance, the provinces have collaborated on negotiating PLAs…[the
PLA] process disadvantages private plans and those paying out-ofpocket by ultimately keeping prices high for those purchasing their drug
privately...to the degree that PLAs continue to be used by the provinces
in Canada, we believe that they should equally benefit private payers
and Canadians paying out-of-pocket (CLHIA 2012).

344

Manulife Website, accessed September 22, 2016, www.manulife.ca.
Introducing Manulife DrugWatch, accessed September 22, 2016, http://pointbreakcg.com/wpcontent/uploads/2015/09/DrugWatch-Brochure_GC2690-E.pdf
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250
It is not at all clear how public PLAs “keep” private insurer prices high. Sophisticated
insurance industry transnational corporations (TNCs) are more than capable of
negotiating their own deals with pharmaceutical TNCs, and need not rely on public
officials to secure lower prices. However, out-of-pocket patients would seem to be
disadvantaged in a system where major public and private payers can negotiate prices and
rebates to list prices.346 Unfortunately, there is no good data on the extent of those
uninsured for drug coverage in Canada. Large provinces such as Québec have universal
coverage and an individual insurance mandate. Other provinces have catastrophic drug
programs (Phillips 2016).
The private insurance industry’s lobbying (and the lobbying of other stakeholders)
has fallen on sympathetic ears in the Trudeau administration that took power in 2015. In a
2016 speech, the Federal Health Minister signalled she will move forward with many of
the same reforms advocated by the insurance industry including 1) PMPRB reform,
specifically referencing the influence of high US pricing in its international
benchmarking;347 2) establishing a common national formulary; and 3) even raising the
prospect of private plan inclusion in confidential pCPA negotiations. The federal
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One prominent patient organization has acknowledged this: “The question of different pricing
levels for public payers, private/corporate payers, and individual patients is important and warrants further
examination in light of current system realities. Currently, both private and public payers have tools
available to negotiate prices but individual payers do not. This is a hardship for individuals who don’t have
bulk buying power and could be viewed as discriminatory.” Best Medicines Coalition, Submission to the
PMPRB, October 2016, accessed January 30, 2017, http://www.pmprbcepmb.gc.ca/CMFiles/Consultations/Rethinking_the_Guidelines_2016/Submission_Best_Medicines_Coalti
on_Oct_2016.pdf).
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“We also need to review, and I think this is a very exciting area, the role of the regulatory body,
whose job it is to protect Canadians from excessive brand name drug prices. Right now you may know that
the Patented Medicines Prices Review Board is required to use as benchmarks for deciding the right
price…they are compared against some of the highest cost manufacturing jurisdictions in the world,
including the United States” Hon. Jane Philpott Speech, September 29, 2016, Ottawa.
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government itself only entered pCPA months earlier in 2016.348

While the private

insurance industry struggled for many years with lower institutional capacity, it now
seems poised to better leverage public institutions.
The prospect of PMPRB reform was also raised by the Board itself in 2014 when
it embarked on a year-long strategic planning process “for the next quarter century”
(PMPRB 2015c). The PMPRB recognized that the implementation of the Canada-EU
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) would require changes to the
Patent Act. The Board Chair used this as an opportunity to spark a process of renewal
that would see the PMPRB “reaffirm its consumer protection origins” (Ibid). As with past
trade treaty implementations, Canadian institutions seem poised to assert space for
themselves within the policy process. Many of the private insurance industry’s priorities
were also reflected in the PMPRB’s early response to the evolving international IP
environment. This was captured in a June 2016 discussion paper that kicked off a
PMPRB Guidelines reform process. Some of the many issues flagged for potential
reform by the PMPRB include: 1) price discrimination between payer types (i.e. public
versus private) due to public PLAs; 2) price ceilings revised with the passage of time (i.e.
regular price re-benchmarking or on launch of new therapeutic indications); 3) issues
related to pricing tests and which PMPRB7 international comparator countries should set
Canadian patented price ceilings;349 and 4) the important new role that CADTH plays in
pharmaceutical cost-effectiveness review based on therapeutic merits (PMPRB 2016).
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“I hope to explore with the provinces and territories ways to further look at the advantages of
bulk-buying and joint price negotiations which we are now doing across the country, saving now over $700
million a year, and the possibility of expanding that bulk-purchasing… negotiation to the private insurance
plans as well” Hon. Jane Philpott Speech, September 29, 2016, Ottawa.
349
The PMPRB made explicit reference to how US prices “skew the median [price] calculation”
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Figure 6.7: Institutional Layering and Capacity in the Canadian Public Market as
Compared to the Private Market
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In summary, the private insurance sector, the PMPRB, and the federal Minister of
Health all seem to be in general alignment on these points. The private market seems
poised to more fully leverage public institutions in the future. Figure 6.7 shows the
intricate layering and conversion for the institutions discussed to this point.

International Diffusion of Canadian Ideas and Cost-Effectiveness Institutions
This section discusses the international diffusion of Canadian ideas and the establishment
of comparable institutions internationally. As identified above, evidence of Canada’s
leadership on an international diffusion of evidence based medicine and HTA for
pharmaceuticals would tend to call into question a market power hypothesis and lend
support to an historical institutionalism hypothesis. Indeed, much of the OECD now uses
some form of HTA assessment as a basis for public decision-making on patented
pharmaceuticals (OECD 2008). Canada was a pioneer in evidence-based medicine and
cost-effectiveness reviews that diffused rapidly across the world through international
epistemic cooperation (Culyer 2013; Battista, public remarks, 2015; Hailey and Menon
1999; Sackett 2015). Australia was also an early adopter in 1992-93 and was the first
country to institute a mandatory HTA review for all new drugs considered for formulary
listing (Government of Australia 2009, 47). This was a mandatory process for all
manufacturer applications for funding, but like Canada, HTA decisions were non-binding
on government. As HTA spread internationally its methodologies, definitions of costs,
benefits, value,350 institutional structure, processes, outputs and proximity to funding
decision makers all varied to some extent. This examination illustrates an alternative
350

See Valérie Paris and Annalisa Belloni, “Value in Pharmaceutical Pricing,” OECD Health
Working Papers, No. 63, (Paris, OECD Publishing, 2013), accessed November 10, 2013,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k43jc9v6knx-en; Sorenson, Drummond and Kanavos (2008).
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model to the dominant image of regulatory standard-making as a function of solely
power. Standards arise in different path dependent ways and even small powers can have
significant influence through their ideas and through cooperation.
Sometimes HTA analysis relates strictly to comparative cost-effectiveness. Other
countries such as Sweden decided not to make coverage decisions based on specific costper-QALY thresholds but considered specific government budget impact assessments in
the decision making process (WHO 2015, 65; OECD 2008).351 The UK’s National
Institute of Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) was established in 1999 to conduct
HTA reviews, determine product availability and inform pricing within the National
Health Service (NHS). NICE functions internal to the government National Health
Service (NHS). Expert decisions are largely binding within the system. For example, if a
patented technology is recommended by NICE, NHS centers across the country must
provide it (PPRI 2015).
Other international HTA bodies are not as operationally close to government nor
are their decisions binding on government payers. What unifies international HTA
processes is their core function: HTA mediates demand for health technologies via expert
or scientific analysis. Cost-effectiveness is most often an explicit mandate for these
organizations and governments rely on their advice to mediate requests for funding from
both manufacturers and the public.
Dr. Tony Culyer was the inaugural Vice-Chair of NICE and an important figure in
the internationalization of HTA. For several years, he chaired NICE’s International
outreach activities and later was a member of CADTH’s Board. At a public presentation
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Canadian provinces also make extensive use of budget impact assessments submitted by
manufacturers.
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in 2013, Culyer commented on the centrality of Canadian ideas and methodologies to the
development of NICE, which quickly grew in capacity and prestige to become the
preeminent HTA body internationally:
NICE didn’t pioneer tremendously much, I don’t think, the
methodology of HTA…CADTH’s predecessor, CCOHTA was there
before NICE was ever invented, and in the early days we relied quite
heavily on the experience and the advice, and the guidance that the
Canadians had invented…Just as Canada invented evidence-based
medicine (Culyer 2013).352
Canada was clearly a catalyst for international policy learning. EBM principles and HTA
methodologies seem to have diffused organically through knowledge sharing and
international epistemic cooperation. Canada was not alone in this effort and was not even
the first globally to institute HTA for devices as both the US Congress and Sweden had
earlier HTA mechanisms in the 1980s (Banta and Jonsson 2009). However, cost-based
HTA was not applied to drugs in Sweden that were negotiated with its regulatory drug
Board, established as an independent body in 1990 (Jonsson and Banta 1995, 221).
Canada played a key role in the development of EBM and the international diffusion of
cost-based pharmaceutical HTAs. One 1997 assessment acknowledged the Canadian and
Australian system of cost-based HTA as leaders in comparison to those in Europe
(Drummond, Jönsson, and Rutten 1997).
Throughout CCOHTA’s (now CADTH’s) existence it has maintained strong
linkages with similar bodies developing internationally under various knowledge sharing
fora on assessment and methodology (CCOHTA 2003).353 For example, CCOHTA was
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From its creation in 1999 until 2003, Culyer was Vice-Chair of the National Institute for Health
and Clinical Excellence (NICE); he also served as Chair of NICE International and was a member of
CADTH’s Board.
353
International Information sharing fora include the International Network of Agencies for Health
Technology Assessment (INAHTA), a network of 52 global HTA agencies; the global scientific and
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fundamental to initiating and housing the first secretariat for the primary international
HTA knowledge-sharing forum, the International Network of Agencies for Health
Technology Assessment (INAHTA) (Hailey and Menon 1999). This forum and others
such as Health Technology Assessment International (HTAi) were preceded by
foundational epistemic societies and conferences within which Canadian academics also
played leadership roles (Banta, Jonsson, and Childs 2009).
Clearly there were normative, functional, and cooperative elements to this
diffusion. The idea that medical practice should be based on the best available evidence is
a critical norm that had achieved wide intuitive appeal. This spread through international
epistemic community dialogue. According to one student of international HTA
networking efforts, an important component of INAHTA’s success was “routine
interaction of its members with public sector decision makers” (Hailey 2009, 26). This is
not surprising given that HTA provided many useful tools for improving health outcomes
as well as managing government costs. By contrast, earlier networking initiatives ran into
resource issues and, while foundational, were not sustained as ongoing institutions
(Banta, Jonsson, and Childs 2009). It would seem that national institutional support from
government decision makers was a key success factor.
This makes sense given that advancements in medical science and the
proliferation of health technologies posed both opportunities and challenges to public
managers. TRIPS’ patent protections ensured that those innovations would be rewarded

professional society Health Technology Assessment International (HTAi) as well as the World Health
Organization Collaborating Centre for Pharmaceutical Pricing and Reimbursement Policies and its
networking and information-sharing initiative Pharmaceutical Pricing and Reimbursement Information
(PPRI). CCOHTA (now CADTH) is particularly active within INAHTA. For example, CADTH’s CEO
was also Chair of the INAHTA Board in 2016.
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but also would come at a financial cost. HTA helped to moderate the resulting increase in
demand for resources.
While developed in large part in Canada, the adoption of HTA was really a
country-specific process that was greatly influenced by established national health
systems, institutions, and power hierarchies.

One detailed assessment of HTA and

reimbursement mechanisms in Europe notes the context-specific nature of its adoption:
As one component in the broader health-care decision-making process,
HTA programmes typically reflect the current national policy landscape
such as the need to contain costs or improve access to a given
intervention or service… Almost all [European] countries require
assessments to ascertain reimbursement status, although they place
differing importance on the economic evidence…some reimbursement
committees may require assessments only for patented drugs and new
indications… Overall, health economic evidence appears to have the
most impact for decisions on drugs with broad use (thus, significant
potential budget impact) and when [cost–effectiveness] varies by
indication or patient sub population (Sorenson, Drummond and
Kanavos 2008, 12, 27).
In other words, HTA is used in different ways according to local preferences. The degree
to which cost-effectiveness analysis is used for cost-containment on patented drugs
reflects domestic decision making processes and circumstances.
This new, more technocratic and arms-length decision making framework
challenges existing hierarchies and places experts in a position of considerable power.
Naturally, different countries will respond to this in different ways depending on local
political and institutional factors. Consider Culyer’s candid remarks based on his
experience in helping the UK install a Canadian-inspired HTA framework:
How do you get an organization that in principle, if it’s not very
careful, could challenge and threaten pretty well every significant
player in the health care…scene? It looks like it might be a threat to
patients, because it gets set up as a kind of cost-constraining
organization. It threatens the professionals because they don’t like

258
being told what to do. It seems to infringe clinical freedoms, and so on.
It certainly looks like a threat to manufacturers who don’t really want
their stuff scrutinized to that extent. It threatens politicians in a way,
because some of the judgments that organizations like CADTH and
NICE make are essentially statements of social policy, and politicians
might think those decisions are more appropriately taken elsewhere,
than at arm’s length (Culyer 2013).
Culyer’s perspectives cut to the heart of the politics of these institutions. Despite
frequently including mechanisms for patient and clinician input and participation, HTA is
fundamentally a methodological assertion of social policy.
The inherently political nature of HTA entailed that its institutional adoption in
each country reflected the existing system to a considerable extent. In Canada’s case,
political decision-making was not usurped as the HTA process operates separately from
provincial reimbursement decisions. Provincial governments wanted to maintain full
authority over formulary listing decisions.
Some countries have made more aggressive use of HTA review in their own drug
listing processes. For example, New Zealand has used HTA as a basis for other policy
tools such as reference-based pricing (RBP) and used sole-source tendering for generics
following patent expiry. Reference based pricing essentially forces all prices in a
therapeutic class to the lowest price in that class.354 These can be organized into subgroups of the class, based on the level of therapeutic value. Sole-source tendering is
applied when governments actually purchase technologies through a competitive bidding
process. Tendering is typically opposed by both generic and brand industries as
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New Zealand PHARMAC Website, accessed September 5, 2016,
http://www.pharmac.govt.nz/medicines/how-medicines-are-funded/new-funding-applications/; RBP is also
used in some Canadian provinces such as British Columbia for select drug categories.
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restricting choice.355 Canadian governments have instead opted for inter-jurisdictional
price negotiations for patented drugs, and “tiered” price setting for generics.356
Regardless of the specific reimbursement mechanisms used internationally, most employ
some sort of therapeutic referencing and Canadian-style cost-effectiveness analysis.
These methods are prominent in single payer and welfare-state nations in the EU,
and notably the UK. The US provides an interesting alternative example. In 1972, the US
was one of the first nations to conduct economic ‘technology assessments’ for
Congressional decision making when establishing the Office for Technology
Assessment.357 However, this and a variety of other early assessment bodies in the US
have had only a “limited and indirect” impact on the health care system (Battista and
Hodge 1995, 292). These mechanisms were not similar in function and proximity to
health decision-making to those that developed in Canada, Australia and Europe. The US
differs from many HTA frameworks in that “comparative effectiveness” is the primary
focus. Comparative cost-effectiveness is more of an implicit factor given the legislative
hurdles that US Congress built into Medicare reform:
Comparative Effectiveness Research (CER) is the term used to describe
the new $1.1 billion initiative funded in the US as part of the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act 2009 (i.e. the fiscal stimulus measures
enacted in response to the global financial crisis)…Comparative
355

In response to signals by the Council of the Federation regarding tendering, the Canadian Generic
Pharmaceutical Association (CGPA) Commissioned a paper in 2012 on the risks associated with that
policy. While the Brand industry certainly disagreed with what the risks are, it is also typically opposed to
tendering: Paul Grootendorst and Aidan Hollis, “Tendering Generic Drugs: What are the Risks?” study
commissioned by the Canadian Generic Pharmaceutical Association (October 2012) accessed June 10,
2013, http://www.canadiangenerics.ca/en/news/docs/10.24.12%20Tendering%20Generic%20Drugs%20%20What%20Are%20the%20Risks_FINAL.pdf
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See discussion above. Council of the Federation, “Canada’s Provinces and Territories Realize
Real Savings in Healthcare through Collaboration” July 26, 2013 press release, accessed September 5,
2016, http://www.conseildelafederation.ca/en/latest-news/13-2013/339-canada-s-provinces-and-territoriesrealize-real-savings-in-healthcare-through-collaboration
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This office was defunded and closed in 1995. Princeton University Maintains a Web Archive of
its work, accessed November 2, 2016, https://www.princeton.edu/~ota/
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Effectiveness is the systematic appraisal of the benefits and risks of
alternative treatments and other health care interventions (e.g.
screening). The inclusion of costs in the appraisal is not explicit.
Although some have argued that it is implicit and will lead to cost
driven decision making, others point out that Medicare is prohibited by
legislation from considering relative costs in the reimbursement
decisions.358
In 2010, Congress established a permanent institution, the Patient-Centered Outcomes
Research Institute (PCORI), to guide these federal investments (Ali, Hanger, and Carino
2011). PCORI is a public-private governed institute funded by an additional $1.26 billion
Congressional appropriation over 9 years (2010-2019) and also sustained by mandatory
fees to health plans and Medicare beneficiaries (Ibid).
The separation of cost from comparative effectiveness research in the US would
seem to imply domestic path dependence. Both the market orientation of US institutions
and a political aversion to a strong federal role in directing health care decisions have
provided considerable ammunition for opponents of federal CER initiatives.359 Canadian
and European cost-effectiveness analysis institutions are cited in the US Congressional
discourse opposing PCORI, even in its more limited role restricted to non-cost based
analysis (CER-only).360 There was considerable Congressional debate on cost-based
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Centre for Health Economics Research and Evaluation, University of Technology Sydney
“Reducing the use of ineffective health care interventions,” Working paper 2010/5 for the New South
Wales Treasury, accessed July 10, 2013, http://www.chere.uts.edu.au/pdf/wp2010_5.pdf.
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For example, Senior Senate Republicans have consistently fought against such a federal role:
“[The Medicare Prescription Drug Price Negotiations Act of 2007 contains] a provision authorizing
consideration of comparative clinical effectiveness studies in developing and reviewing formularies under
the Medicare prescription drug program…This is the first step of a dance the Democrats want to do called
‘cutting in on the relationship between doctors and patients.’ Decisions about what drugs patients should
take should be made by doctors and patients. I think we should keep the Government out of the exam
room.” Senator Mike Enzi (R-WY), Congressional Record, Senate Vol 153, Pt. 7, April 18, 2007: 9107.
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See statements by: Senate Minority Whip, Senator Jon Kyl (R-AZ), Congressional Record,
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HTA. Existing international HTA institutions were framed in strongly negative terms to
discourage its adoption in the US:
NICE is notorious for delaying or outright denying access to health care
treatments based on comparative effectiveness research that takes into
account the cost of the treatment and the Government’s appraisal of the
worth of the patient’s life or comfort…[PCORI] will be the American
version of NICE, using CER to save the government money by
rationing health care. We tried very hard in the [Health, Education,
Labor & Pensions] Committee to insert one word, ‘prohibit,’ that CER
could not be used in any way for cost containment…It was talked about
for 2 or 3 days, and then in a very partisan decision, ‘prohibit’ became a
thing of the past.361
Ultimately, however, cost-based CER was indeed rejected by Congress. The final version
of the Affordable Care Act 2010 explicitly prevented cost-effectiveness analysis and its
incorporation into Medicare decision-making.362 Canadian and UK-style methodologies
regarding “dollars per-quality adjusted life year” were expressly prohibited.
Canadian ideas found favorable homes in Europe and the UK but were strongly
opposed in the US.363 While the US did install institutions that were notionally similar,
policy reflected domestic preferences and market structure. Like the international
adoption of US IP norms, the international diffusion of Canadian ideas and cost-based
pharmaceutical review institutions substantially reflected local institutional realities and
path dependence.
361
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Clinical Effectiveness Research: “The Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute established under
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This more organic model of regulatory design provides an alternative to dominate
ideas in the IPE literature that stress power. In an elegant and admittedly appealing
argument, Drezner (2007) has posited that
great powers [who] oversee large internal markets remain the primary
actors writing the rules that regulate the global economy…The key
variable affecting global regulatory outcomes is the distribution of
interests among the great powers…Smaller state and nonstate actors in
the international system do not affect regulatory outcomes, but they do
affect the processes through which coordination is attempted (Drezner
5, 2007).
There is certainly some truth to this when considering large structural institutions that
may require size and critical mass to sustain. Drezner does provide considerable
additional nuance to his argument not reflected in this quote, particularly on the role of
domestic governance. However, the approach does not sufficiently account for the realworld intersection and integration of global regulatory standards with local politics and
institutions. Smaller actors can have a material impact on regulatory outcomes, even if
their regulatory approaches and methodologies are not codified or centralized as a formal
regime. Institutions and behaviour constraints can also be informal. Standard diffusion is
not always nor entirely a function of size and the distribution of interests among great
powers.364 The diffusion of evidence-based medicine and HTA suggests that market
power is insufficient to evaluate regulatory design and international policy diffusion.
Historical institutionalism provides a valuable alternative lens.

364

There is also level of analysis issue to be considered. International regulatory standards are only
what sovereign nations make of them.
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Conclusion
When it comes to implementation of international treaties, states are not unitary actors.
Some parts of the bureaucracy are concerned with the technical details of meeting trade
commitments in law. Others actively assess the domestic impacts of legislative changes
and implement their own related, but separate policies to manage those changes.365 This
chapter examined institutional repellence and resistance somewhat removed from
Canada’s international trade and intellectual property diplomacy. It argued that to manage
growing costs associated with patented technologies, Canada fostered and repurposed
evidence-based medicine and health technology assessment institutions. The sequencing
of institutional capacity development was critical to success in this effort.
HTA added an institutional layer onto earlier pricing regulation institutions for
patented products. Canadian HTA institutions have mitigated the practical market
exclusivity provided by the international IP regime by using cost-effectiveness analysis
and epistemic expertise to narrow the public procurement market for IP protected
products. Canada’s public procurement negotiation framework further entrenched the
centrality of HTA analysis, and added an additional institutional layer on an already
dense institutional complex. Provinces use HTA as a tool to set the parameters and
starting point for negotiations with manufacturers of patented medicines. HTA is also
used to justify simply ‘saying no’ to funding requests, or screening out a number of
technologies available to the publicly-insured population.
365

Industry Canada officials have acknowledged this in internal briefing communications: “From
1988 to 2002, R&D investment in Canada by pharma MNEs increased most likely because of major IP
changes that were made (1987 and 1993) and the negotiated agreement that accompanied these changes,
even as the revenue gains for pharmaceutical companies were at least partially mitigated by federal and
provincial price controls and increasingly restrictive formularies.” John Connell, Associate Assistant
Deputy Minister, Industry Canada, “Advice to the Senior Associate Deputy Minister,” November 8 2011 Secret – CCM 227176.

264
Canadian private markets have recognized the power of these interrelated
institutions and their own comparative lack of existing capacity. Despite a notional ability
to go the free-market route to controlling patented drug costs, the private insurance sector
in Canada has instead opted to pursue the path laid by public institutions. Private insurers
increasingly attempted to access and leverage public institutional power.
Institutional layering and conversion also reverberated internationally. Canadian
policy innovations in this area diffused through epistemic cooperation and policy
learning. Like the diffusion and implementation of trade-related IP protections, the
diffusion of compensatory HTA was a country-specific process that ultimately reflected
existing domestic preferences and institutions. Even the US system adopted similar tools
under Obamacare. However, the power of those tools within the actual procurement
process was significantly diminished.

The experience in Canada, and particularly

Canada’s HTA policy protégé the UK, was used to raise fears about rationing and
dissuade US Congress from adopting cost-based HTA evaluations.
The adoption and international proliferation of evidence-based medicine norms
and HTA institutions is significant from a theory perspective. Market power suggest that
international regulations should be a function of power and that small states should have
little role to play in the design of standards. This work shows that there are productive
alternative ways to think about regulatory standard-making where domestic processes are
better integrated as part of the outcome metric. Without denying that market power often
matters, it is argued that the role of domestic institutions and policy feedbacks are
essential and should not be discounted. The innovations of small states can affect
regulatory outcomes even if the method of doing so is different from when large states
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propagate standards. Furthermore, it is notable that these innovations can serve as a
counterweight to other standards favored by powerful actors. This analysis shows that
key historical institutionalist ideas of institutional change such as layering and conversion
can be significant in an IPE context (Thelen 2003). HI feedbacks within the procurement
system should not be ignored.
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Chapter 7 – Conclusions and Next Steps

This dissertation addresses the research question: are dominant theories of international
political economy such as “market power” sufficient to explain the design and
implementation of international intellectual property standards? The dissertation focuses
on trade-related intellectual property rights and argues that powerful standard-makers do
not unilaterally establish international regulatory standards. Even highly dependent
standard-takers can significantly shape international regulatory outcomes and protect
domestic institutional sovereignty. Market power is an important factor but is not
sufficient to explain trade-related regulatory agreements and associated institutions. Other
theoretical frameworks such as historical institutionalism (HI) help to create a more
accurate and nuanced picture of state preferences and policy processes. The current
literature on trade and international regulatory regimes is incomplete and must consider
factors beyond negotiations. International regimes establish consistent standards to
facilitate cooperation and predictability. However, their primary function is often to
shape domestic laws and regulations. International agreements arise out of, and are
inseparable from, domestic economic regulation. Existing regulatory standards lay a path
for future standards. Domestic institutions and the politics of implementation are thus
integral to international regulatory outcomes.

Historical Institutionalism in IPE
The application of historical institutionalism to international political economy (IPE) is a
relatively new and contested approach (Farrell and Newman 2010; Drezner 2010). When
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implementing trade-related regulatory regimes, international standards clash with
entrenched domestic standards creating policy feedbacks. Feedback is a core concept
from historical institutionalism that views past policy decisions as constraining future
outcomes through path-dependence: “when policy creates politics” (Pierson 2004).
Established institutions and entrenched actors adapt to changing circumstances through
institutional layering. Existing institutions are also converted to address new policy
challenges.
The dissertation argues that these policy feedbacks can repel and resist new
international standards and reinforce domestic power to a surprising extent. It examines
the negotiation and implementation of trade-related intellectual property standards and
identifies different varieties of policy feedback. These include regulatory, judicial,
procurement, and international relations feedbacks. It shows that institutional feedback
and sequencing dynamics can significantly shape policy outcomes.

Canada as a Critical Case
This dissertation employs the Canada-US relationship as a critical case for the market
power hypothesis. Canada is a critical case due to overwhelming trade dependence on the
US and the critical link between IP and trade. Given Canada’s overwhelming trade
dependence, we would expect market power to be the most important driver of outcomes
in the Canada-US trade relationship. However, Canadian institutions shaped the
negotiation of trade and regulatory agreements and the final domestic regime produced
when implementing those agreements. This process had a legacy effect for future
international agreements. Canadian policy feedbacks preserved and reinforced a strong
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role for existing institutions as the trade context evolved and as regulatory standards
progressed over multiple agreements.
A foundational “policy that created politics” was Canada’s pre-TRIPS
compulsory licensing regime. This 1920s-era regime modeled after British law was
significantly expanded in 1969 to drive down pharmaceutical prices through the granting
of compulsory import licenses. The policy facilitated the growth and consolidation of a
powerful Canadian generic pharmaceutical industry. These domestic interests found
alignment with sub-national provincial government purchasers of patented technologies.
The interest coalition has since significantly shaped intellectual property (IP) policy
including Canada’s negotiation and implementation of international treaties.
Canada implemented US-style IP rights to promote domestic research and
development (R&D) as a critical concession for broader trade liberalization with the US.
However, at the domestic institutional level Canada has consistently resisted and
mitigated the full extent of those protections. Feedbacks within the regulatory, judicial,
and procurement systems introduced important constraints to global IP standards. These
implementation constraints (see Figure 6.1 for an overview) and layering and conversion
strategies (see Figure 6.7) demonstrate how historical institutionalism can be a more
effective framework for analysis than market power in some cases.
Chapter 3 discussed the establishment and evolution of Canada’s powerful
regulatory price control institution, the Patented Medicines Prices Review Board
(PMPRB). A market power approach would not predict Canada’s ability to powerfully
shape this institution to constrain the impact of patent protection. Yet time and again, the
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PMPRB has been leveraged and shaped in response to evolving trade-related IP
standards.
A key feature of the regulatory institution was its flexibility and open-ended
powers. This has allowed it to evolve and adapt as the trade-related IP context changes
over time. PMPRB powers were protected by Canadian officials in the multilateral trade
negotiation and the institution was strengthened in the context of NAFTA
implementation. In 2017, the PMPRB is again being strengthened to further protect
consumers from patented pharmaceutical prices and in the context of new IP protections
under the Canada-EU Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA).
Chapter 4 showed how other regulatory feedbacks critically shaped Canada’s
implementation of US-style patent linkage provisions. Market power theory would
predict that standard-taker nations simply adopt the more powerful standard-maker’s
regulatory approach. Partial diffusion or the implementation of significant policy
mitigations would suggest that a market power explanation is not complete. Patent
linkage is a key innovator protection, however Canada implemented this narrowly in
comparison to US standards and in comparison to other policies that constrain IP
protections, such as price controls (see Figure 4.1).
Implementation of this policy produced a Canada-specific litigation mechanism
and a significantly diminished regime in comparison to US Hatch-Waxman Act standards.
The path forged by the US system of patent linkage was only partially exported to
Canada. It clashed with a domestic path, legal institutions and an institutionalized interest
coalition. Regulatory feedbacks continue to shape the patent linkage regime. Protections
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were diminished following stakeholder lobbying in the late 1990s. Furthermore, in 2017
the regime will be fully overhauled in the contemporary CETA implementation context.
Chapter 5 examined feedbacks in the judicial system that have significantly
narrowed the very definition of patentable utility in Canada and thus constrained the full
impact of international treaty language. As a state-level approach, market power is not
well suited for considering dynamics within the black box of the state. As such, it does
not hold much insight on the affairs of domestic judicial institutions, despite their clear
importance on patentability outcomes and the interpretation of domestic law.
Feedbacks in the judicial systems have created cross-national divergence on
patentability outcomes and have significantly impacted Canada’s international relations
with the US. The judicial branch has constrained the practical extent of market
exclusivity provided by the international intellectual property regime. Canadian legal
institutions are shown to be resilient in the face of international regulatory standards and
bilateral pressure to address Canada-specific patent invalidations under the promise
doctrine. Market power and “naming and shaming” by powerful US state actors have
negligible importance at the legal institutional level.
Finally, Chapter 6 examined policy feedbacks related to Canada’s procurement
regime for health products. Canadian policy actors have adopted strategies to limit
government market exposure to expanded IP protections. Market power predicts that
small standard-takers would not be effective in significantly mitigating trade
commitments that are contrary to the interests of larger market powers. Contrary to this
perspective, Canadian institutions were converted to provide a rigorous review process
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that would help governments determine what patented technologies would be available in
Canada, and at what price.
The success of these public institutions has attracted the attention of Canadian
private insurers who have attempted to harness this public institutional capacity. The
ideas and methodologies that Canada developed were very also successful and spread
internationally through epistemic community cooperation. Canada was particularly
important in informing the development and approach of UK institutions. Similar
institutions now help to mitigate the impacts of IP protections and patented
pharmaceuticals in many international jurisdictions. In other words, domestic policy
feedbacks have reach and impact beyond domestic politics. Canada’s repellence
feedbacks reverberated internationally. Contrary to market power predictions, small
states can significantly impact regulatory outcomes. However, in keeping with an HI
perspective, policy tools diffused in various path dependent ways reflecting existing
domestic institutions.

This mechanism of policy diffusion offers an alternative to

diffusion based on imposition of standards under market power or naming and shaming. .

Contribution
This dissertation makes both theoretical and empirical contributions. It offers a new way
of thinking about international trade and regulatory regimes by temporally extending the
dependent variable. Agreement is only the starting point for a much longer policy
process that includes implementation and related policy feedbacks. Trade agreements are
historically cumulative and new agreements tend to grow from domestic regulations and
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past agreements.366 As such, the dependent variable should be the regulatory regime “in
domestic practice” rather than “as negotiated.”
From a theory perspective, this dissertation addresses a central criticism of
historical institutionalism. Critics argue that HI is most aligned with “reinforcing” policy
feedbacks and that the existence of “resistance” and “repellence” would tend to
undermine the approach. The dissertation shows that “reinforcement” is not the only
dynamic that supports HI when resistance and repellence are rooted in path dependent
domestic policy choices and institutions. In a sense, they are a dynamic of the broader
reinforcing domestic feedback process.367 In such cases, resistance and repellence do not
undermine the framework, but rather significantly support it.
While it is tempting for the purposes of theoretical parsimony to privilege market
power, this can obfuscate important nuance and determinants of policy outcomes. States
are not unitary actors. Policy is complicated. It is increasingly difficult to separate out
international politics from domestic regulation. The conventional notion is that
international regimes are about constraining state actor activity in the international
sphere. However, this dissertation illustrates how regulatory regimes are also about
influencing domestic behaviour and regulation. International trade is fundamentally about
domestic economic policy.
This dissertation shows that we must look beyond market power to fully
understand international IP standards. Historical institutionalism helps to inform a more
representative picture of how international regulatory standards are designed and take
366

A practical illustration of this is that trade negotiations are structured around issue chapters that
build off of the same framework as issue chapters from past agreements. They tend to update those
previously agreed standards.
367
Trade liberalization and globalization is not some permanent end state-of-being. The legacy of
domestic institutions and politics continue to feedback in response to globalism.
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shape. The dissertation does not suggest that one framework or theory is most
appropriate.

Power factors and institutional factors tend to combine to produce

outcomes. Ultimately, a pluralist lens in needed to reflect causal combinations as well as
the possibility of equifinality.
In mediating between market power and HI, the dissertation helps to show how
multiple theoretical perspectives can be combined to explain outcomes. Market power is
a good starting point to contextualize regime incentives but institutional power cannot be
abstracted away from the analysis.

As indicated, the dissertation addresses a core

criticism of HI identified in the literature. It shows that ‘repellence’ can be consistent
with path dependence.
From an empirical perspective, it contributes a detailed account of IP-specific
trade and regulatory policy through substantial archival research and unique elite
interviews. It shows a side to policy making that is not already captured in the
negotiations literature. The dissertation puts the technical disciplines of price regulation,
intellectual property law, and health economics in their proper political context. These
empirical areas will be completely new to many IPE scholars. The combination of
perspectives and diverse spheres of knowledge amalgamated within an IPE framework is
original and helps to fill acknowledged gaps in the literature on IP and trade agreement
implementation (Sell 2010). Scholars in the technical disciplines of IP law and health
economics will also be interested in its empirical contributions and the historical
chronology that ties this political analysis together.
For example, the study of trade negotiations is often agent-centric (actor and
personality-driven) and can gloss over the very important details of integration into
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domestic law and politics. Similarly, while Canada’s patent linkage regime and the
“promise doctrine” are well known by IP law practitioners, its sources and trade-related
context is not robustly addressed in that literature. It is identified and branded as “judgemade law,” but is not really explained. The promise doctrine is as much an international
relations issue as it is a domestic legal issue.
Similarly, the technical and highly positivist discipline of health economics
typically aims to remove politics from decision-making. Politics do not typically factor
into the narratives of the discipline. However, politics are absolutely central to its very
purpose and current function. Arguably, Health Technology Assessment (HTA) only
enjoys its current prominence in the policy discourse due its functional role in curbing
drug costs created by trade-related IP reforms. Yet politics, trade, and IP are rarely given
consideration by the HTA community.
Finally, this dissertation has implications for the study of regimes in other issue
areas. The sources, implementation, and impacts of regimes should be assessed together.
Negotiation outcomes and “win sets” need to be reassessed following implementation
and with the benefit of real-world experience under the regime. Those who wish to
design successful international regimes should consider implications and potential
barriers due to domestic politics and entrenched institutionalized interests. Future regimes
could include specific provisions and protocol for domestic implementation to ensure
final regulatory outcomes reflect what was negotiated. Nullification or impairment
provisions368 have not been used for intellectual property matters. However, due to the
power of domestic path dependence we might reasonably want to consider their use in
368

For example, provisions that provide remedies for damage to a country’s benefits and
expectations from membership in an international regime due to another country’s change of policy or
failure to carry out agreed upon obligations under the regime. This language mirrors the WTO conception.
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other regime issue areas. This could help prevent indirect shirking on commitments, and
ultimately, promote successful cooperation.

Limitations
As acknowledged by past work, historical institutionalism is not well suited to
‘predictive’ insights, particularly over the longer run (Farrell and Newman 2010, 619). HI
is often backward-looking and therefore other factors are needed to fully explain change.
Those who point out that the predicted effects of path dependence are too powerful
clearly have a point (Drezner 2010, 795). Public policy is not a QWERTY keyboard.369
The QWERTY keyboard has value as a conceptual heuristic, but should not be mistaken
as the basis for a positive law. Technological progress cannot be explained solely by
looking at the legacy of past technologies. Similarly, policy innovation cannot be
explained solely by looking at past policies.
This research supports the central HI prediction that feedbacks will tend to reflect
embedded actor interests where they have proximity to regulatory decision making
processes (Ferrell and Newman 2010, 620).370 However, this dissertation suggests that
proximity is not the full story and feedbacks also tend to have functional and normative
elements. For example, we might predict that policy actors will be more successful when
helping to achieve practical state problems such as economic development or budgetary
369

The example of the QWERTY keyboard is raised as a key illustration of path dependence.
QWERTY is the universal English language computer keyboard today, but is not as ergonomic or optimal
as potential alternatives. QWERTY was used for early typewriters for mechanical reasons, and it has
endured as the standard due to path-dependence. New generations of technology incorporated the previous
standard, which had a reinforcing effect.
370
Specifically, Farrell and Newman (2010) note: “We may predict that where policy feedback
loops have occurred, variation in states’ preferences over existing institutional bargains will depend on
which interest groups have succeeded in becoming embedded in the relevant regulatory decision making
structures. Those interest groups that have succeeded in embedding themselves within the relevant
institutional frameworks will unsurprisingly use their advantageous position to pursue regulatory policies
that favor them.” (620).
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cost control. This was the case for both the generic pharmaceutical industry and the HTA
epistemic community.
Perhaps we are examining the wrong predictive question by asking, “where and
when will feedbacks happen?” Historical feedback is present in every facet of human and
social life. History is the venue where actors negotiate the future. History is the
foundation that determines the distribution of actor resources. Self-reinforcing feedback
is a continuous phenomenon. Perhaps a more relevant predictive question for future
evaluation is “when will policy feedbacks really matter as an independent source of
power?” It is clear that feedbacks will matter when they are associated with a powerful
nation with the capacity to project power globally (Sell 2010). This dissertation suggests
that feedbacks are also likely to be important where there is an exogenous global
challenge to domestic sovereignty, a given social bargain, or a fundamental distribution
of resources. Furthermore, ideas and institutions that are useful in insulating domestic
actors from exposure to the international market are likely to diffuse organically for
functional reasons. This contrasts with extant narratives of policy diffusion that focus on
a powerful actor leveraging market power to impose its will. This is only a subset of the
mechanisms of regulatory policy diffusion.
Another potential limitation is what some HI-purists might view as an inherent
conflict between HI and process tracing,371 despite their frequent pairing. HI aims to
study longer-run causes and long-run outcomes from an historical perspective. It focuses
on macro-historical trends and aims to avoid getting bogged down in agent-based
accounts or policy micromechanisms. Process tracing methodology, on the other hand, is
often used to evaluate causal mechanisms associated with shorter-run policy and
371

See Pierson (2004).
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decision-making processes. As such, a temporal compromise to balance theory and
method seems appropriate. This dissertation avoids overemphasis of micromechanisms
within an individual trade negotiation. It has attempted to achieve balance by looking at
policy processes over a longer time horizon for both the independent and dependent
variables. However, it has stopped well short of macro-historical analysis so as to
maintain relevance to contemporary policy processes.
A third potential limitation is empirical. While capturing many interesting
interview insights, the topics under study are now somewhat dated and this impacted the
ability to do many interviews. For example, some of those most associated with Canada’s
early Evidence Based Medicine and Health Technology Assessment institutions such as
David Sackett and Jill M. Sanders have passed on. Also, much of the subject matter
herein is legal in nature. Government lawyers were expressly reluctant to comment on
confidential subject matter.

When embarking on this research it was thought,

erroneously, that this time gap would actually help to mute the political nature of the
subject matter. However, even after several decades some officials contacted for
interviews still did not feel comfortable commenting on this highly political subject
matter, or would not do so with attribution. It is surprising how political these topics
remain, decades later.372 The now obvious reason for the political sensitivity is that these
same issues and institutions (PMPRB; the patent linkage regime and dual litigation;
patent term restoration) are among the most central political topics in the current trade
and regulatory context. The dissertation illustrates that these issues never really went
away.

372

A relatively low 29% interview request success rate actually supports the central thesis by
helping to illustrate that these political sensitivities persist over multiple agreements.
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Nevertheless, this study was primarily based on archival research, information
obtained under the Access to Information Act, unpublished statements by officials and
material from a wide range of sources in the public domain. Supplemental interviews
were also highly instructive and the research was successfully advanced by many critical
insights shared on an anonymous basis. Unlike negotiations, the written historical record
on many of these issues, including implementation, case law, and institutional history, is
actually quite good. Policy analysis in this area proved to be more a matter of “learning
where to look.”
One additional question that might arise in readers’ minds is the actual extent of
the constraints provided by each of the various institutional layers discussed.373 After all,
the popular media is full of narratives regarding expensive drugs. Canada’s drug
spending (including non-patented generic drugs and mark-ups by wholesalers and
pharmacies) are indeed among the highest internationally in per-capita terms. If Canadian
price regulators are indeed powerful, why were Health Technology Assessment and
purchasing institutions even necessary?
It should be remembered that the PMPRB was always designed to hold prices to
the median of rich industrial countries, and was explicitly intended to lock in Canadian
patented drug prices at around 80% of US prices.374 As of 2015, Canadian patent drug
prices were nowhere near this benchmark. According to the PMPRB, the average price
ratio at market exchange rates for Canada was 1.00 to 2.70 in the United States,375 or
373

See Figure 6.1 for an illustration of “magnitude” at various institutional levels.
Harvie Andre, Second Reading of Bill C-22, House of Commons Debates, November 20, 1986,
1372, accessed October 15, 2016, http://parl.canadiana.ca/view/oop.debates_HOC3302_01/1374?r=0&s=1
375
PMPRB Annual Report 2015. Canada still has among the highest drug expenditures per capita
internationally, but US patented drug prices are well above Canada and the rest of the world. For this
reason, it is significant that the PMPRB uses a median price test rather than an average. Another point to
note is that the PMPRB does not have access to confidential rebates noted in Chapter 6, nor data on rebates
374
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36% of US prices. The PMPRB also plays an important price stability role to prevent
large price increases that would otherwise be possible under unrestricted patent
protection.376 Fundamentally, the institution is incredibly powerful but has not been used
aggressively to drive prices down over time. This essential insight has been clearly
articulated by Health Minister Jane Philpott when signalling to Canadians that she intends
to adopt a more activist approach:
I’m working quite determinedly with organizations within Canada that set
the prices of prescription medications. It’s a little known fact that actually
we have a lot of control over that. That with a few regulatory changes and
guidance changes for this organization that does the price review on
pharmaceuticals we can actually dramatically lower the cost of
prescription drugs.377
In other words, Canada has the power it needs to further constrain drug costs under
existing legislation (as implemented under its trade deals).
In contrast to politically popular positioning on “out of control” drug costs,
Canada has actually significantly constrained the impact of patented pharmaceuticals.
According to the PMPRB, patented drug sales at the factory gate were $15.2 billion in
2015. This is only 52% of the total $29.2 billion in prescription drug spending reported
by the Canadian Institute for Health Information (CIHI).378 The top-line prescription
drugs spending figure is used in international spending-per-capita comparisons and thus
informs much of the basis for the expensive drugs narrative in Canada. The other half of
spending is on non-patented generic prescription drugs, which are known to be among the

in most other countries. International price comparisons are fraught with challenges. PMPRB comparative
analyses based on list prices are sufficient as general indicators but should be treated with caution. In
particular, policy makers should get a better sense of actual health system cost-drivers before devising
future policy.
376
In 2014, Canadian prices were closer to 41% of US prices. US prices are not controlled as they
are in Canada.
377
Jane Philpott, CBC program The Fifth Estate “Canada’s Drug Problem” January 13, 2017.
378
CIHI data as cited above; PMPRB Annual Report 2015.
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highest priced in the world,379 and middlemen mark-ups at the wholesaler and pharmacy
industry level. Pharmacist compensation (distribution profit) is hidden in the prescription
drug cost line item. This is depicted in Figure 7.1. Canada’s “drug problem” is really a
market design and market fragmentation problem.380
Figure 7.1: Patented Drugs Comprise 52% of Total Prescription Drug Spending (Billions)381
Total Prescription Drug Spending: $29.2 Billion (2015)

Other Components
of Prescription
Drug Spending:
Generic Drugs;
Mark-ups; Pharmacy
Margins
(Provincial
Jurisdiction)

Patented Drug
Costs: ExFactory Sales
(Prices
Regulated
Federally by the
PMPRB)

Additionally, Canada is not a single payer market. Institutionalized market
fragmentation between public and private, and between provinces entails that Canada’s
pharmaceutical market is much more similar to the US pharmaceutical market than to
single payers in Europe. Some of the excess in Canada’s overall drug spending is due to a
lack of HTA and negotiation institutions on the private side of the market. This strongly
supports the institutional thesis advanced herein rather than undermining it in any way.
Similarly, the fact that other jurisdictions have used Canadian ideas and other institutions
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PMPRB, Genrics360, Generic Drugs in Canada, 2014, February 2016, accessed April 2, 2017,
http://www.pmprb-cepmb.gc.ca/view.asp?ccid=1233&lang=en#exec
380
Even those most critical of high per-capita drug spending in Canada acknowledge the central
issues of a multi-payer “patch-work” system and comparatively higher generic drug prices. Morgan et al.
(2017) note that the price of high volume generic drugs are 47% lower in the US, 60% lower in Sweden
and 84% lower in New Zealand (Morgan, Li, Yau, and Persaud 2017).
381
CIHI, National Health Expenditure Trends, 1975 to 2015, data tables, accessed September 22,
2016, https://www.cihi.ca/sites/default/files/document/nhex_2015_datatables_en.zip; PMPRB Annual
Report 2015.
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more aggressively to constrain their total expenditures does not undermine the
significance of Canadian efforts. And as Canada moves in the context of new IP
protections under CETA to further constrain drug costs through PMPRB reform in 2017,
the significance and inherent power of Canadian institutions has become all that more
apparent. Time and again, Canada’s domestic institutions significantly narrow the
practical extent of market exclusivity provided by the international IP regime. Powers to
regulate were protected through exemptions to nullification or impairment that Canada
was careful secure (see chapter 3). Canadian courts have consistently upheld the
constitutionality of the federal government’s right to regulate patented drug prices. New
institutional layers have been employed to further enhance Canada’s capacity in this
regard.

Future Research
There are two principle avenues where this study can help to inform future research:
Opportunities to apply the framework to other regime issue areas; and, opportunities to
extend the research over space and time. This dissertation has presented a “varieties of
policy feedback” framework may be useful as a guide for analysis of trade agreements
and regimes in other issue areas.

For example, when evaluating an international

agreement, analysts could ask a series of questions: How is the force and effect of the
new rules impacted by their implementation?; How does implementation alter the
conception of “winning” the negotiation?; Is this influenced by regulation, case law,
procurement, or international relations feedbacks?; How do domestic interests and actors
react?; What strategies do they adopt to manage change? Answering these questions will
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help IPE and regime theory better account for the real-world institutional drivers of
policy.
IPE and regime scholarship has been driven by the foundational problem in
international relations: “how order emerges from anarchy.” However, contemporary
global regulatory problems suggest a shift in focus may be needed. The more
contemporary root problem of importance is “how can nations successfully address
pressing global problems?” The dissertation assesses how global regulatory initiatives
interact with local institutions. This is a first step to understanding barriers to success and
how to design better regulatory systems that can accommodate existing domestic
institutional realities. To be successful, we must consider the practical intersection of
global standards and domestic institutions.
Secondly, this research could be extended over space and time. Recent events in
the United States have called into question the future of US-led rules-based international
trade. The Trump world outlook embodies the “market power” perspective in
international political economy: It’s the size of your market that matters. In this context,
this dissertation offers an alternative perspective and hope to even the most tradedependent of nations. It argues that when considering trade and regulatory agreements,
market size is only one part of the equation. Institutions matter and can help to mitigate
significant market power asymmetry. Re-negotiation and re-implementation of NAFTA
should be viewed under the lens of this alternative perspective. It would also be useful to
test these insights over a macro-historical context to capture even longer-term causes and
longer-term outcomes than explored herein.
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This perspective could also be tested for different treaty types and different
national institutional contexts. For example, one could test how dynamics differ between
“dualist” systems like Canada and “monist” systems such as the Netherlands, France, and
Spain.382 One might assume that there are few implementation dynamics in some monist
systems; however, there are undoubtedly other related national dynamics to consider
when introducing new complex regulatory measures that reach into domestic life.
Furthermore, as noted, the history of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) suggests that monist systems struggle to uphold direct application for complex
agreements (Jackson 1992, 333-4). Political implementation dynamics would be
particularly interesting (and challenging) to study in the EU where parts of so-called
“mixed agreements” can be provisionally applied under EU jurisdiction, and other parts
require national ratification (and can be held up by sub-national actors who aim to exact
subsequent concessions).
From a theoretical perspective, there is no doubt that future work could also offer
greater specificity on exactly how various perspectives such as market power, historical
institutionalism, and constructivist norms and identities can be combined productively
within a pluralist framework. The question is how can scholars transcend the nomothetic
problem of false precision on one perspective (market power) while avoiding the
ideographic problem of imprecision due to the empirical reality of equifinality? In other
words, when abstracting for theory, how can we find room between the perspective that
“only one factor really matters” and the opposite challenge of an absence of theory where
“everything matters”? The use of necessary and sufficiency relationships is a promising
382

See discussion Chapter 4. In monist systems, treaties can be notionally “directly applied” or
“self-executing” and invoked in law. Implementation provisions are sometimes also used (Jackson 1992;
Halpérin 2014, 174).
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way forward. For example, this dissertation demonstrates that market power is a
necessary but not a sufficient condition for setting an international standard. Similarly, it
found that financial strain is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the
international diffusion of mitigating cost-control institutions. These types of analyses and
insights could be useful to inform the design of future regulatory approaches.
From an empirical perspective, this work suggests that the analysis of trade and
regulatory regimes could be more integrated with respect to time. It is important to
capture trade-offs and policy linkage between issue areas within the same trade
agreement as is typical in the negotiations literature. However, it is equally important to
examine specific issue-areas (e.g. intellectual property and investment) to assess how
institutional history and past policy choices impact the evolution of policy outcomes over
time and over multiple agreements. For example, each issue-area in a trade agreement
(e.g. each negotiation chapter) has its own stakeholders, norms, politics, regulatory
traditions, and historical practices. These factors can be as relevant as specific negotiation
trade-offs made within a single trade deal. Market power is naturally more suited to
analyzing power distribution dynamics and trade-offs made within a single negotiation.
Historical institutionalism is more suited to in depth examination of policy and politics in
a specific regulatory domain and explaining the drivers of state preferences within an
issue-area over time. The present analysis of intellectual property issues over multiple
agreements shows that institutions and institutional feedbacks can be just as significant as
market power, and at times, even more so.
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ANNEX A to Chapter 3
PMPRB Pricing Categories and Associated Tests, effective January 1, 2010383
Category

Definition

Allowable pricing

Breakthrough

A breakthrough drug
product is the first one to
be sold in Canada that
treats effectively a
particular illness or
addresses effectively a
particular indication.

Median International Price Comparison (MIPC) test:
median of the ex-factory prices (the price manufacturers sell
to wholesalers and other customers) of the same strength and
dosage form of the same patented drug product for each
country listed in the Regulations (France, Germany, Italy,
Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United
States)

Substantial
Improvement

A drug product offering
substantial improvement
is one that, relative to
other drug products sold
in Canada, provides
substantial improvement
in therapeutic effects.

The higher of:

A drug product offering
moderate improvement
is one that, relative to
other drug products sold
in Canada, provides
moderate improvement
in therapeutic effects.

The higher of:

Moderate
Improvement

1.
2.

1.

383

A drug product offering
slight or no
improvement is one that,
relative to other drug
products sold in Canada,
provides slight or no
improvement in
therapeutic effects.

Midpoint of:
i.

2.

Slight or No
Improvement

Therapeutic Class Comparison (TCC)- the
highest existing price in the same class; and,
Median International Price Comparison (MIPC)
test: the median international price for that same
product

1.
2.

Top of the TCC test comprised of all drug
products identified by HDAP pursuant to
section C.8.7*and
ii.
MIPC test; and
Top of the TCC test comprised of all drug products
identified by HDAP pursuant to section C.8.7.* If it
is impossible to conduct a TCC test (i.e., unable to
derive comparable dosage regimens or the prices of
the drug products used for comparison purposes
appear to be excessive), then use the MIPC test.
Top of the TCC test comprised of all comparable
drug products identified by HDAP pursuant to
section C.8.9**
In the exceptional cases where HDAP does not
identify any comparable drug products, use the
lower of
i.

the bottom of the TCC test comprised of
all superior drug products identified
by HDAP pursuant to
section C.8.10*** and

PMPRB, “Compendium of Policies, Guidelines and Procedures,” accessed December 20, 2015,
http://www.pmprb-cepmb.gc.ca/view.asp?ccid=492#c61
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3.

ii.
the MIPC test.
If it is impossible to conduct a TCC test (i.e., unable
to derive comparable dosage regimens or the prices
of the drug products used for comparison purposes
appear to be excessive), then use the MIPC test.

*C.8.7 For new patented drug products that represent a moderate therapeutic improvement, HDAP will
identify drug products with the same approved indication or use over which the new patented drug product
represents a moderate therapeutic improvement.
**C.8.9 For new patented drug products that represent slight or no therapeutic improvement, HDAP will
first attempt to identify comparable drug products, based on the primary and secondary factors set out in
section C.6.1, with the same approved indication or use as the new patented drug product under review.
C.6.1 The following factors are to be used in recommending the level of therapeutic improvement of a
drug product:
Primary Factors
• Increased efficacy
• Reduction in incidence or grade of important adverse reactions
Secondary Factors
• Route of administration
• Patient convenience
• Compliance improvements leading to improved therapeutic efficacy
• Caregiver convenience
• Time required to achieve the optimal therapeutic effect
• Duration of usual treatment course
• Success rate
• Percentage of affected population treated effectively
• Disability avoidance/savings
***C.8.10 If no comparable drug products are found, HDAP will identify all drug products that are
considered superior in treating the approved indication or use, based on primary and secondary factors.
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ANNEX B to Chapter 3
Excerpts from Minister Michael Wilson Speeches 1991-1993

Speaking
Engagement
Financial Post
Conference on
North American
Free Trade
Montreal QC,
April 25, 1991
Investment
Dealers
Association,
Whistler BC,
June 17, 1991
Softworld
Trading Forum
and Conference,
Vancouver BC,
September 23,
1991

Quote

Significance

“The Canadian requirement for secure market access and the
need to guard against protectionism led us to negotiate the
[FTA] with the United States…And it has driven our decision
to join…trilateral free trade talks”

Illustration of the
obvious point that US
market access was a
clear Canadian
priority.

“[Foreign Direct Investment] as you know very well, brings
benefits to Canada and its Economy in the form of:
technology transfers; international management expertise;
production know-how and product innovation; creating and
preserving high value-added jobs and export opportunities
“You face all of the problems encountered by technologybased companies. Competition is growing. You need to
finance R&D on a continuing basis. You have a limited
window of opportunity within which to reach the market”

Shows key objectives
of Canada’s
investment strategy
for the knowledgeeconomy
Illustrates the
challenges faced by
knowledge-economy
companies including
high input costs and
limited time to recover
investments (in this
case for software)

University of
Western Ontario
Conference at
Sutton Place
Hotel, London
ON, October 3,
1991

“The FTA has already shown its true colours by mitigating
the domestic impact of a global recession and of world-wide
adjustment trends…The [FTA] dispute mechanism is proving
to be an effective shield for the enhanced market access the
agreement provides.”

Canadian
Luncheon at the
Davos Annual
Meeting
February 1, 1992

“The size of the U.S. market, its proximity, and familiarity,
the continuing position of the U.S. as a world technology
leader – as well as the opportunities provided by Canadian
companies as a result of the Canada-U.S. [FTA]—will mean
that the U.S. will continue to be an important export growth
market. We want to capitalize on FTA-related opportunities
and increase the importance of advanced technology exports
and related investments.”

Shows the centrality
of rule-based trade—
specifically a dispute
resolution
mechanism—to
protecting Canadian
interests when dealing
with a major market
power.
Illustrates the
importance Canada
placed on access to the
U.S. market and
developing its
domestic
pharmaceutical
industry.

Arthur Andersen
Symposium St.
Charles Il, June
2, 1992

Notes for an

“If [Bill C-91 IP changes] sound like an invitation for
pharmaceutical firms…to increase their investment in
Canada, that’s just what it is”
“The GATT was the foundation upon which the Canada-U.S.
Free Trade Agreement (the FTA) was built. Equally it is the
basis for negotiation other trading arrangements, such as the
proposed [NAFTA]. Furthermore, the GATT will provide the
basis for expanding continental trade with the emerging
European Community and the high-growth Asia-Pacific
region.”
“Canada has benefited from the dispute settlement process

Shows how policy
makers view trade
agreements as
cumulative. New
standards build on
previous standards.
Shows how rules-
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Speaking
Engagement
address at the
conclusion of
the North
American Free
Trade
Agreement
August 12, 1992

Wall Street
Journal
Conference,
New York,
September 24,
1992
Binational
Conference on
Trade Disputes:
Settlement
Mechanisms and
Future Prospects
October 20,
1992
Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers
Association of
Canada,
Ottawa ON,
October 30,
1992

Quote

Significance

established in the FTA. We have won a majority of cases.
And now we have negotiated a strengthened dispute
settlement system with safeguards to ensure that the system
runs fairly. The rule of law, not power, will prevail in settling
disputes.”

based trading and
dispute resolution
institutions are
explicitly intended to
mitigate power
factors.

“The NAFTA itself need not be a closed club. Perhaps, too,
this deal will lend some impetus to the worldwide trade
negotiations in the GATT, where Canada has been playing a
leading role”
“Rather than hindering the multilateral process, the NAFTA
should provide an impetus to the successful conclusion of the
Uruguay Round… It will … show other newly industrialized
and developing countries that they, like Mexico, can
successfully enter into freer trading relationships with
developed countries. This is very important to us.”
“The absence of effective dispute settlement procedures [in
NAFTA] would create a situation in which raw economic
power, rather than established rules and procedures, dictate
the outcome of trade disputes.”

NAFTA was seen as
an impetus for
expansion and future
trade diplomacy.
Illustrates the view of
NAFTA as a pumpprimer.

“The introduction of Bill C-91 improves the business
environment for your sector as well as demonstrates the
government’s strong commitment to your industry. Bill C-91
brings Canadian intellectual property practices more in line
with those of other industrialized countries…The
Government of Canada remains committed to early passage
of the bill.”

Reiterates the
centrality of rulebased trade,
specifically, a dispute
resolution mechanism,
to protecting Canadian
interests in dealing
with a major market
power.
Shows a key objective
of government was for
R&D to be distributed
across the country.
The PMPRB is tasked
with tracking this.

“We are also please that a number of these [$500 million new
R&D] investments [are] outside Que & Ont. I hope that as
circumstances warrant, you can broaden this regional spread.”
(Hand Written)
Conference “Les
Grands Enjeux”
Montreal, QC
November 25,
1992

“Two other key factors [in addition to prosperity and
competitiveness] are investment and research and
development… the government introduced Bill C-91 into
Parliament for the purpose of bringing our patent protection
more into line with other countries…
Over the last ten months [major innovative firms] have
announced over $500 million in new R&D investment, in
Canada, contingent upon successful passage of C-91”

An Evening with
Rene Soetens,
Pickering ON,

“A university of Toronto Study….[has] suggested that
Canada have faced an even deeper recession without our
participation in the Free Trade Agreement”

A 4-page “Insert on
C-91” was added to
the speech to address
the high politics of C91.
Typifies how Wilson
leveraged promised
investments by the
pharmaceutical
industry to make the
case for Bill C-91.
Shows how the
argument for NAFTA
was build on the
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Speaking
Engagement
November 25
1992

Quote

“NAFTA covers many services that weren’t covered in the
FTA…”

Talking points
Faxed to
Minister
November 25,
1992 in response
to Canadian
Press wire by
Dennis Bueckert
on opposition to
Bill C-91.

Talking points
Faxed to
Minister
November 25,
1992 (same as
above)

“The FTA, and now the NAFTA, create tremendous
opportunities for Canadian companies…we can build on the
considerable opportunities that having access to a market of
nearly $8 trillion in national income and over 360 million
potential customers”
Talking Point: “[C-91] is good for Canada: more investment
($500 M plus); more high skilled jobs; more research; better
medicines; strong price control; reward for innovation…
Canada has been holding its own, but, if we want investment
we must act now, [Canada is] at a critical juncture…Note
[the] track record of C-22:[drug] prices [increasing] below
[the consumer price index]; investment up; jobs up.”
Minister Wilson additional hand written notes:
“[Canadians] say they want R&D, [Investment], high tech
jobs…But you can’t just wish this…C-91 will help...
Delaying treaties risks [investment]; Should concentrate on
price control regime”
“CP Wire:
New Legislation Threatens thousands of job in [Canadian]
owned industry.
Rebuttal:
Generics said the same thing in 1987—yet they have
continued to grow -- & they can grow under the new regime –
at rates at or above the average growth rate in the pharma
industry. Note brand name have created more jobs since 87
than total employment in generic sector.”

Significance
successes of the FTA.
It aimed to preserve
US market access.

Shows responsible
Minister’s thinking
and that price control
regime was central to
legitimizing increased
patent protection;
illustrates how the
legacy of previous
institutions under C22 1987 was key to
the argument for C-91
1993.
Shows the economic
impact assessment that
was critical to making
the case. Shows
government actively
rebutting generic
industry messages.

“CP Wire:
The legislation will drive drug cost up by $1 [billion] per
year. ‘seniors will be hard hit by the legislation.
Rebuttal:
This is an outrageous lie. The cost will be [$]129 [million]
cumulative [between] 1992 – 1996. – This is $1/per
[Canadian] per year – as compared to $500 m of investment
benefit & the economic effort that will have.”

Building a More
Prosperous
Canada” Speech
December 2,
1992
House of
Commons

Michael Wilson notes: “Who benefits from cures [?] –
seniors.
Who pays [?] – gov’t / taxpayer”
“In entering the NAFTA negations, Canada’s primary
objectives were:
-‐ to secure better access to Mexico;
-‐ to safeguard and improve the gains made in the
FTA; and,
-‐ to guarantee and improve Canada’s position as an
attractive investment location in North America.
It is clear that these objectives have been achieved. The FTA

Links NAFTA
objectives to building
on and protecting
advances made in the
FTA; Provides a clear
articulation of
Canada’s central
objectives, as viewed
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Speaking
Engagement

Notes for an
address by
Michael Wilson,
Third Reading
of Bill C-91
December 10,
1992.
Notes for
Michael Wilson
Speech on Bill
C-91 to Senate
committee
January 21, 1993

Minister’s
Orator for
University of
Toronto
Conference
“Transcending
Boundaries”
January 15, 1993
Speech on Bill
C-91 to the
Senate [Foreign
Relations]
Committee,
January 21, 1993

Quote

Significance

has been good for Canada and the proposed [NAFTA] will
build on that success”
“opponents [of Bill C-91] say that drug prices will soar as a
result of Bill C-91. They won’t. They haven’t in the past and
they won’t in the future. The [Patented Medicines Prices
Review] Board has been given new power over both new and
existing patented drugs. These powers include the ability to
roll back prices, recover excessive revenues, impose fines and
imprison offenders. This Bill has teeth – sharp teeth.”
“Since 1987, when Bill C-22 was passed, the international
community has move significantly in the direction of stronger
patent protection. Canada, the only developed nation with
compulsory licensing of medicines, was becoming more and
more isolated on this issue…Meeting international trade
obligations is one important reason for moving forward with
this legislation… Bill C-91 moves us closer to the
international competition… innovative drug companies have
already announce over $650 million in new investments for
Canadian locations…”

at the highest levels of
government.
Shows how the record
of drug pricing under
the FTA-era
institution was used to
justify further IP
protections and a
strengthened PMPRB.
Companies continued
to increase their
investment
commitments to help
Minister Wilson make
his case for the
completion of Bill
C-91.

[the prices of patented medicines] will continue to be under
the close control of the [PMPRB].”
“there is an accession clause providing for other countries or
groups of countries to join the NAFTA. In this way, the
NAFTA creates an important precedent for trade and
economic co-operation between industrialized countries and
developing countries.”

“Meeting international trade obligations is one important
reason for moving forward with this legislation…Any cost
increases that might occur will be a result of the average
three-year delay of the entry of lower-priced generic products
onto the market. This cost increase has nothing whatsoever to
do with the price of individual patented medicines. These will
continue to be under the close control of the [PMPRB]”

Atco Ltd.
Strategy
Conference,
Phoenix AZ
April 5, 1993

“Canada was one of the first proponents of a world trade
organization, conceived to offer a stronger institutional basis
for international trade policies. Canada is still very positively
disposed to such an institutional framework… Dispute
settlement has also been greatly simplified and improved by
the FTA…Canadian industry has had positive results in more
than half the completed panels to date.”

Senate Foreign

“[Canada] decided that the best way to ensure a prosperous,

Provides a good
example of the pumppriming argument and
how NAFTA was
designed as a
“template” agreement.

Draws an important
distinction between
direct costs associated
with drug pricing and
indirect costs
associated with the
length of effective
patent life. Canadians
would not be paying
more for a given drug.
They would be paying
the same price as
before, but for a
longer period of time.
Shows Canada’s core
interest in rules-based
trade. Policy makers
were aware of how
Canada was
benefitting from
institutionalized
dispute settlement.
Shows the importance
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Speaking
Engagement
Relations
Committee,
Ottawa ON,
May 26, 1993.

Third Reading
Debate on Bill
C-115, The
NAFTA
Implementation
Act, Ottawa ON,
May 27, 1993

Quote

Significance

competitive Canadian economy was through…rule-based
trading regimes, both at the multilateral and regional levels.
The key was to secure our trading relationship with our most
important partner, the United States. And the Free trade
Agreement has accomplished just that.”
“The NAFTA improves upon the FTA
through…comprehensive coverage of intellectual
property...and a strong, improved dispute settlement
mechanism.”
Canadian Businesses gain new intellectual property
protection in the NAFTA…As the Canadian Economy moves
into higher value-added, knowledge-based growth areas, this
protection…will protect our ability to expand into the
NAFTA area”

Canada placed on the
US trading
relationship.
Intellectual property
and dispute settlement
were important
elements of NAFTA.

Shows an important
link and trade-off on
intellectual property.
Enhanced IP
protection would
facilitate Canada’s
access and expansion
into the NAFTA area
market.
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ANNEX B.1 to Chapter 3 & 4
Chronology of Statues, Regulations and Trade Agreements Cited in Chapter

Statues of Canada. 1867. Constitution Act, 30 & 31 Victoria, c 3. (U.K.). Accessed
February 6, 2016, http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/const/FullText.html
Statues of Canada. 1985. Patent Act, R.C.S. c. P-4. Accessed February 6, 2016,
http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/P-4/index.html
Statues of Canada. 1987. “An Act to amend the Patent Act and to provide for certain
matters in relation thereto,” Bill C-22. Canada Gazette Part III, Volume 10, No. 6,
January 26, 1988. Ottawa: Queen’s Printer for Canada.
Government of Canada. 1988. “Patented Medicines Regulations: Regulations Respecting
the Reporting of Information Relating to Medicines and the Extent to Which
Patented Medicines are Invented and Developed in Canada,” SOR/88-474. Canada
Gazette Part II Vol. 122 (22) September 15, 1988. Ottawa: Queen’s Printer for
Canada.
Statutes of Canada. 1988. “An Act to implement the Free Trade Agreement between
Canada and the United States of America” Bill C-65, (assented to December 30,
1988) accessed December 3, 2015, http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/PDF/C-10.6.pdf
Statues of Canada. 1993. “Patent Act Amendment Act, 1982” Bill C-91, (Assented to
February 4, 1993) Canada Gazette Part III, Volume 16, No. 1, May 10, 1993.
Ottawa: Queen’s Printer for Canada.
Statutes of Canada. 1993. “An Act to Implement the North American Free Trade
Agreement” Bill C-115 (Assented to June 23, 1993) Canada Gazette Part III,
Chapter 44, Volume 6 (5a) August 25, 1993. Ottawa: Queen’s Printer for Canada,
accessed December 20, 2015,
http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/databases/canada-gazette/093/001060-119.01e.php?document_id_nbr=11227&image_id_nbr=671562&f=g&PHPSESSID=o6k9t
o9ho1lkgo0iev21fiafb7
Government of Canada. 1993. “Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations:
Regulations Respecting a Notice of Compliance Pertaining to Patented Medicines”
SOR/93-133. Canada Gazette Part II Vol. 127(6), March 12, 1993. Ottawa:
Queen’s Printer for Canada, accessed December 20, 2015,
http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/databases/canada-gazette/093/001060-119.01e.php?document_id_nbr=11024&image_id_nbr=643965&f=p&PHPSESSID=5b1jb
ebrmp8med72ltjkmh5kb2
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 1993. Results of the North American
Free Trade Agreement Negotiations: The Legal Texts. Ottawa: NAFTA Secretariat,
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accessed December 20, 2015, https://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/Home/LegalTexts/North-American-Free-Trade-Agreement?mvid=2.
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations Establishing the World Trade Organization signed at Marrakesh April
15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1143.
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), Annex 1C
of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations Establishing the World
Trade Organization, signed at Marrakesh April 15, 1994 I.L.M. 1143.
Government of Canada. 1994. “Patented Medicines Regulations: Regulations Specifying
the Information to be Provided Related to Patented Medicines and Patentees’
Revenues and Research and Development Expenditures,” SOR/94-688. Canada
Gazette Part II Vol. 128(24), November 1, 1994. Ottawa: Queen’s Printer for
Canada.
Government of Canada. 1998. “Regulations Amending the Patented Medicines (Notice of
Compliance) Regulations,” SOR/98-166 Canada Gazette II, 132(7), March 12,
1998. Ottawa: Queen’s Printer for Canada. Accessed September 5, 2015,
http://publications.gc.ca/gazette/archives/p2/1998/1998-04-01/pdf/g2-13207.pdf
Statutes of Canada. 2001. “An Act to Amend the Patent Act,” Bill S-17. Accessed
September 5, 2015,
http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Language=E&Mode=1
&DocId=2331026&File=16#1
Statues of Ontario. 2006. “Transparent Drug System for Patients Act” Bill 102, Section
11.5 (1) “Rebates etc.,” Accessed December 3, 2015,
http://www.health.gov.on.ca/en/common/legislation/bill102/
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ANNEX C to Chapter 5
Select Chronology of Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation Post-Wellcome (2002):
Patents Held Invalid on Utility Grounds including PM(NOC) Cases
Extracted from “Expert Report of Bruce Levin, PH.D, Professor of Biostatistics,
Columbia University”384
With due consideration of critique from “Second Witness Statement of Marcel
Brisebois”385

Case
Merck & Co. Inc. v. Apotex Inc
Abbott Laboratories v. Canada
(Minister of Health)
Aventis Pharma Inc. v. Apotex Inc

Year and Citation
2005 FC 755
2005 FC 1095

Appeals
-

2005 FC 1283

Abbott Laboratories v. Canada
(Minister of Health)
Pfizer Canada Inc. v. Apotex Inc.

2005 FC 1332

Affirmed by 2006 FCA 64 Leave
to appeal to SCC refused: Aug. 3,
2006
Affirmed by 2007 FCA 153

Eli Lilly Canada Inc. v. Apotex
Inc.

2008 FC 142

Shire Biochem Inc. v. Canada
(Minister of Health)
GlaxoSmithKline Inc. v.
Pharmascience Inc.

2008 FC 538

Affirmed by 2007 FCA 195
Leave to appeal to SCC refused:
Nov. 1, 2007
Affirmed by 2009 FCA 97 Leave
to appeal to SCC refused: Oct. 22,
2009
-

2008 FC 593

-

Eli Lilly Canada Inc. v.
Novopharm Ltd
Sanofi-Aventis Canada Inc. v.
Apotex Inc.

2009 FC 235

-

2009 FC 676

Ratiopharm Inc. v. Pfizer Ltd.

2009 FC 711

Affirmed 2011 FCA 300
Application for leave to appeal to
SCC dismissed (July 12,2012).
Affirmed by 2010 FCA 204

Lundbeck Canada Inc. v.

2009 FC 1102

-

2007 FC 26

384
Bruce Levin, “Expert Report of Bruce Levin, Ph.D; Professor of Biostatistics, Columbia
University” September 7, 2015 Case No. UNCT/14/2, accessed August 2, 2016,
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw4376.pdf
385
Marcel Brisebois, “Second Witness Statement of Marcel Brisebois” December 7, 2015, Case
No. UNCT/14/2, accessed August 2, 2016,
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC7
237_En&caseId=C3544
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Case
Ratiopharm Inc
Sanofi-Aventis Canada Inc. v.
Ratiopharm Inc.
Pfizer Canada Inc. v. Ratiopharm
Inc
AstraZeneca Canada Inc. v.
Apotex Inc.
Novopharm Ltd. v. Eli Lilly and
Co.

Year and Citation

Appeals

2010 FC 230

-

2010 FC 612

-

2010 FC 714

-

2010 FC 915

Eli Lilly Canada Inc. v.
Novopharm Ltd.

2011 FC 1288

AstraZeneca Canada Inc. v.
Phamascience Inc.

2012 FC 1189

Pfizer Canada Inc. v.
Pharmascience Inc

2013 FC 120

Affirmed 2011 FCA 220 Leave to
appeal to SCC refused: Dec 8,
2011
Affirmed 2012 FCA 232 (see
also: 2009 FC 1018, reversed and
remanded 2010 FCA 197) Leave
to appeal to SCC refused (May
16, 2013).
FCA reversed trial judge (2014
FCA 133), finding inutility
allegation justified
-

Novartis Pharmaceuticals Canada
Inc. v. Teva Canada Ltd.
Alcon Canada Inc. v. Cobalt
Pharmaceuticals Company
AstraZeneca Canada Inc v Apotex
Inc
Les Laboratories Servier v. Apotex
Inc.

2013 FC 283

Affirmed 2013 FCA 244

2014 FC 149

-

2014 FC 638

Appeal unsuccessful: 2015 FCA
158
-

Eli Lilly Canada Inc. v. Mylan
Pharmaceuticals ULC
Gilead Sciences, Inc. v. Idenix
Pharmaceuticals Inc., *
Eli Lilly Canada Inc. v. Hospira
Healthcare Corporation *
Allergan Inc. v. Apotex Inc.*

2015 FC 125

2015 FC 108

2015 FC 1156

Notice of Appeal filed (A-12015)
-

2016 FC 47

-

2016 FC 344

-

*More recent cases not covered in Bruce Levin report.
FC – Federal Court; FCA - Federal Court of Appeal; SCC – Supreme Court of Canada
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ANNEX C.1 to Chapter 5
Patents Held Invalid on Utility Grounds 1980-2015: Pharmaceutical vs. NonPharmaceutical Cases
Extracted from “Expert Report of Bruce Levin, PH.D, Professor of Biostatistics,
Columbia University” With due consideration of critique from “Second Witness
Statement of Marcel Brisebois”
Patent Cases in the Pre-2005 Period
Involving a Decided Challenge on
Grounds of Utility
Patent
Patent Total % of
found
found
all
invalid
valid
invalid
on
on
on
utility
utility
utility
grounds grounds
grounds
***
Pharmaceutical
0
3
3
0%
Non2
22
24
100%
pharmaceutical
Total
2
25
27

Patent Cases in the Post-2005
Period Involving a Decided
Challenge on Grounds of Utility
Patent
Patent Total % of
found
found
all
invalid
valid
invalid
on
on
on
utility
utility
utility
grounds grounds
grounds
***
24*
39*
63
100%
0
6**
6**
0%
24*

45*

69**

*According to Levin’s chart (above) these figures appear to be misstated and should read 24
pharmaceutical cases invalid and 39 pharmaceutical cases valid in the post-2005 period. Per Brisebois’
identification, one pharmaceutical case from 2014 was missing. However, this was a duplicate PM(NOC)
ruling and this matter had already been litigated by another company with the patent upheld and thus was
already counted by Levin. As such, the chart has not been amended to reflect Brisebois’ recommendation
on this case.
**According to Brisebois one non-pharmaceutical case should also be removed from analysis versus
Levin’s original 8. This recommendation is reflected above. Brisebois also argues that there was in fact one
invalidation of a non-Pharmaceutical patent post-2015. However, this requires double counting as the case
involved many different patent claims some of which were held invalid but others held valid. Given that the
result of litigation did provide market exclusivity on those claims upheld, it does not seem appropriate to
include it as an invalidated patent. While this likely should be counted as ‘valid’, as a compromise between
Brisebois and Levin, rather than double counting, this case has similarly been removed from the analysis
yielding 6 total for non-pharmaceutical cases held valid. The case in question is Eurocopter v. Bell
Helicopter Textron Canada Ltee, 2013 FCA 219.
***Column added by Author: Not included in Levin’s analysis
Note: Given some controversy about included cases the present analysis does not comment on the question
of statistical significance that Levin finds between utility-based invalidity rates for pharmaceutical and nonpharmaceutical patents. The chart is primarily provided in annex for illustration rather than statistical
purposes and has not been updated to include at least 3 additional 2015-16 pharmaceuticals patents held
invalid, and 2 pharmaceutical patents held valid since Levin’s analysis. It should be noted that the increase
in pharmaceutical utility litigation is itself an important outcome even if those challenges are not always
successful. As such, the present analysis gives little weight to the value of the denominator, instead
privileging the chronology of actual invalidation rulings. Perhaps a more interesting comparison is the
percentage of invalidity rulings between pharmaceutical and non-pharmaceutical patents (highlighted in
bold). On balance, there is more than enough evidence to suggest a meaningful constraint on patentable
utility in Canada.
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